Re-imagining Political Communities in the Mediterranean: Peoples, Nations, and Empires in the Age of Democratic Revolution

Project workshop, 'Re-imagining Democracy in Europe and the Americas c1750-c1860' European Institute, Columbia University, New York, September 13-14 2013

Those present more than transiently were: Andrew Arsan, Lauren Benton, Neda Bolourchi, Linda Colley, Margaret Crosby-Arnold, John Davis, Victoria de Grazia, Michael Drolet, Tom Ertman. K.E.(Katy) Fleming, Antonis Hadjikyriacou, Joanna Innes, Maurizio Isabella, Daphne Lappa, Viviana Mellone, Gabriel Paquette, Christine Philliou, Mark Philp, Eduardo Posada Carbo, Anna Maria Rao, Riccardo Rosolino, Andrew Robertson, Pablo Sánchez León, Juan Luis Simal, Michail Sotiropulos, Nadia Urbinati, Konstantina Zanou

Session 1: Introduction to the project and the workshop

Joanna Innes

Welcomed those present and thanked those who had made the occasion possible. She then introduced the project, concluding "you may be asking yourselves, what do they mean by Re-imagining Democracy – and if the project is about democracy, why is the theme of this meeting so general: why is it about 're-imagining political communities'?"

The text of the remainder of the introduction follows:

Mark Philp

The reason we haven't asked you all to talk about democracy as such, though that's our core interest, is because if we do that, we think we risk premature closure. The tendency is for everyone to bring to the discussion their own ideas about what democracy is or should be, and then to discuss what went on in Europe 200 years or so ago in that light. The essence of our project is that we don't want to start with what *we* think about democracy. We want to start with what *they* thought about democracy. And they (actually not totally unlike us, when you start looking into it) thought an enormous range of contradictory, and sometimes quite vague and confused things about democracy. If anything the range of their discussions was wider than ours, though. There was no consensus that democracy was a good thing; indeed for much of our period the prevailing view was that it was a bad thing. And there was no consensus about how, or even whether, democracy could in fact be a stable institutional form in the modern world. From the viewpoint of 1860, looking at what had happened to the French Second Democratic Republic, and indeed what was happening over the Atlantic in the United States, there wasn't in fact much basis for confidence for thinking that, if that was what democracy was, it had much to recommend it.**?**

Why '*re-imagining* democracy'? Across Europe and the Americas educated people were familiar from the start of our period with the concept of democracy. It was a concept primarily associated with the ancient world, with Greece and republican Rome. It was from those experiences that many negative images of democracy came. Democracy was broadly understood to mean regarding everyone as equal, or everyone as equally entitled to govern, or, in its most perverse form, as the special right of the non-elite to govern - or mob rule! Since the ancient world blurred politics and society, the term referred both to the nature of decision making and the social order with which it was intimately connected. If the modern

tendency is to think that democracy means elections; the classical sense related more about an order in which equality held sway – in which, as Aristotle put it, those who are equal in one respect think they should be equal in all respects. Both its Classical critics and the learned audience informed by these critics understood democracy to be populist, bellicose, turbulent and unstable: prone to give rise to tyranny of the mob, or tyranny by demagogues who played to the mob, or of strong men rose because they could master the mob.

The term was not used exclusively in the ancient context. Democracy was embraced as a component part of systems of mixed government and the balance of powers; it was also used to vilify a wide range of positions; and, very occasionally it was used slightly more positively – particularly inasmuch as it was contrasted with aristocracy. The name was applied to Holland (more in the seventeenth than in the eighteenth century) and to some Swiss cantons; by the later eighteenth century it was reckoned that a battle between aristocratic and democratic forces was underway in both republics. The newly independent American states were thought of as democracies (although for many with an expectation that they would develop into more hierarchical orders – since democracy was seen by many as primitive); Nonetheless, small city states remained the predominant cases of democracy, and the term was seen as having little relevance for the successful commercial states and empires of the Atlantic world. As such, it was not clear that it was a very important concept for understanding the emerging modern world.

It was not a major feature of the American Revolution, although there is a recent historiography that argues for the increasing salience of the term and its claims to equality in the immediate, post-revolutionary period in America, with the Federalist Papers being seen as a reaction against these more egalitarian and participatory demands. And this conflict, although smoothed over in 1787-9 reappeared in a number of respects with the rise of democratic, and democratic-republican societies in America, in 1792-4, in response to events in France. After a period of intense anti-democratic propaganda at the end of the decade, the election of Jefferson in 1800 as head of a carefully moderated Democratic party did much to lay to rest the most virulent conflict over democracy in America – the term became an accepted part of the lexicon of American politics, a party label, with a relatively low level of ideological content, although gradually infiltrating the system, culminating in Andrew Jackson's election in 1830. America came to be widely viewed as a democratic society by both domestic and foreign observers, – one in which there was broad equalisation of condition, signified by the introduction of white manhood suffrage (especially from 1820), and by the rise of party politics.

American democracy, however, held little attraction for many European thinkers, who thought that their older societies required more complex forms of government. With the French Revolution, however, democracy did come to play a more central role in European political debate and rhetoric – initially largely negatively, with democrats being seen as those who would destroy a society of orders and insist on equality, eradicating the possibility for a British-type mixed government solution. In a standard rhetorical move, some besmirched by the term subsequently came to embrace it, fashioning themselves as egalitarian citizens of a republic of discourse and conversable sociability, sometimes also aspiring to create a more egalitarian and responsive political order expressing the will of its sovereign people.

The associations forged in the public mind between the mobilized people, democracy and the Terror, and the subsequent collapse of the republic into Bonaparte's dictatorship, served only to confirm the classical analysis of democracy as the gateway to the abyss. The negative connotations of the term were dramatically re-emphasised, not only in France, but also in Britain (and briefly in America). When the term re-emerged as a term of art in France, it was

in the hands of the Doctrinaires, whose reflections on history, the revolution and the condition of France led them to believe that the pressure for equality might well be part of what was distinctive about the modern world. However, even if modern societies might be democratic in character, that left open the question of what political forms could be devised to manage them in ways that would prevent the worst effects associated with it in the classical world, and experienced in dramatic fashion between 1792-94.

More broadly in Europe, the will to take up the terminology of democracy and to use it to think through possibilities in the present was slow to develop. Democracy was sometimes presented as a counter-balance to autocracy and despotism; but it might equally be seen is despotism's calling-card. Democracy as a positive aspiration revived only gradually – and as it did so its content changed. It was not a major component of the European revolutions of 1820s or 30s; but was much more of a presence in the 1840s. In Britain and probably France at that point the term entered the popular vernacular, but it remains unclear how far or how widely that was true elsewhere in Europe.

The term's content is more difficult to describe, in part because, as we argued in the first book, meanings were more divergent the 1850s than they had been earlier or would be later. In France, from the Restoration, democracy meant primarily equality; despite strictly limited voting rights, French society was said to be democratic because privilege had been abolished; when the second republic was called a 'democratic republic' that did not primarily mean that all men got the vote, but rather that, along with much else, political opportunities were equally shared. This in turn generated debate over whether the quest for equality should extend to social sphere. Equal political participation was not central to the French definition of democracy – but more an issue raised by it. In Britain, democracy became a short-hand for demands for universal manhood franchise in the elections to the House of Commons, though the term also connoted equality, especially equality of opportunity. In Ireland, it referred primarily to the mobilisation of rural population to demand (especially Catholic) rights. In the US it referred to a whole cluster of elective institutions, but also to a particular political party: and this latter fact made the term more easily usable by some than by others: for example, Lincoln did not use it.

It is also important to emphasise the diversity of practices. The association of democracy with elections developed slowly, and it was rarely an exclusive association; in Ireland it was more linked to with mass meetings; in France, it was connected with plebiscites (yes/no votes) rather than with more active models of choice. And when elections were held to choose representatives or officeholders, they were extremely diverse in form. They might be direct or indirect; the airing of political philosophies and acknowledgments of partisanship might be encouraged or discouraged; and the nature of candidacy varied widely across the period and across these states. Moreover, one election might focus on one choice or a whole string of different choices. And in making these choices, and adopting these forms and practices, there was little sense that people were making them using a concept of democracy as the critical criterion – for example, as to whether something was 'more' or 'really' democratic, in contrast to something else; or in terms of whether something was democratic or undemocratic. That is, even when the language was beginning to come into use in this context, it was often not highly developed or conceptually precise. The term remained for many a fighting word – challenging the 'aristocratic', but not signifying a precise set of institutions of practices so much as a cluster of ideas of equality, the people, and the responsiveness of government and law to those ruled by them. When Marx referred to democracy as 'the resolved mystery of all constitutions', he was drawing attention to a point that Hume had made 100 years before – that it is 'on *opinion* only that government is founded'!

So, across all four of the states we considered, the idea that government has some responsibility to those it governs only slowly became associated with the term democracy; and the process by which term became associated with particular practices and institutions was even slower – and each of these developments were profoundly shaped by particular national contexts.

There is a historical tradition identifying 1750-1850 as a key point in the emergence of democratic politics. On our reading, things are not quite so clear. It was in this period that the term migrated in some places from being a learned term to becoming a vernacular one, and in the course of that move it became entangled with a broader array of political terms, including republicanism, popular sovereignty, socialism, and liberalism -- all bearing testimony to changing relationships between the people and their states. The renegotiation of relationships of authority and power was undertaken through these changes – a process that was rarely 'idea-driven' but more inter-active, multi-directional and fluctuating..

Seen in this way it should be clear why we do not want to focus wholly on the history of the word or the idea, or even the concept. Rather, for us the word is more like a loose end which we can pull to unravel a deeper social and intellectual history of the ordering of power and authority, compliance and revolution, in this period, and across the rapidly changing world of Europe and the Americas. The value of studying the history of a term with so many and various applications, which is not securely instantiated in political practice, is that it opens new perspectives on the period, bridging the concerns of social, political, conceptual and intellectual history. It also offers us a way of standing back from our own world of democratic states, allowing us to ask what other futures our pasts might have allowed us to develop, and encouraging us not to see our present conception of democracy as the natural telos of modernity.

Of course, this kind of work does pose methodological problems: in the countries we studied in the first collection there is a consistent difficulty in being able to say what is 'in' or 'out' as a feature of the re-imagining of democracy. Was, for example, the reform movement in Britain in the 1790s a democratic phenomenon? Might not the Loyalist movement of the same period also be classified as such? Clearly, the latter was anti-democratic in principle, but its practices involved new forms of participation and representation, that were often as innovative as those used by radicals. But the way we have responded to these difficulties in the past – which I think is the right response – is just to avoid dogmatism: if we think in broad terms of the project of studying the process of 'Re-imagining democracy' as involving an attempt to pull together work in conceptual, intellectual, political and social history, to chart the changing ways in which people thought about, reacted to, sought to institutionalize, and innovated in practice, in ways that bore upon the relationship between the people and those who rule or aspire to rule, it doesn't matter much that very diverse things were sometimes called democratic: each usage just takes us to a different point within the larger picture.

Innes

What are our intentions in taking 'the Mediterranean' as the focus for the second stage of our enquiry into certain elements of the re-imagining of political communities, elements that attached weight to the voice of the people? And what problems and questions do we want to encourage you to focus on over the next couple of days?

The Mediterranean is, first of all, a collection of places that have in common that they're not the north Atlantic places we studied earlier. Our first aim is to take the theme of diversity that ran through our first book and to take it further, further enhancing our story of diversity. It

seems to us that political traditions even just across southern Europe differed significantly: the mixed monarchy or pactist traditions of Spain and Portugal, revived in the early nineteenth century, differed from the republican and absolutist traditions of Italy, while independent Greece had to invent a political system more or less from scratch, or possibly incorporating elements of Ottoman-era community self-government. In what ways the experiences of different Mediterranean regions were – in these and other respects -- like and unlike eachother, and like and unlike those of north Atlantic states is an open, empirical question, one that we have some hypotheses but not predetermined views about.

The fact that we looked at the north Atlantic first and now at the Mediterranean doesn't mean that we think America or France or Britain invented democracy and Mediterranean polities then received it. We're broadly committed (because we think this fits the facts) to a non-diffusionist account, in which every place re-imagines democracy in its own way. In southern Europe, the idea of democracy was around and had its own local histories long before the French Revolution. The French Revolution did much to put the word into currency, and provided an important reference point for discussions both positive and negative. But people in every place had their own problems to solve and their own set of resources, local and borrowed, to use in solving them: nobody *just* copied anyone else –



Proportion of Google Books texts mentioning equivalents of 'democracy' 1700-1900 (★= 0.002%): French, Spanish and Italian patterns compared

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as this image showing varying timings in the incidence of writing about democracy suggests. The French revolutionary peak in France made little impression in Spain, but was echoed on a lesser scale in Italy. Spanish use first grew around the time of anti-Napoleonic rallying around the Cadiz constitution (1812), then again at the time of the constitutionalist trienio

(1820-3), in the 1850s, and then in what historians now call the sexenio democratic (1868-74). By contrast, in Italy, democracy did not recover from its post French revolutionary slump until 1848, but then peaked sharply. Unfortunately Google ngrams don't deal with Greek texts, and we're not yet clear about patterns of Greek usage, but there as elsewhere the word initially seems to have had negative connotations – Greek Orthodox churchmen associated democracy with paganism and unruliness. The fact that the same word was used to cover the spectrum elsewhere covered by both 'democracy' and 'republic' complicates analysis of its subsequent development.

The case of the Ottoman and Arab world is different, because the concept of democracy didn't have a continuous history there – terms were invented to enable medieval discussions of Aristotle, but they then dropped out of use. For most of our period, not only were the same Ottoman/Arabic words used to translate 'republic' and 'democracy', but also this word figured in translations only, in describing foreign ways: it had no currency within local political culture. But as Ottoman and Arab writers tried to make sense of the kinds of ideas, events and practices that Europeans discussed in terms of democracy, they drew on practices and experiences of their own, and saw particular local applications for European political concerns. So representative assemblies were recurrently portrayed as equivalents to tribal councils; the project of holding rulers to account by law was welcomed as equivalent to an Islamic aspiration; and equality was seen as particularly interesting in its application to religious difference. By 1830, some local commentators were finding their own uses for European political theories, turning natural-rights talk back against the French, querying what they were doing in Algeria.

So, the Mediterranean is in part shorthand for 'another set of disparate places'. Can we make more of it than that? Is there anything to be gained from considering the Mediterranean as a region? In our southern European meetings this year, this proved to be the most controversial of the topics we broached. To our surprise, the Portuguese, who don't even have a Mediterranean coast, proved to be far and away the most relaxed about the notion that they were Mediterranean. Everyone else took exception to it. In Spain, someone suggested that the Mediterranean was an 'orientalist' concept, and we see the force of that: we see that it <u>could be</u> that kind of concept.

Moreover, even if there's <u>some</u> merit in considering the Mediterranean as a region, it's clear that this was not the only and wasn't necessarily the most important region in which the places we're studying figured. For Spain and Portugal, links across the south Atlantic were very important. For north Africa, links southward, to west Africa; from Egypt, to the Sudan and the Hijaz; for Turkey and the Middle East, eastwards to Iraq; for Greece, towards the Balkans. And for all these places, and Italy too, what we've taken to calling for convenience the 'northern powers' (Britain, France, Austria, and Russia) were very important: positively, as cultural models, negatively, as powers to be contended with. In fact, all of these 'northern powers' were also Mediterranean powers in their own right: France had a Mediterranean coast – two, once she took over Algeria from 1830; Austria had Trieste as an outlet to the Mediterranean, and in the second part of our period a more extended Adriatic coast; Britain had Mediterranean islands: Gibraltar, for a period Minorca, then latterly Malta and the Ionian islands. Russia from the 1780s gained access to the Mediterranean through the Black Sea. So arguably a full definition of Mediterranean polities would include all these powers. In any case, it would be crazy to restrict the relationships we investigate to the Mediterranean only: that wouldn't be an aid to understanding, and we won't do it.

But we think there is *something* to be gained from considering the Mediterranean as a region in our time period, and that's one proposition we want to test over the next couple of days.

The main point here, we think is geo-political. The French Revolution and Napoleon between them exposed the weakness of Mediterranean powers: as revolutionary generals invaded Italy, Egypt, and briefly Syria, and Napoleon consolidated French power over Italy, and struggled to achieve hegemony in Spain – at the same time that Russia continued her advance southwards and Russians and Greeks extended their mutual accommodation. The end of the wars saw the northern powers (Britain, France, Austria, Russia) – the 'great powers' as they were increasingly termed -- assert their right to shape the future of the region. Most Mediterranean polities at some point in the nineteenth century struggled to maintain effective sovereignty even over their own territories One thing we hope to explore over the next couple of days is how far this common predicament provides a useful framework for an investigation of the region. One of its merits as a framework is, we think, that it disrupts a historiographically entrenched habit of contrasting the Ottoman and Arab world with what is called 'Europe', but meaning essentially Britain and France. Spain, Portugal and Italy were 'Europe' too, but in our period they faced challenges that were not totally different from the ones the Ottomans faced, even if they faced them with rather different cultural and political resources.

There were two sets of years in our period when the Mediterranean appeared to be above all where the action was. One of these was the post-Napoleonic period: 1815 through the 1820s. In September 1817, a young Birmingham Dissenter, Matthew Davenport Hill, recorded in his diary some account of a presentation he had made on the virtue of 'reform' to a debating society that he had set up with his friends. He wrote: 'Subject this evening – On political reformation – I considered *first* the propriety of reform from the continual mutations of nature which argue the propriety of change – how water becomes putrid by stagnation – *2nd* from the imperfection of present establishments *3rd* the dangers of reform – comparison of the northern & southern nations of Europe Southern nations more open to reform than northern ...' It's particularly interesting that this young, provincial English dissenter saw things in this way because this was <u>before</u> a wave of revolutions broke out across southern Europe, in 1820– though certainly there had been earlier uprisings and conspiracies, notably in Portugal, Italy and Serbia. Hill's sense that the south represented a zone of political opportunity was certainly shared by other Britons of the era, for example by the Bentham circle and also the younger generation of the so-called Romantic poets (the following year, 1818, saw the publication of Shelley's 'Revolt of Islam': an epic if highly idiosyncratic dream of revolution within the Muslim world). These were years of political tension in northern Europe too – with mass petitioning movements (and an attempt to blow up the cabinet) in Britain, secret-society activity in France and student radicalism in Germany. But it was in southern Europe that, in 1820 above all, existing regimes were seriously challenged, even overthrown. Why was that? The causes seem various, but perhaps at the same time there <u>was</u> something of a common predicament, particularly large elements of local elites being dissatisfied with the post-Napoleonic order. Or maybe established governments in the region were less able, in part for resource and organisational reasons, to put trouble down.

The 1850s was another decade in which post revolutionary settlement – political restabilisation in the wake of 1848 revolutions – left the Mediterreanean region in the position of continuingly unstable frontier. Again, there was no single story. In Portugal, this was, finally, an era of stabilisations: the so-called Regeneration, *Regeneracao*; relative political harmony provided the context for a revision of the constitution which provided for direct elections and widened voting rights. In Spain, the 'progressive biennio' of 1854-6 -- which brought Espartero back to power, and provided a context in which the recently founded Democratic party emerged from the shadows – by contrast proved merely another episode in a long history of domestic conflict. In the eastern Mediterranean, division and

turmoil within the Ottoman empire affected several regions. Russia decided this was a good moment to advance her claims; Britain and France decided this was a good moment to take Russia on – and so began the Crimean War a war which brought the British and French (including some French North-African-Muslim soldiers) into alliance with the Ottomans against the Russians – meanwhile offering the Greeks a chance to try to press their own expansionist ambitions. The war set off a train of consequences. Russia's defeat left her unwilling to support her former ally Austria's position in northern Italy, and that opened the way for Piedmont (which had belatedly supported the Franco-British axis) to establish itself at the heart of a unified Italy: a new power thus emerged in the Mediterranean. This heartened liberals, though Spanish radicals and Greek irredentists looked above all to Garibaldi's southern Italian insurgency for inspiration. Peace terms required further reforms within the Ottoman empire – echoed with local variations in the semi-autonomous state of Tunisia, where a 'Fundamental Pact', promulgated in 1857, a kind of declaration of rights, was followed by what's sometimes called the first Muslim constitution, in 1861 (though some elements of it echoed laws contemporaneously promulgated in other Ottoman provinces).

In any case, those look like two periods when the political future of the Mediterranean region seemed distinctively open, and some interconnections were evident.

Another theme we think worth exploring, loosely linked to the geo-political theme, is the theme of 'regeneration': the idea that, in a longer historical perspective, this was a period of weakness for Mediterranean polities, from which they needed to emerge. The Mediterranean had been the site of great civilisations: Egyptian, Greek, Roman, Byzantine, Islamic, indeed into the modern period: Venetian, Ottoman, Portuguese, Spanish. But in our period, all these powers suffered territorial depletions, and were in relative decline. In the idiom of the time, they didn't seem to be advancing in 'civilisation' as rapidly as were, notably, Britain and France (though note that the first article of the French 1848 constitution claimed that the object of establishing France as republic was to advance it along the path of civilisation: becoming more civilised was widely identified as challenging work in progress).

The sense that in this context one was lagging behind was not uniquely Mediterranean, but this did provide a common theme in discussions across the region, and, we suggest, an important context for debate about political options. So, contemporaries considered such issues as: Were local political arrangements, diverse as they were, in some sense a symptom, or indeed a cause of backwardness? What, if any, political choices had the potential to bring regeneration, advance in civilisation, in their train? Was popular insurgency a symptom of barbarism, or of new growth? What needed to be done to make the peoples of the region fit for the modern world? The problem of decadence had already been diagnosed across the region already in the eighteenth century, and had then stimulated the production of a variety of 'reform' discourses and initiatives; one might see the constitutional reform movements of the early and mid nineteenth century as existing in a continuum with those earlier efforts (as Gabriel Paquette has recently argued it is fruitful to do in the case of Portugal). The quest for regeneration extended into the Ottoman world too, and recent historiography has emphasised the significance of the local dynamic. In the Balkans and the Middle East, and indeed in the Ottoman heartland, we find British, French, Austrians and Russians simultaneously striving to impose their own visions of modernity; but that was much less the case in Egypt, where (in the early and mid nineteenth century) Mehmet Ali, his successors and allies themselves largely decided what they did and didn't want to take from Europe. In Tunisia, leading minister Khayr-al Din had his own ideas about what was needed in terms of a programme of regeneration (whereas, in sharp contrast, the Algerians were given little chance by ther French colonial masters to work out their own destiny).

We don't think developments in this region in this period are *in general* best understood in terms of the rise of 'nationalism', though what was done with the idea of the 'nation', and with ideas of belonging and identity is certainly something we'll want to discuss. The Mediterranean remained a region of empires: Spain and Portugal retained extra-European empires, if reduced ones. France and Britain both maintained an imperial presence in the Mediterranean. Greece and Italy had barely formed as nation states before they began to manifest imperial ambitions of their own; a reformed Egypt conquered Syria. Many people throughout our period lived under layered systems of rule, if by no means always the same ones at start and end. Perhaps one reason for accepting this was military: go it alone and you needed your own army, with associated costs. Self-rule was seen as compatible with acceptance of someone else's overlordship; indeed, *often* what was in question was some form of self-rule within larger, layered systems – such as Europe has returned to more recently. Constitutions could be drafted, or organic laws promulgated, in relation to sub-units within a hierarchical system – thus in Britain's Ionian islands in 1817, or in Tunisia in 1861. It's worth remembering that one of the big political debates of the mid nineteenth century was about the relative advantages of unitary rule and federalism: about the extent to which and ways in which power might be shared between different levels in a political community.

So that's three themes that we expect to emerge in our discussions– and we'll try to make sure they do: geo-politics; regeneration – or debates about what it took to be modern, and the co-existence (in many cases the relatively peaceful co-existence) of interest in nations as forms of human community existing <u>within</u> imperial or other complex structures of rule.

And, to complement those three themes, here are three questions on which I hope our discussions might shed some light:

First: How did political identities change over time? One name used across southern Europe in the early nineteenth century was 'patriot'. That was a name that had gained favour and diverse connotations in the late enlightenment. How did its meaning change over the period – from the eighteenth into the early nineteenth century and from the early nineteenth century to mid century? Did Mediterranean patriots conceive of their causes as complementary or competitive? (certainly this varies by time and place: there were recurrent stark tensions between Spanish and Portuguese patriotism). Enthusiasm for 'liberal' causes burgeoned in the early nineteenth century. What are the merits and limitations of Maurizio Isabella's suggestion that there was a 'liberal international' extending across and beyond southern Europe – especially into France and Britain? How did the establishment of liberal regimes in the 1830s in France, Britain, Spain and Portugal change liberalism itself and perceptions of liberalism? When did being a 'democrat' become a partisan identity? Florencia Peyrou (who has a new young baby, so unfortunately can't be with us today) suggests in her current research that a European democratic international took shape in the 1830s and 40s, forming its own public in part by exploiting opportunities presented by the developing public sphere: opportunities that had not existed in the same way in the 1810s and 20s, the era of conspiratorial societies.

Second: how did people's perceptions both of what problems they had to solve and what options they had to choose between in solving them change over time? What did people who wanted change identify as <u>wrong</u> with the way that power was exercised? Did expectations of the state change -- and was the state in fact a different kind of entity by the end of the period? What did people at the time think about how church and state should relate? About how church and society should relate? Did they think that there should be free choice in religion? Should there be a religious market place – if so, how was it appropriate to hawk faiths within it? How much and in what ways did people talk about sovereignty? Did they equate or

distinguish between national sovereignty and popular sovereignty? How did people understand the relation between (to use a formulation from American revolutionary historiography) the struggle for home rule and the struggle for rule at home?

Third: Did ideas about how to exert pressure on the powers that be change – or perhaps, vary over time, without changing in any single direction? Did ideas about what could be expected from the use of military force change? Did ideas about how to organise a revolution, and what could be expected to result from one? How did the repertoire of devices that could be employed within civil society to affect government change over time? How did conventions of protest change? Were there important changes in the use made of petitioning? How did practices of voting change over the period: in terms of who got to vote for what? In terms of how the act of voting was constructed, for voters and others? How did constitutions figure in political culture: how widely, and why were they desired? What range of people participated, and in what ways, in discussions about what forms constitutions might take? When constitutions existed, did they of themselves constitute a political resource? And what lessons did people draw from looking at eachother's experience?

Philp

Let's finish by looking ahead to what will unfold over the next two days. As Jo has said, we want *both* to explore diversity within the region, indeed to use comparison to highlight diversity, *and* to consider common experiences, esp experiences arising from the geo-political context and responses to these. We'll start today, Friday, with an emphasis on the regional and intra-regional, and then shift in the course of Saturday to explore particular local experiences in more detail.

To start with, we're going to be particularly interested in questions like, how did contemporaries conceive of challenges facing the region? And how did different political entities interrelate? How did jostling for power within this space shape options and experiences, both for polities and for individuals? How did these things shape meanings attributed to sovereignty, self-government, liberty, rights, nationality?

Insofar as individuals and groups within the region sought to develop contacts elsewhere in the region, or physically relocated themselves, we're going to be interested in what they thought they were doing in doing this – and indeed also in what things beyond their consciousness may have informed their choices. To what extent did people think they shared a common predicament? If they did, who else did they perceive as sharing in it: to what community did they see themselves as belonging (certainly not necessarily a regional one) How were the contacts they developed and the choices they made shaped by various forms of bond and network operating within and beyond the region: by cultural geographies, that were themselves shaped by economic and political and religious geographies? How did these geographies develop over time, and to what extent were they shaped, intentionally or otherwise, by political developments?

Our intention is that presentations should be short; only half your time will be spent listening to presentations; for the other half of the time, we'll have general discussion. Though in discussion you may of course want to test or challenge what particular speakers have said, our main object in discussion, as in this workshop as a whole, is to try to advance collective understanding of what happened in this region in this time frame, and how we can best interpret that. We look forward to your contributions.

The questioning were opened by **Margaret Crosby Arnold** who suggested that French debates on the status of persons and people of colour between 1794 and 18 infused discussion

of political change. They introduced the concept of race, and the ordering of populations on the basis of race, into western discourse in particular in relation to naturalisation law. From this emerged racialised ideas of the nation state.

Tom Ertman pointed to the importance of anti-corruption discourses aimed at patronage and clientage in developing opposition movements in the 19th century.
Joanna Innes distinguished between two forms of corruption one relating to electoral issues and the other relating to financial management. The first was specific to countries where elections helped to determine who governed; the other more general.

Pablo Sanchez Leon asked why this meeting was so centred on geopolitical issues
Maurizio Isabella said the scholarship had too often ignored this dimension. People at the time saw the Mediterranean as an important arena.
Innes underlined that, though this had been identified as a key theme for this particular conference, it was only one among other themes up for discussion. What was up for discussion was the hypothesis that coping with overweening great powers was a significant and common concern across the Mediterranean in this period.
Konstantina Zanou argued that issues in the region might have a geopolitical dimension without that dimension being Mediterranean: thus in the case of the Ionian islands.
Isabella agreed: what was proposed was the geopolitics was important to Mediterranean states, not that that geopolitics was itself purely Mediterranean. Mediterranean states did not always experience themselves as sharing a common predicament, but might stand in positions of enmity to eachother. The period saw the development of an orientalist discourse which posited fissures within the region.
Andrew Arsan also wanted to emphasise the more than Mediterranean ramifications of events. Thus the Greek revolution might be seen as touching off a train of events which affected Poland in 1830 and Ireland and indeed India.
Antonis Hadjikyriacou said that the common predicament was that of being subject to 'northern' European imperialism and colonialism, which was a more broadly shared experience. Orientalist discourses operated and were combated across this broader terrain.
Lauren Benton suggested an amendment to the list of themes proposed: starting with political identities she thought was often unhelpful: apparently shared identities had different meanings in different places.. Also there are many other 'political' communities of significance not defined geopolitically: religious communities, federations, port cities.
Crosby-Arnold referred to Braudel's distinction between the true Mediterranean and the greater Mediterranean in which the true Mediterranean's influence was felt. German and Russian influence were important in the region. Moreover rivers linked the Mediterranean to other parts of Europe.
She also pointed to the danger of reifying ' democracy' between 1750 in 1860: it was only really post the Second World War that democracy was widely endorsed.
Philp pointed out that this was broadly the project's story. Nonetheless, ways of thinking about democracy did change, setting the scene for its later widespread endorsement.
Neda Borlouchi wanted to know how religion fitted into the process of reimagining.

Session II: The geo-political context: organising the Mediterranean I

Anna Maria Rao: 'Matteo Galdi and his *Dei rapport politico-economici fra le nationi libere*.'

She endorsed the project's anti-diffusionist story. Her central character, Matteo Galdi, operated in Italian enlightenment circles and was linked to Filangieri. His career took him from Enlightenment to reform, through revolution and post-revolution. He was a liberal in the 1820s and president of the Neapolitan Parliament of 1820-21. The work under examination needs to be set in the context of his other writings of the 1790s, in which he argued for the need to establish a republic in Italy, and also for a new international law based on popular sovereignty.

In *Effemeredi repubblicane* (1796) he presented a history of republics and elaborated a form of 'democratic constitution'. He said this form of government would best preserve the rights of man and citizens: rights to existence, property, happiness and the right to revolt against tyranny. He was influenced by both the American constitution and the French constitution of 1793. He adopted a distinction typical of the Directory period between two types of democracy: that is direct and representative democracy, the former being possible only in small states, whereas large states needed to use elections. The French Directory was a period of elections in France and Italy. He also raised the question of whether the people were ready from democracy

His pamphlet *Necessita di stabilire una repubblica in Italia* (1797) sought to answer this. Here he shifted focus from democratic government to an international order based on popular sovereignty. The key word was regeneration. He foretold that the Mediterranean would become a French lake. He sought to establish an Italian Republic, and argued that Greece should be liberated not by the despotic Russians but by the generous French nation; he also advocated the opening of the Suez Canal to facilitate communication with India, saying 'who knows how far we could extend freedom' and arguing that any nation in the world was susceptible to democratic government.

In his 1797 *Discorso*, a translation of which went through two French editions in 1798, the key words were freedom, fraternity, federation, regeneration and natural justice. He proposed a league of freedom between France and Italy, Holland, Spain and the Ottoman empire, to promote peace and general happiness. He said that, even if Spain and the Ottoman empire were not republics, they would become better through interchange with free peoples. The key word was not democracy but republic - a republic of universal freedom. He argued for a new republican diplomacy, The aim was to turn the Mediterranean into a scene of peaceful exchange and to promote colonisation without slavery.

In these texts of Galdi we find an original position. He proposed a federation between all free people and all people who had to become free. Later though (1801, 1806) he moved from republican universalism in 1801 towards nationalism, His goal became to establish Italy as an independent state with military power: he came to see freedom as depending on Italian independence. Freedom and independence became his keywords.

Gabriel Paquette: Almeida Garrett and *Portugal na balanca da Europa* (1830).

Garrett was a poet, writer, politician, at one point emissary to Belgium; in the 1830s he served in the lower house. He ended his life in the upper house, having been briefly minister of foreign affairs, and part of a body responsible for 'ultramontane affairs', in the early years of the regeneration period. He is usually credited with introducing romanticism into Portugal, though he himself rejected both classic and romantic as labels- although he did much to shape literary activity in Portugal in C19. Between 1820 and 1834 he founded half a dozen political newspapers. He was a ventista – a supporter of the constitutional movement – in the early 1820s, but later distanced himself from this, becoming a central voice of Portuguese liberalism. Among other things he helped formulate a legal code.

By the end of the 1820s he had become sharply aware of Portugal's dependence on great power politics. His long pamphlet was published in 1830, when the constitutionalist cause hung in the balance. The French Revolution of 1830 gave Portugal a reprieve from Miguelism. The pamphlet was published just after the July Days. He began writing it in 1825. Its success had much to do with the publishing context, though ideas in it had circulated earlier.

Garrett identified liberty as the natural original condition of human kind, degraded by monarchical despotism and oligarchy. He saw civilisation as the process of recovering liberty in a form consistent with order and international peace: this provided his main narrative thread. The American Revolution had marked a first stage; the French Revolution was then subverted, chiefly by Napoleon, though Napoleonic rule did awaken the hope of liberty among especially the Iberian and Italian peoples. They had enjoyed liberty in the past, but experienced a reawakening now. He praised the Constitution of Cadiz as a first step in the recovery of liberty. He wrote of a *sistema de libertad meridional.* The southern/northern contrast was a commonplace of European romanticism [de Stael, *De l'Allemagne*; Sismondi, *De la littérature* du *midi de l'Europe*, etc], but it was usually given literary application. Garrett gave it a political twist, suggesting that southern revolutions might be peaceful, avoiding the destructive violence that had broken lose in France. Nations associated with this principle were aligned against the Congress system. He saw the failure of new southern revolutionary regimes to establish themselves securely as a result of the formation of a 'new revolutionary aristocracy' which left the people no more happy or free, and therefore laid the basis for Don Miguel's overthrow of the liberal order. He believed that political liberty could be preserved in a single state only in alliance with other states, and therefore cast national issues in international and sometimes in interoceanic terms. He offered two conceptions of liberty, one involving the establishment of a constitutional system, the other an appropriate international order; this reflected esp his concern that Portugal would be swallowed up by Spain.

Garrett's pamphlet was written in an post-imperial moment, just after Portugal had formally recognised Brazil. He saw Portugal as a counterweight, helping to preserve the balance between Spain, France and Britain: he didn't want to see Portugal totally dominated by either Britain or Spain. He saw the balance as under threat given Portugal's now diminished wealth and power. To survive in these circumstances, he thought it necessary to turn inwards, to stablise and consolidate free institutions. He saw Britain as a key model, having avoided revolution because of the extent to which liberty was entrenched in its constitution. He praised the 'democratic' element in the emergent social order. He thought it likely that Portugal would be absorbed by Spain, but he also believed that Spain would be less likely to keep its liberty without an independent Portugal. He also believed that loose alliances were

better on the whole than formal empires or federations. He argued that it was better to have stability than to pursue an illusory liberty at the price of national sovereignty.

At the same time, he was telling Portuguese literary men that they should avoid foreign influence: he lamented the wave of French translations. He recommended the study of other languages, and said there was something to be learned from them all, but that Portuguese circumstances should not be confused with other peoples'.

His work valorised the national as an essential element to the political order.

Michael Drolet: 'The Union of Peoples: Michel Chevalier and his *Système de la Mediterranée*'.

Chevalier lived 1806-1889. He was a graduate of the Ecole Polytechnique and the Ecole des Mines. He was a leading Saint Simonian, and edited their newspaper *Le Globe* 1831-2. In 1832 he was convicted with Enfantin and sent to a political prison for eight months. In 1833 he was sent on a mission to US, Canada, Mexico and Cuba. His letters from there came out in 1836, at the same time as Tocqueville's *Democracy in America.* In 1840 he secured a chair in political economy at the College de France. During the Second Empire he was Napoleon III's chief economic advisor.

In 1832 *Le Globe* published 13 articles under the heading *Systeme de la Mediterranée*; Chevalier wrote 9 of these. The Saint Simonians saw the Mediterranean as symbolic of a divided past and the potential for a united future. East and west were locked in combat, but the Mediterranean offered the promise of a marriage. Unlike Tocqueville, Chevalier wanted to see French colonisation in North Africa abandoned.

This work was rescued from total neglect by Jean Walch in 1963, who published an article about it. There has been one article since, 2001. In 2008, a partial edition was published. Chevalier's neglect by historians of political thought arises from his reputation as naïve or merely reformist. For example, he proposed the building of 60,000 kilometres of railways across the Mediterranean – allowing for the speedy transfer of goods and the development of commerce that would bind societies in the region together: Christians, Jews and Muslims. Such a system would ultimately lead to world peace. This seems very utopian, esp given France's first railway line had been established only 3 years earlier. But while visionary, Chevalier's work is full of ideas. It included an interesting presentation of 'industrie' as a response the corruption of the mercantilist system. It also provides a fascinating example of cosmopolitanism with a political-economy basis, in order to achieve efficient resource use in the interest of all.

Chevalier turned the old criticism of democracy as faction-ridden on its head, suggesting that it was rather the ancien regime that was multiply divisive. He welcomed a new social reality, democratic inasmuch as it was defined by equality of condition. However, he did not support popular sovereignty. He argued for a new science of politics that would work to replace an ideological world marked by war, want and waste. The new *politique industriel* would improve resource use, and the world of class and cultural privilege would be abolished. The new system would be integrated through science and the new politics would unite old oppositions.

He looked for economic integration of the region, understood in both material and spiritual terms. Materially, though networks of road and rail; spiritually, through the flow of financial capital and the conciliation of interests. The circulation metaphor extended beyond the economic, poor circulation was seen as symbolising the class problem. Speed of communication would draw together the different classes, allowing a new and distinctive ethos to be forged.

Chevalier reworked Saint Simon's 1814 vision of Europe [in *De la reorganisation de la societe europeene*]. Improved circulation was seen as crucial to the vitality of civilisation. Activity in the veins and arteries – the communication networks – would stimulate nations out of the torpor – a view connected to vitalism and to geology. The new attitude would encourage stewardship of the globe; new canals would bring new land into production, and give access to new minerals. Modern conveniences would improve the lives of the working classes and the peasantry. He costed the rail programme at 4,500 m francs – but showed that this would be cheaper than the French spending on wars. He remained faithful to these interests throughout his life, supporting the Panama Canal and a project for a Channel Tunnel.

Isabella asked Paquette whether Garrett was influenced by Lafayette and whether he ever discussed international law. He seems linked to a broader movement in the 1820s, an internationalist *ventismo*: Italians were also discussing the hope that constitutional regimes might link to form a broader international system. To Drolet: what did Chevalier think about what France was doing in Egypt, the Middle East, Algeria; was he in favour of a soft imperialism, or active political engagement? How tolerant was he of diversity? He finds Italians often very vague about what it might mean to be involved with the middle east.
Paquette: there seems to be no link with Lafayette. Though he trained as a lawyer pre 1820, he doesn't talk about international law in this pamphlet; he's much more concerned with the ties of civilisation. Scholars point to his periodic bouts of disenchantment, after which he would seek to reintegrate ideas he had rejected.
Drolet: Chevalier didn't talk about France in North Africa in *The Mediterranean System*, but in general he saw his proposals as a St Simonian alternative to the way the French government is acting. The government in turn saw the St Simonians as revolutionary, linking them for example to riots in Lyon; and officials were being warned that engineers deployed in North Africa were being attracted to St Simonianism. Saint Simonians attempted to present a more respectable face. Chevalier broke with Enfantin in 1833. He continued to present binary opposition which he argued infrastructural improvement -- communications and a more broadly supportive banking system (more like US than France) -- could overcome. He was increasingly drawn into the regime; he was appointed to Napoleon III's commission to Mexico in 1863. He argued that Mexicans were not making good use of their resources. In general he thought natural resources should be seen as a global heritage: this could legitimate external intervention. But he avoided specificity as to what role France should play.

Several questions were now taken together:

Innes suggested that the three presentations foregrounded three different visions of the Mediterranean. Galdi's was a French Revolutionary Mediterranean in which France played a critical role; Garrett's, one in which the northern powers in general were problematic; and Chevalier's perhaps not specifically a Mediterranean vision at all: she wasn't clear how distinctive a place the Mediterranean had within a larger global vision. She also wasn't sure

when Chevalier began writing: was he responding specifically to the French invasion of Algeria?
Michalis Sotiropoulos: wanted to know more about the place of international law in these discourses – was Vattel a reference point? It seemed to him that the categories in play – national sovereignty, notably – were drawn from international law.
Crosby Arnold: What about natural equality – how does this fit into a discourse of national inequality? Was a natural equality of nations posited? To Drolet: did a focus on railways entail a vision of a land-based network to challenge Britain's maritime supremacy?

Compound answers:
Rao Vattel had some importance, but there was an ambiguity: was self-determination a core value? Or should republican regimes intervene in other states to dislodge tyrants? There was a vision of a just war of intervention. Galdi often referred to a role for saviours, of salvation. He favoured a form of African colonisation that would not rest on slavery [taking Napoleonic Egypt as a model?]

Drolet: Chevalier was interested in ships as well as railways. He was attempting to develop an alternative vision of politics that would speak to entrepreneurs.

Paquette: Garrett provided few footnotes, but he seems to have looked chiefly to historical precedents for inspiration. On Brazil: the loss was traumatic for many, but not so much for Garrett. He thought that dependence on slavery in Brazil had skewed Portugal's national trajectory.

Session 3: The geo-political context: organising the Mediterranean II

Lauren Benton: **"Hitherto unknown in the history of nations": The legal definition of British protection in the Ionian Islands, 1815 to 1850**

Accounts of the development of the notion of a right to protect tend to jump from Grotius to the development of the notion in its canonical form in late C19th in the form of Protectorates. Early C19 developments deserve more attention; that era provided a specific context for the development of international law and constitutionalism. She would focus on, the Ionian Islands, where the islands were incorporated within a vision of an imperial legal order.

Protection entered C19 with an established but not doctrinally precise place. From C16 protection was used to justify exercises of imperial power. 1774 the Kucuk Kaynarca treaty accorded Russia the right to protect Christian subjects in Ottoman lands. British legal authority in newly acquired territories often inserted the new office of 'protector'. The notion of protection figured in debates about the extension of jury trials; it was discussed in relation to the extension of East India Company powers, eg in relation to British expansion in Kandy, where the local rebel leader was coached to ask for British 'protection'.

The vagueness of the term was an attraction. It referred both to warding off threats, and to unifying populations: it was an inside/outside discourse, as Walker would say [RBJ Walker, *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory* (1993)].

In Corfu and the 7 islands, the British expected the Treaty to announce Britain's annexation of the islands, so Maitland, already governor of Malta, could be made governor of all British

possessions in the Mediterranean, and build on the pattern of rule that he had developed in Ceylon and Malta. But in fact the Congress of Vienna gave Britain the role only of protecting sovereign. Maitland was to preside over an assembly that would devise a constitution. He had not shown a gift for gradualism, and anyway was under pressure to determine the exact character of British rule.

The first question to be answered was, did Ionian citizens have the same rights as British citizens and exemption from Ottoman rule? For the British, maritime cases were especially vexing. The Ottomans arrested as pirates people the British sought to protect. In one case, the British ambassador shifted to describing them as Ionian subjects, subjects of a foreign nation under the protection of the British flag, but still said they should enjoy the privileges of British subjects. This case arose at a time when the cession of Parga [on Greek coast, near Ionian islands] to the Ottomans was still being negotiated. The Ottomans warned the British not to take their case too far.

Objections to the extent of British interference soon arose, eg from Capodistrias. Bathurst had to spell out a vision of British protection in replying. He asked what protection would mean if it had limits, assuming it meant more than just providing garrisons. He thought there was clearly a mandate for the improvement of government and legal administration.

Maitland's successor Douglas got embroiled in debate with British judges as to the constitutionality of the penal code. The British judges observed that the peculiar relationship between Britain and the Ionian islands meant that this was not a municipal question only but could become international. The Ionians collectively, though bound by the terms of the treaty, who could call on the British to correct the treaty. Evidently there was in this case a peculiar tangle between imperial jurisdiction and international law.

Her title referred to a claim by Douglas that the islands lay in a middle state between being a colony and being an independent country. Douglas claimed that a form of [what we might term] controlled democracy represented the only way of steering through. By the 1840s, [because of increased opposition from islanders,] possible ways forward had narrowed.

The case shows that there was no clear international law doctrine of protection at this point – and that much of the implications of awarding the islands that status had to be worked out through negotiation and contestation on the ground. Resolution of some of the problems that arose was seen at the time as lying in assimilating the islands more fully to imperial jurisdiction.

K. E Fleming: Whose subject? The Don Pacifico affair, 1850

She said she would focus on telling a story, leaving analysis for the discussion. She would explain what gave rise to the famous Don Pacifico affair, when Palmerston, in the early 1850s, threatened to place an embargo on all Greek vessels and to blockade Greece in order to obtain proper treatment for a British subject: a famous instance of gunboat diplomacy. The story began 3 years earlier, with a complaint by a Jewish resident of the Greek capital, formerly in Portuguese service, about goods stolen from him by the populace of Athens. Palmerston said the Greeks had fallen from their historical role, and he would teach them the true meaning of the rights of man

What was at issue was in effect a hate crime: it was significant that he was Jewish. A mob of 300 broke down his door, took his goods and injured his wife and children. This took place on Easter day; crowds included high-profile Athenian youth; the police watched. The case came before the Athens criminal court one month after the event, but the court did nothing.

Pacifico then wrote to London, saying the goods that had been looted included goods entrusted to him by other Jews, destined to fund the construction of a synagogue in Athens; he acted on behalf of the Israelite community (he claimed).

Greek authorities had just banned the traditional celebration of Easter, which included the burning of Judas. There was an especially violent tradition on the Ionian islands. The crowd was enraged by the ban, and believed that Pacifico had been instrumental in its enactment.

The background was a visit to Greece by Lord Rothschild, who had mediated a big loan to Greece, on which the Greeks had defaulted. By 1847, the payment situation was desperate. Rothschild visited in this context. It was not thought good for him to see anti-semitic demonstrations.

Don Pacifico had been born in Gibraltar.

Sceptics have noted that Palmerston was much readier to stand up to weak oriental states mistreating British citizens: he didn't take a similarly firm stand in a Frankfurt case, or ones arising in Russia or France.

In Greece, things were in a fairly chaotic state. There was no effective tax collection, so they couldn't pay off the loan. 1847 was a year of international economic crisis. Bavaria (because the Greek king was Bavarian) and Russia were both involved in Greek affairs.

October brought a second assault on Don Pacifico, again involving high-born youths, including now the prime minister's son; his wife and daughters were chased through his home, and seriously frightened. Pacifico reconsidered his position in Greece. He asked the British, if they couldn't protect him, at least to grant him passports.

The affair now became a matter for dealings between governments. The British government made a number of proposals to the Greek government, through several changes of administration. The British concluded that the Greeks were not yet advanced enough in civilisation to understand the rights of man in relation to religious toleration.

Pacifico went to London, and died there.

Themes include regeneration: the Greek past was used by the British to cudgel the Greeks; geopolitics, and the coexistence of empire and nation.

Maurizio Isabella: Risorgimento patriotism and Europe's colonial presence in the Mediterranean

He focussed on the international dimension of the Risorgimento, arguing that the debate around Europe's colonial presence in the Mediterranean, a theme neglected by historiography, was central to definitions of Italian nationalism. European colonial expansion

was seen as an opportunity as well as a threat to the political projects of the Risorgimento; it provided ideological weapons to support Italy's nation-building process.

Central to visions of Italy as a Mediterranean power was the reception, adaptation and manipulation of themes drawn from French *industrialisme* and the Saint-Simonians (discussed by Michael Drolet). Ideas of *industrie* and of the Mediterranean as a new space of civilisation, where West and East would meet and merge, were common currency from the late 1820s among Risorgimento liberals and democrats. They were employed to challenge ideas of French supremacy, and to place Italy at the centre of the region and in the expansion of civilisation.

Some came to see Britain not France as the best promoter of liberty in the Mediterranean. People who took this view were not necessarily counter-revolutionary: they included for example Ugo Foscolo, who had originally welcomed the revolution. They engaged with a circle of thinkers around Lord Bentinck (who for a while governed Sicily) including Leckie and Paisley. They thought the British could do this by fighting slavery and Barbary pirates, and creating protectorates over islands: Sicily and the Ionian islands. They thought it would be possible to reconcile British imperial rule with autonomy, taking Sicily as a model. They thought that Ionians might follow the same model, judging them unfit for simple self-rule, having degenerated under Venetian oppression. Maitland's despotic rule crushed these hopes.

A new vision emerged in the context of ideas coming from France and the Saint Simonians. This context justified the Risorgimento as a political project. It was espoused by a range of people, from anti-democrats to Mazzini. Cesare Balbo's famous writings from the 1840s, for instance, conceived both the Risorgimento and Europe's colonial expansion as part of Christian progress. Balbo was against the idea of a hegemonic European power in the Mediterranean, believing that all European nations, Italy included, should have equal standing in leading the civilisation of the basin. However he was not interested in an imperial role for Italy, which he pushed to the distant future. Contrastingly, Vicenzo Gioberti, in his *Del primato morale e civile dell'Italia* (1843), challenged more radically Saint-Simonian visions, aiming to replace France with Italy as the leader of the Mediterranean. He advocated that Italy play an imperial role in colonising the East, and justified Italy's supremacy on the basis of the superiority of her Catholic civilisation.

Both Balbo and Gioberti rejected Islam as incompatible with civilisation and progress. However an alternative reading of Europe's role in the Mediterranean was provided by Lombard liberals, and in particular by GianDomenico Romagnosi and his pupils, who included the famous republican and federalist Carlo Cattaneo. Their vision of the Mediterranean was based on a specific reading of ancient colonialism, and in particular of pre-Roman settlements, as colonial experiments based on commerce, peaceful cohabitation with the local populations, and federalism. This stance entailed an explicit critique of French colonialism and of French conquest of Algeria in particular. Lombard liberals often portrayed the England as a warmongering nation whose empire defended the interests of a small and rich aristocratic oligarchy protecting economic monopolies against those of a majority of poverty- stricken labourers (although Cattaneo had a more nuanced opinion of the British Empire as a federal polity superior to the French centralising Empire). Against moderates like Gioberti and Balbo, Lombard radicals rejected simplistic contrasts between a civilised Europe and a backward Ottoman Empire, and the association between Christianity and progress. Cattaneo in 1860 advocated a Mediterranean of independent nations, not an Ottoman Empire controlled by Europe.

These debates help to explain the various positions which emerged when an Italian liberal state was created, notably ideas about whether or not the Risorgimento had laid the foundations for an Italian empire.

A series of comments and questions were taken:

Konstantina Zanou: to Benton: this whole discussion should be connected to 1815 negotiations in the Congress of Paris (following the Hundred Days), in which Capodistrias was involved. He and Foscolo had a clear vision of what they wanted in the form of protection. She also suggested that whereas it was usual in the historiography to compare one pattern of British rule with another, from the point of view of the Ionians the important comparison was between different forms of rule they had experienced
To Isabella: suggested that one reason for Anglophilia was opposition to Austria. In this context, British willingness to grant freedom of the press was a key issue.
John Davis: All three papers help us to see how the Mediterranean was perceived. The realities of the colonial Mediterranean post 1815 were new. With Egypt and Malta, colonialism showed a new face. The commercial treaties which followed 1815 reflect new realities. Braudel's Mediterranean all related to Philip II, but this was not now a unified Mediterranean: each European power had its own Mediterranean world, providing local nationalisms with a variety of focuses. Dominique Reill, *Nationalists Who Feared the Nation: Adriatic Multi-Nationalism in Habsburg Dalmatia, Trieste, and Venice* (2012) is of interest in this connection.
Against Isabella: thought that the north Italians were more pro-British than in the south. Southerners tended to oppose British thalassocracy.
To Benton and Fleming: the cession of Parga became a massive symbol for Italian nationalism in the 1820s and 30s. It was seen as a case of liberal Britain selling an independent people into slavery. Moreover, in Malta the British made no attempt to honour their promise for a constitution. And the Don Pacifico case similarly worried Turin liberals: they thought that the British were right in a sense, but also in violation of international law; if they treated the Greeks like that, then they worried about how they might treat them.
Sotiropoulos: to Isabella - How did they reconcile seeing Britain as a moderate power with Britain's failure to commit to free trade. In the Ionian islands, was this an important issue?

Answers from speakers:

Benton: said she agreed with Zanou about the Treaty of Paris. Local culture was very important, but we know less about the British Empire than we need to know: these elite colonial administrators circulated, which meant stronger connections between them and British political discourse than with the local scene. One needs to look at the correspondence between London and local officials – where we find them looking for a policy and a constitutional theory to justify their positions; it was in this context that ideas about 'protection' were developed. However, that theory needed to be worked out in increasing detail as their administration became more embedded. By the 1850s, British policy was affected by perceptions of what was happening in Italy.

Isabella: agreed with Zanou: they were anti-Austrian because they saw Britain as a more liberal political order. To Davis: had not meant to generalise about north and south To Sotiropoulos: people were often not very well informed about the details of British practice;

often they relied on French sources, and by the end of the 1820s the British could in any case be seen by the informed as moving towards free trade.

More questions were taken:

Borlouchi: wondered if there were parallels between the Pacifico and Dreyfus affairs.
Hadjikyriacou: what became clear in the Don Pacifico case was a stratification of statehood in the international imagination. He wondered if there was also social stratification in subjecthood, replicating in microcosm the international order.

Answers:

Fleming: it was a Rashomon-type of event: there were many different understandings of what had happened. She came to it from an interest in Greek anti-semitism, but another important context was provided by the conditions of Greek independence: the Greek state had been formed with huge infusions of capital, generating substantial debt, and leading to recurrent cycles of economic collapse, bailing out and resentment, repeated again in the 1890s. There is also an interesting urban historical context: involving the construction of Athens by European architects who had their own idea of what Greece should be like [see Eleni Bastea, *The Planning of Modern Athens. Creating the Myth* (2000)]. Much land was bought up and/or taken by eminent domain. Pacifico was one of the losers in this process, and was engaged in litigation in consequence. He was for example paid a lot less for than was the historian Finlay. He thought this reflected anti-semitism.

Benton: There's also a question raised by the conference about what sort of political imagination existed. She suggested that for the most part this was an imperial political imagination – or a national inter-imperialism that used imperial languages, but often in the service of national claims. The liberalism of the British Empire tends to go in and out of focus, but what was most important to people was the idea that it was an ordered empire. Empires often helped to preserve order within these states.

Session 4: Transnational perspectives I: 4.30-6.00

Konstantina Zanou: 'Rehearsing' nationalism and constitutionalism on the Ionian islands.

She opened with two short anecdotes.

The first concerned Ioannis Kapodistrias, the first Governor of the Greek state, long celebrated as the 'Founder of Greek Independence'. In 1818, when he was still the rising star of Russian diplomacy and Foreign Secretary of the Tsar, a delegation of Russian peasants of Greek extraction visited him in St Petersburg; he reprimanded them for not speaking Greek. *It is shameful to be a Greek and not know your mother tongue* – he appears to have said. But had they spoken in Greek, he would have understood almost nothing. Having received his elementary education in a Franciscan monastery at Corfu (the only education one could get in a distant periphery of the Venetian Republic), Kapodistrias had learned how to write Italian and French, Latin and maybe some Ancient Greek, but had no knowledge of how to express himself in Modern Greek. *Δε γράφω εις την γλώσσα μας, επειδή εις αυτό το μέρος νηπιάζω περισσότερον παρά εις κανέν άλλο* [I do not write in our language, because I am an *infant* in

this field much more than in any other] – he wrote to his teacher of Greek, whom he decided to hire at a later stage, when he was in his mid-30s.

This was the 1810s, when language had gained a much different meaning. Judging from another letter to his teacher at this time, one of his few written in Greek, Kapodistrias was conscious of this change.
Let us stop our correspondence in French, he said. *The time of repentance has come. This will neither become true nor will bring benefit if a patriotic law does not sanction it. This is […] my supplication: to order as legislators that 'if a Greek writes to another Greek in a foreign idiom, he will be proclaimed a foreigner'. I do not dare, of my own free will, to submit myself to such a violent law, because now we are not in a time of Martyrs, and when I count the depth of my ignorance in the Paternal language, the voice of my consciousness controls and pesters my mind.*

In fact, Kapodistrias never overcame the 'infancy' stage in writing (and perhaps speaking) Greek; even while Governor of Greece, he wrote almost everything in French and Italian. Ironically, he failed to apply to himself the 'patriotic law' that he had set for others. In this he certainly resembled one of the constitutions of the 'Septinsular Republic' on which he had spent so much of his energy in 1803. One article stated that: *As of 1810, nobody can be elected for the first time to a public post if he cannot read and write the standard Greek language of the Nation. This language, as of 1820, will be used exclusively in all public documents*. Yet the entire text was written in Italian and signed by almost all those who voted for it in the same language.

The second story concerns Ioannis Zambelios, also an Ionian, from the island of Lefkada and some ten years younger than Kapodistrias. Follower of the ideas of Foscolo and Korais, Zambelios was famous for his historical patriotic tragedies in Alfierian style, which he wrote for 'the benefit of the regeneration of Greece'. He was a fervent supporter of the 1821 Revolution and proponent of the democratic ideals of ancient Greece, as well as an active member of the *Filiki Etairia* (the Greek secret society equivalent to the *Carbonari*). According to his autobiography, in 1822 his passion for the Greek Revolution reached such a height that he got sick and stayed for a month in bed suffering from 'patriotic insanity'. But only five years before, in 1817, when he was asked, together with others, to determine which persons had the right to vote in the newly established government of the 'Ionian Republic' under British protection, to the great astonishment of the British Governor of Lefkada, Zambelios proposed to exclude all land-owning peasant farmers. It seems that the Venetian past, with its hereditary aristocratic structure, was too deeply rooted to be easily left behind. In spite of his passionate revolutionary nationalism, Zambelios was still attached to the pre-Revolutionary political value-system. His nationalist outlook did not necessarily imply a *democratic* stance.

Both these stories connect to one of the major paradoxes of modern history: the creation of a *Republic* by two *Empires* and, at the same time, the proclamation of *independence* through an act of *conquest*: thus the 'Septinsular Republic', formed by agreement 1800 between Russia and the Ottoman Empire after their forces had expelled the French revolutionaries. They agreed to make the Islands an independent state on the model of Ragusa, under the sovereignty of the Porte and the political and military protection of Russia. It has been observed that establishing systems of rule in new terrain produces experimentation. The Ionian Islands are a case in point, since the two absolutist rulers agreed to grant a constitution to the new state, turning it into a novel 'protected Republic'. The Sultan and the Tsar were

not moved by principles of national independence and constitutional liberty. Rather, in the face of the Napoleonic threat, they sought ways to prevent these ideas from spreading further east. Their internal antagonisms also played a part in determining the result.

Durimg the seven years of its existence (it lasted until 1807, when the Tsar handed the Islands back to Napoleon), the 'Septinsular Republic' saw its constitution revised three times. In all three, the political system was aristocratic – although in the constitution of 1803, the most liberal, the hereditary aristocracy was replaced by a new 'constitutional nobility'. This meant that the citizen body was broadened with a view primarily to including the economically and socially powerful: the impetus was anything but democratic. While the Draft Constitution Committee stated that *the granting of hereditary political rights to a limited number of noble families, regardless of individual qualifications, was hateful and unjust, because the exclusive exercise of this privilege would disturb the Harmony of the Nation, dividing it into ruled and rulers*, it also declared that *it was absurd, contrary to the Imperial Conventions, and to reason and experience, to grant political rights to all equally, because there cannot exist political equality where there is evident inequality in property, intellect and virtue.* Though the constitution was nationalist, it was accepted that the Ionian nation, despite its centuries-old existence and connection with ancient Greek ancestors, was now reborn as a 'nation-infant'. And for that reason it was unable to become a democracy.

A recent publication of the Charters of the Ionian Islands has usefully launched discussion around the phenomenon of Ionian constitutionalism – never considered in depth by Greek historiography. The introduction stresses that, through successive constitutions, the 'Ionian Republic' remained in thrall to the administrative models established under Venetian rule. And in the absence of political sovereignty, these constitutions were essentially the custodians of foreign control and the social order. These charters were not 'national constitutions', since they were not the product of a national movement or a popular uprising against imperial rulers, but a result of diplomatic negotiations. They came 'from above or without, rather than from below and within'. As a legal scholar puts it, the constitution of the 'Septinsular Republic' reflected rather a pre-national constitutional moment, in transition from the feudal regime of the imperial age to the bourgeois regime of the nation-states.

Yet this was the first time that a constitution of any kind was granted, and with the tolerance of Russia and the Ottoman Empire, to a part of Eastern Europe. The 'Septinsular Republic', despite being more of a Russian protectorate than an independent state,. was viewed by contemporaries as the 'first free national Greek government after many centuries'. As this petite-state was taking shape, many institutions were tested out for the first time: borders were drawn, ministries formed, the army systematized, the Church administered and the education organized. The 'Septinsular Republic' was a rehearsal for the Greek state-to-come.

She concluded by arguing that the story of the 'Septinsular Republic' provides insights into the potential of small places in creating history, in functioning as the backstage of historical performances. It also makes us rethink certain notions that we tend to read backwards, such as 'independence', 'republic', 'aristocracy' and 'democracy'; it provides a context in which we can reflect on what these things meant in the early nineteenth-century Mediterranean.

Christine Philliou: The Vogorides-Musurus Correspondence

Her aim was to put her research into conversation with the larger discussion. She is concerned with Phanariots: a Christian, Orthodox, Greek elite in the late C17-18, who reached a critical turning point in the 1820s. They then became very much eligible to re-imagine political belonging: some threw their lot in with the Greek state; some stayed loyal to the Sultan.

Previously they had best been known interpreters for the Sultan and as assistants to the Ottoman admiral (who exercised jurisdiction over Aegean island). They also managed tax farms especially in Wallachia and Moldavia. Phanar is a quarter in Istanbul where they resided and where the Patriarch was based. They were intelligence gatherers and were often involved in the provisioning of grain and other foods.In 1820/21 the first front was not Greece but Wallachia/Moldavia.

Vogorides was Bulgarian, but spoke Greek: an interesting counterpoint to Capodistrias. He was an admirer of Napoleon, Metternich and the Ottoman Sultan. In the 1830s he played a behind the scenes role in Ottoman foreign ministry. He left a large correspondence with his son-in-law, who married his daughter in the 1830s and became his protégé. They were conservatives, and defenders of Ottomans; his son-in-law was the first Ottoman ambassador to Greece. They didn't take Greece especially seriously: in 1844, Musurus told Vogorides that there was nothing to worry about there. They saw the Ottoman empire as very stable. They were politically agile: open to change- but not reformers. Vogorides used the analogy of swimming through dangers. They didn't have any kind of general Mediterranean vision.

Vogorides acquired the office of governor of Samos, a Greek governing a Greek community for a Turkish sultan, but with considerable independence. It presents an interesting case: Samos had taken part in the Greek revolt, but was close to the Ottoman mainland and was left out of the final settlement; it was then given a certain amount of autonomy, under Ottoman sovereignty but international guarantee. Vogorides was appointed by the British and Ottomans together; he was an absentee Prince, but sent his son-in-law to negotiate with the islanders, moving from village to village, explaining the new system of rule. A new 'organic statute' was established. They seem to have reproduced forms of power with which they were familiar from Wallachia and Moldavia. They built up a clique on the island known as the Phanoristos – the little Phanariots.

One form of re-imagining political community which took place in this period was the re-imagining of a form of Phanariot community in Istanbul. So-called neophanariots who emerged in the 1820s and 30s, and played a prominent role in the Tanzimat, were largely new families, unlike Vogorides. Greece also represented a re-imagining of something, as did Samos, another improvised solution. The Ottomans had to adapt and re-imagine their rule in new circumstances.

Vogorides emerged as a Christian-court favorite, an anglophile, as against his chief rival, a Russophile. Other Tanzimat statesmen were also pro-British. They looked to Britain to oversee Ottoman reforms.

Several questions were taken together:

Innes: one context for thinking about democracy is against 'aristocracy': to many contemporaries the challenge was to think about what form of government might suit a

different kind of society. Worth nothing that in that context Britain figures as a model of a society whose state was succeeding in the modern world but which had yet remained aristocratic.
Philp: noted that national categories don't necessarily capture identities within the region. Asked why we should regard Vogorides as Greek – since he was in at least some sense Bulgarian!
Crosby-Arnold: Race was first conceptualized in terms of natural history, not biology. Criteria for national belonging may be set out not in public but private law. Did racialised notions of the nation affect ways in which Ottoman subjects challenged Ottoman rule?
Isabella: welcomed Konstantina's challenge to the teleological narrative of Greek nationalism, but wondered whether what she had to say about the Ionian islands could be extended to Greece.
Fleming: wondered if the multi-lingual capabilities of the people discussed support or challenge the view that links language and national identity.

Answers:

Zanou: the term the Greeks used of themselves was 'yenos', a pre-national term. Yenos later gave way to ethnos.
Philliou: there's a problem about how to translate their terms. Vogorides saw himself as 'omogeneis', one of us, but wouldn't have called himself hellenas.
Hadjikyriacou – yenos came to be appropriated by patriots as a relatively traditional and religious term, and as such offered an alternative to ethnos in the later C19. The term Rum/Romios, was a more strictly religious term. Identity had mobility implications: how you presented yourself helped shape where you could move and how you would then fit.
Philliou: Rum was never not religious – to be Rumian was to be a part of a religious sensibility. But it was also a component of the imperial hierarchy.
Zanou: there's a problem in identifying people in the Adriatic and Balkans. People were born as pre-ethnic/national subjects - and they might subsequently live as Greeks and die as Bulgarians. As to Maurizio's observation: she agreed there was an issue; she wasn't escaping from teleology enough. But Greek historiography was saturated with it. Which made her think that she should abandon discussion with Greek historians and go for a more international context. To Fleming: it's complicated: language could be hailed rhetorically as an index of national belonging when patterns of use were different.
Philliou: Greek had many practical uses; among other things, for many people in this period, the real language of Christianity was Greek.

More comments and questions were taken:

Andrew Arsan: to Philliou, wondered why Vogorides and Musurus weren't more worried about the future of the Ottoman empire in 1844.
Also, suggested that the meaning of religion in the Ottoman empire changed from the 1830s, partly because the British and French paradoxically promoted religious identity by worrying about equality of treatment. It became a statistical category of belonging, and a basis for representation.
Hadjikyriacou: we should see language as a conveyor, not as something static, but as giving access to different identities, depending on the identity one wanted to project.
In relation to Samos, locals characterized conflict as between 'guillotines' and 'goblins'. It wasn't explicitly political, in terms of their being programmes or manifestos. In general he thought that it would be worth bringing lower-level revolts into the picture. These often

responded to socio-economic tensions, yet though they were apparently local in character, there were times when such revolts broke out in many parts of the Ottoman empire, thus around 1800, the 1830s. Concurrence suggests common dynamics, and these could be related to changes in the representative structures of administration at the local community level, which affected many. Greeks, Muslims and many others.[see again p. 34][i]
Simal: saw potential for comparing the Spanish Empire and the Ottoman. He just wrote an article with an Ottomanist friend about how Spanish liberals used the image of the oriental despot [under consideration for publication]. Wondered if in the Ottoman Empire people had an image of Spain?
Sotiropoulos: gave example of two brothers, both political economists, one of whom ended up identifying as Greek, the other as Rumanian. Wondered if those who went to Greece from the Ottoman heartland took with them ideas they had acquired in that administrative setting.

Philliou: responding to this - those who went to Greece kept in touch with those who stayed She has a jointly authored article on Phanariots outside the Empire ['Families of empires and nations: Phanariot hanedans from the Ottoman Empire to the world around it (1669-1856)', ch. 9 in *Transregional and Transnational Families in Europe and Beyond: Experiences since the Middle Ages*, edited by David Sabean, Simon Teutscher, Christopher Johnson, and Francesca Trivellato (2011)]

Sotiropoulos: in Greece in the 1850s, there were attacks against those in the University and public affairs identified as 'Phanariots' (a reflection, he thought, of fundamental disagreements about what politics is all about and what the state should do: whether it should just administer the state or also govern civil society, so-called Phanariots being thought to have a narrow conception of the state, focussing on petty politics etc) [expanded in the light of his subsequent explanation]
Philliou: they were the despots, if anyone

Zanou: noted of Mavrocordatos that he became Europeanised: changed his clothing, his way of doing politics. Seems to represent a contrast with Vogorides.
Philliou: what's remarkable is that he made this change in a single lifetime. It was a more common change between generations. Thus of Vogorides and Musurus, Musurus more fully Europeanised.

Daphne Lappa: she had the impression that people were emerging from an early modern world in which multiple identities were normal to a new one in which they became problematic.
Zanou: though modern identities are not simple either. **Innes**: complexities might manifest themselves in different ways, as in the case of Don Pacifico. **Zanou:** this raises again the question of whether we shouldn't abandon the idea of 'transition'. Perhaps there are multiple dimensions, multiple points of change, rather than a single break.

Drolet: De Maistre had difficulty conceptualising the relationship between Catholicism and Orthodoxy when he was in Russia. He had a sense that there is something about a religious sense of belonging that might be used in the modern world.

Crosby-Arnold: the early modern/modern distinction is important, but a key part of what was changing was the emergence of a body of private law, and the development of individual claims, standing in cases, who can be sued and who cannot – etc.

Pablo Sanchez Leon: all this also needs to be set in the context of a shift from composite monarchies towards more unitary states, which might take different forms, as in the cases of Spain on the one hand, the Ottoman empire on the other. In Spain, religious identity provided the basis for national identity. Thought that official recognition of identities mattered: in systems of economic privilege, economic identities were important, and threats to these identities might provide the basis for political mobilisation (as in the case of merchant groups in Spain).

Philliou: Tanzimat reforms involved the dissolution of a number of hierarchies in favour of legal equality, which rendered Christians in principle the equals and not inferior to Muslims, but in that context the fact that they were often richer then became a ground for Muslim resentment.
In relation to Arsan: Vogorides and Musurus basically took the Empire as a given, and didn't contemplate it ever becoming overshadowed. She noted that Vogorides used religious statistics in the Holy Sites disputes. She thought that ethnic identities became more important in the context of the Macedonian question.

DAY 2

Transnational perspectives II

John Davis: The Spanish War of Independence and the Liberal Revolutions in Italy

Noted that the liberal revolutions of the 1820s in Spain, the two Sicilies and Piedmont represented the first challenge to the political order of Vienna. The Spanish reinstatement of the Cadiz constitution triggered events in Italy; the Sicily revolutions would be over by 1821, when Metternich summoned the congress of Laibach and an Austrian army was sent to restore order in Naples with the King's support. That prompted a very brief revolution in Piedmont, but a detachment of the Austrian army put that down in a few weeks. Interest in this period is now reviving.

His questions were: how did Italian liberals understand the Cadiz constitution? And how good a concept is the' liberal international' – a term employed by Maurizio Isabella, but first coined by a Spanish historian 30-40 years ago? [Garcia-Lleva, José Luis Comellas El Trienio Costitucional (Madrid 1963) - see also Marion Miller 'A liberal international? Perspectives on comparative approaches to the revolutions of the 1820s in Spain, Italy and Greece' in Clement, RW, Taggie,BF, Schwartz (eds) Greece and the Mediterranean (Kirksville 1990) 61-8].

Why did Italians south and north adopt the Spanish constitution as their own? The starting point must be the work of Giorgio Spini [*Mito e realtà della Spagna nelle rivoluzioni italiane del 1820-21*, 1950]. He stressed the importance of the war of independence to perceptions of Spain. Against that background, the constitution was seen as both a national and a liberal document, entailing a rejection of Napoleonic autocracy and centralisation. Many of those involved in Italian events had served in French armies on the Peninsula before 1815. The idea of rejecting the common experience of subordination to Napoleon was crucial.

Since then, there has been less work on the impact of Cadiz in Europe than in Latin America, but it is now possible to go beyond Spini. The content of the constitution was well known: there were many translations. A prehistory for Italian constitutional thinking was provided by local debate in print about the relative merits of different French constitutions 1796-9; this continued throughout the Napoleonic period. Napoleonic constitutions were pretty widely rejected by liberals. Antipathy to them provided a focus around which Italian liberalism developed. [Anna Maria Rao 'Republicanism in Italy from the 18th century to the early Risorgimento' *Journal of Modern Italian Studies* 17/2 March 2012 pp149-167 & Antonino De Francesco, *Rivoluzione e Costituzioni. Saggio sul democratismo politico nell'Italia napoleonica* (Naples ESI 1996)]

The constitutional movement gained force from the development of secret societies, also now due for re-examination. They were at the heart of an extraordinary popular mobilisation, as described by Spitzer [*Old hatreds and young hopes*, 1971], who calls them a circumference without a centre. The revolutions of 1820 were planned as the revolutions of 1848 were not. The secret societies officially adopted the Spanish constitution as their political objective in 1818. Ideas were complicated by the imposition of a British constitution on Sicily during the Napoleonic era, projected as an alternative to Bonapartist realities on the mainland. After the Restoration, the Sicilian constitution was abolished, and Sicily was made effectively a province of Naples, rather than as before having the status of an independent kingdom. The constitution then provided a focus for resistance. Vectors for resistance included the secret societies and the army.

Why was the Spanish constitution preferred to the English? It was less conservative: it didn't include peers, and did provide for universal male (indirect) suffrage. It hadn't been imposed by a foreign power. It associated resistance to autocratic centralisation with the autonomy of local government, an issue on which the parliament of 1820 spent much time. The Spanish constitution was cast in legal terms very familiar to Italians because of the tradition of Spanish rule: thus the language of *fueros* was immediately usable in a local context. Another common bond was opposition to imperialism both in its French and in its British form. internationalism preceded the birth of the nation. But they also left a bitter memory of failure. The famous Sicilian writer of the Risorgimento Michele Amari wrote a history of the Sicilian Vespers [*La Guerra del Vespro Siciliano*, various eds. transl. into English 1850 as *The history of the war of the Sicilian Vespers*]. He had at one time intended to write a history of the 1820 revolution, in which his father had played a part, but abandoned the attempt as too painful. [His *Studii su la storia di Sicilia dalla metà del XVIII secolo al 1820* have recently been published, 2010]. He found in the Sicilian Vespers a more usable past, because then there had been at least some successes. [Amari favoured the English 1812 Sicilian constitution despite its aristocratic tone because his main venom was directed against Naples - but he also believed (and continued to believe) that the British had betrayed Sicily in 1815 by supporting the Bourbon restoration & the subsequent act of union & failing to protest the abolition of the Sicilian constitution/parliament. In 1848 he was suspicious of Lord Minto's objectives and saw British attempts to mediate between the rev government in Palermo and the Bourbons as another British betrayal of Sicilian democratic and autonomist aspirations. His conversion to 'Italian' nationalism was motivated by the pragmatic hope that Turin was more likely to grant Sicily some degree of home rule within an independent (and possibly federal) Italian state than the Neapolitan Bourbons - which makes him a very interesting example of the interplay between municipal/local/regional identities and national identities played a key role in the evolution Risorgimento nationalism].

The failure of the 1820 revolutions helped to turn people away from internationalism towards a more national vision.

Eduardo Posada Carbo: The empire strikes back: post-independence Spanish America and Spain

Between 1810 and 1824, Spain lost all her colonies in the New World save Cuba and Puerto Rico. This was a massive loss. His question is, what was its impact on Spain? And how were the new republics perceived there? A re-imagining of the Spanish political community was necessitated. He would suggest that the effect was to re-inforce anti-liberal tendencies.

The subject has received little attention from modern historians, and contemporaries haven't left much in the way of systematic discussion. There has been historiography on the economic consequences, but literature on the political consequences is thin. Some historians have commented on the apparent lack of national trauma, by comparison with the loss of remaining colonies in 1898 (said to have scarred a generation). Junco explains the contrast in terms of changing conceptions of imperial dominion, saying in the first case the loss was imagined as the king's, in the second case, the nation's. Others suggest problems at home distracted attention. Michael Costello says the empire meant little to ordinary Spaniards.

However, the proposition that it had little impact on attitudes is surprising. 47,000 soldiers were sent 1807-20; loss of trade affected merchants and industrialists; some migrated to the new republics, leaving relatives behind. There has been some relevant work, by Brian Hamnett ['Spain and Portugal and their Continentel American Territories in the 1820s: An Examination of the Issues', European History Quarterly, 41:3, 2011] and Christopher Schmidt Nowara [*The Conquest of History: Spanish Colonialism and National Histories in the Nineteenth Century*. 2006; '"La España Ultramarina": Colonialism and Nation-building in Nineteenth-century Spain', European History Quarterly, 34:2, 2004; co-edited with John Nieto-Phillips. *Interpreting Spanish Colonialism: Empires, Nations, and Legends*. 2005].

Initially, the loss of empire seems to have been expected to represent a temporary setback; the expectation was that American lands would be regained. There were attempts to regain them in 1829; in the 1840s Spain supported a Bourbon monarchical scheme for Ecuador; then it supported imperial intervention in Mexico, in the 1860s, when it also reestablish rule in the Dominican Republic. There were also naval campaigns waged against both Peru and Chile. Recognition of independence was long delayed, and staggered when it came.

There were cultural efforts: to develop a pan-Hispanism. In Cuba and Puerto Rico, empire was reconfigured. Slavery became central to the Cuban economy: over 600,000 new slaves were imported 1811-60. Cuba was central to the Spanish economy, and there was much migration there in the 1840s. The persistence of empire raised issues about inequality, both in relation to slaves and in relation to Cubans and Puerto Ricans. In the 1860s and 70s, the issue of the abolition of slavery was divisive.

The loss of empire arguably contributed to instability. It may have weakened the legitimacy of the crown, and encouraged military involvement in politics. He would focus especially on the second. Crown ambition first drew the military into politics, but this had older roots. Some soldiers were influenced by their experiences in Latin America. Soldiers who had done Latin American service were known as Ayacuchos, after the last big battle fought against the royalists. The prominent politician Espartero was one such. Adrian Shubert has recently

written about the importance of this experience to Espartero's career: he was in America between 1815 and 1825.
[http://www.academia.edu/4661068/America_and_the_Making_of_Baldomero_Espartero]

Independence promoted debate about citizenship and democracy. The Cadiz constitution promoted exclusion on the basis of race, with Latin American circumstances in mind – though by contrast Indians were included as part of the Spanish nation. Latin American revolutions encouraged anti-democratic attitudes. Underrepresentation of Latin America and exclusion of people of African dissent fed into independence movements. Subsequently, departing from Cadiz practice, Cuba and Puerto Rico were altogether excluded from the Cortes. The 1820 revolution was blamed for the loss of America. Chaos in Latin America was cited as evidence of the need for monarchy.

Several questions were taken together:

Crosby Arnold: suggested that it was under the Napoleonic Code that 'race' was first legally constructed in Europe. Wondered about the impact of the Haitian revolution – Napoleon's first major defeat. The loss of Haiti provided crucial impetus for his turn to expansion in Europe and the construction of the Continental System.
Ertman: to Davis, wanted to know about the role of the church in all this: the significance of anti-clericalism in a Spanish and Italian context. To Posada Carbo: did acceptance of the loss of the first empire from the 1870s bring greater political stability?
Mellone: so much of empire was lost all at once: was this explained in terms of conspiracy? Or did they have a theory of spontaneous revolution breaking out simultaneously, perhaps because of shifts in public opinion?

Answers:

Davis: to Crosby Arnold: the Cadiz experiment was so brief in Italy that its interrelation with civil law was never worked through. Property rights rather than citizenship were the focus of reforming attention.
To Ertman: he had left the Church out of his account because so much could be said about it! It was generally noted that, though in some ways radical, the Cadiz constitution affirmed the significance of monarchy and church. Mazzini and others in the next generation found this anathema. But for this generation, memory of the horrors of the counterrevolution were important: they didn't want to precipitate that kind of reaction again.
To Mellone: the revolution on the Spanish mainland was seen as the result of conspiracy, but it was also clear that it commanded significant popular support. In Sicily, revolution immediately prompted civil war: the reason why it was such a bitter memory for Amari. This didn't happen on the mainland, partly perhaps because of the immediate mobilisation of national guards. Public opinion had previously had little chance to find expression because of censorship; the revolution brought the first moment of free speech since the era of the Jacobin republics.

Posada Carbo: to Crosby Arnold - the Haitian revolution certainly had a great impact in Latin America, though it could be read in various ways. It prompted fear, evident in Venezuela. But Bolivar turned to Haiti for support. It had a direct impact on the Cuban economy. Most Latin American constitutions expanded participation more than Cadiz did: they did not recognise race as a barrier to citizenship.

To Ertman – hasn't thought so much about post 1870, but even then, Spain was still clinging on to empire. She granted recognition to Colombia only in the 1880s, to Honduras only in the 1890s.
[he didn't respond to Mellone's question at the time, but now says in relation to this: To some contemporary Spaniards (like Mariano Torrente, author of the classical account of the wars of independence in Spanish America), America was lost not as a result of American opinion but because of the actions of a few 'demagogues', who managed to persuade an ignorant majority. Others like Martín Fernandez de Navarrete (1825) attributed the loss of America to the impact of foreign and false ideas among creoles or Spanish Americans, or their own personal interests, while Indians remained loyal to the Crown.]

More questions were taken:

Sanchez Leon: to Davis: asked about the significance of the historic relationship between Naples and Spain. Noted that one article in the Cadiz constitution promised to establish chairs of political economy throughout the kingdom. This reflected the influence of the Neapolitan enlightenment, notably Genovesi. This influenced especially Saragossa, where there was an attempt to revive a Habsburg legacy as an alternative to the Bourbon one. In the nineteenth century, the link continued via the carbonari. Most local upheavals after 1848 were linked to the presence of Italian carbonari, especially in Andalucia, but starting in the Aragonese world [centering on Saragossa]. [see on this Guy Thomson, *Birth of Modern Politics in Spain]*.
To.Posada Carbo: he thought the short-term impact of the loss of empire was huge. It undermined one element of the Cadiz constitution, which had maintained old-style merchant privilege into the constitutional world, because Cadiz itself was a major port in which merchants were powerful figures. Merchants remained strong while the empire was strong, but when it was lost, their corporate attitudes also lost power in the face of individualism.
Sotiropoulos: to Davis, had thought when listening to him of many parallels with Greece. Debate over American and French constitutions similarly had an important impact on Greek thought. Some Italians were influential in Greece, notably Santarosa [Piedmontese, once in Napoleonic service. Took part in 1821 revolution in Piedmont; went to Greece as an exile 1824]. It is odd, then, that the Cadiz constitution doesn't seem to have attracted attention there.
Fleming: had wanted to ask about the influence of the American constitution, but that has been touched on. Thinks it's hard to shake off national teleology, and that the paper givers are doing well at this. Reill, *Nationalists who feared the nation*, remains a good model in this regard.
Colley: wondered whether liberal constitutionalism and empire can be contrasted: aren't there overlaps? The US used its constitution to construct a new kind of overland empire; there were links between constitution and empire in Brazil; in Haiti, monarchy and constitutionalism were combined. Did people at the time recognise the full range of political projects which constitutions could serve?
Isabella: has two short comments, linking the two papers. Neapolitan constitutionalists did make reference to what was happening in Latin America, though they were more preoccupied with European developments. In terms of why the Cadiz constitution was liked: he agreed with Davis that local autonomy was crucially important. A preoccupation with local autonomy came through very clearly in petitions of the time. Other themes from the petitions were freedom of press and speech, and the need to stem monarchical power.
Philp: commented that in identifying with Spain, constitutionalists were surely identifying with an empire.

Answers:

Posada Carbo: to Linda Colley: he hadn't meant to set up a dichotomy between liberalism and empire. Worth noting that from a Latin American perspective, the Cadiz constitution appeared more imperial than liberal.

Davis: to Sanchez Leon: would think more about reciprocal influences. Aggregate response to other questions: an important thing about the Cadiz constitution was that it had been sanctioned by a Bourbon ruler in Spain; this gave grounds for hope that another Bourbon ruler might be persuaded to endorse it too. He thought this constitution was seen as having synthesised a variety of centre-left experiments of the recent past. He didn't think Spain was generally conceived as an empire: the fact that the Spanish had resisted Napoleon was much more important to their image. The home rule issue was divisive within the Two Sicilies: Matteo Galdi, in his opening statement to parliament, said it was not intended. Some did advocate using the American constitution as an alternative model.

Imagining the political community in its setting: I

Pablo Sanchez Leon: Constitutional imagination and the shaping of political citizenship in Spain 1808-76

Constant, on ancient and modern liberty, saw the nation state as the child of modern liberty. What autonomy were cities expected to retain in that context? Spanish cities didn't secure representation as such in the constitutional era; that could be seen as a form of liberty that had been lost with the Habsburgs. The 1812 constitution did allow for the election of mayors, but *Jefes Politicos* presided over provinces and the cities within them and exercised key powers. His focus would be on the role of cities in the political imagination of liberties.

Traditionally the Spanish monarchy had been conceived as a jurisdictional entity. The 1812 constitution constituted the nation as Catholic more than as Spanish. No special role was given to cities. Corporations were opened to wider participation, with a view to regenerating them from the inside. There were issues both about their national and their local role: the two were not clearly distinguished.

These tensions had a history of their own in enlightenment thought. *Paisanismo* – localism – was recognised as a problem; partialities of all kinds were seen as hindering the pursuit of the common good. But in another tradition, local government was seen as the natural embryo of citizenship: cities could be seen as republics within the monarchy.

Urban juntas seized power in the vacuum left by the loss of the Spanish monarch. Many juntas reproduced urban social structure, including in the role given to the aristocracy. But a new approach was taken to the local constituency. Junta meant gathering or unity: there was a stress on bringing diverse elements together. Juntismo survived as a tradition of political experience down to 1854: it provided a background to the formation of the *Union Liberal*, whose emergence made the theme less important. 1808 marked the birth of both juntismo and pronunciamentos, both key features of Spanish political culture, which vanished from the repertoire only from 1876.

Towns played a cyclical role in political education. Liberals divided on the issue of citizens in towns: different interpretations were offered in 1808 and from 1833 onwards. Democracy was first defined by conservatives in relation to juntismo. Moderados worried about the vision of democratic monarchy held by the progresistas. They believed that it was necessary to build a new aristocracy for the modern age. They linked juntismo to demagogues and plebeian tyranny. Progresistas thought that political citizenship should begin at the local level, and therefore that cities should be value. They valued the junta inheritance, and the tradition of local militias, though they didn't equate this with democracy. They saw the election of ayuntamentos as a way of consolidating the position of the middle classes, and promoting the circulation of elites; also as a means of educating the lower classes, and preparing them for citizenship.

Doceanismo was a discourse about the lost unity of liberals. Republicans, on the rise from the 1840s, joined in the dialogue. Federal approaches to constitution-making were not unusual by the mid C19, but Spanish ideas on this theme were rooted in distinct local traditions. As such they provided a matrix for Spanish republicanism, eg for the ideas of Pi y Margall. This approach made it possible to combine individual and collective perceptions of the subject. Pre 1870, the juntas had conceived their role as transitional: they formed in order to achieve change at the centre. Cantonalismo was a more radical vision: it implied a distinct form of state. It was in the context of the development of this vision that democracy lost its derogatory connotations; anarchist ideology also developed in this crucible.

Juan Luis Simal: The Spanish press abroad and the dispute over international public opinion in the early nineteenth century: liberal and absolutist strategies

His subject was freedom of the press and its geopolitical implications. In 1818, liberals celebrated the power of public opinion. Ferdinand did not ignore its significance: he identified it as needing to be suppressed. The two periods of liberal dominance, 1810-14 and 1820-3, saw an explosion of opinion. Liberals continued to have access to freedom of opinion in exile in Britain and the US. They used this to condemn Ferdinand's monarchy.

By undertaking publication in exile, liberals developed various international links. They published many magazines and newspapers, especially in London; they also found supporters among Latin Americans in London. A Cuban exile -- the priest and member of the Spanish Parliament during the Liberal Triennium, Felix Varela, whose publication played a major role in the evolution of Cuban independence movement – founded the first Spanish newspaper in the US, in Philadelphia and New York. New Orleans was another publishing cenre. There were also some exiles in Latin America and France, especially after 1830. They often collaborated with foreign media.

The Spanish monarchy also published newspapers abroad, with its own version of events, especially in relation to the independence of Latin America. They had to deal with public opinion abroad. Ferdinand first tried to get the British and French to suppress the Spanish press. When this failed, he chose as editor of a London-based paper a former liberal journalist, a Portuguese employee of the Spanish embassy in the US: Miguel Cabral de Noronha. The object was no more than to cultivate skepticism, but even so it was a complete failure: they did not manage to attract a large audience. Further such attempts were made in France after 1823, with the support of the Bourbon monarchy, and in New York and New

Orleans. The fact that they published in Spanish limited their impact. They did also insert news in English newspapers, but they were mainly interested in influencing opinion in the Spanish-speaking world.

Their main audience was in Spanish America, both independent and colonial. Exiles also targeted them: these audiences were key to the economic viability of the exile press. As sales there increased, coverage of Spanish American topics grew.

The initial struggle over Spanish public opinion took place initially abroad, and was intertwined with the struggle for international public opinion.

Various questions were taken:

Paquette: wanted to put a question to Sanchez Leon from a Portuguese perspective. In 1808, the Junta Central was a product of circumstances. But were there some at the time who questioned the need for a Junta Central: did they think initiative should have remained in local hand? In Portugal, municipalism followed the failure to institute political constitutionalism at a national level. Was that also the case in Spain?
Innes: noted that an ongoing project on post 1848 political thought currently being led by Gareth Stedman Jones stressed the ubiquity of these municipalist concerns post 1848. Localism seemed to emerge as a theme in Spain earlier. She wondered why this was.
Urbinati: to Sanchez Leon: she would like to know more about the influence of French theorists, Condorcet and Paine
To Simal: since Hume, it has been standard to observe that all government is based on opinion. But usually this was taken to mean literate opinion. Was that the case in the context he had described?

Answers

Sanchez Leon: to Paquette: there was a reaction against the Junta Central, which was seen as departing from expectations. The seedbed of federal developments lay in that reaction.
To Innes: during the ancien regime, Spanish cities embodied the third estate. The problem was how to combine that tradition with ideas about unity. In the 1820s, when there was a final attempt to make the Cadiz constitution work, this emerged as a key problem, in turn prompting a new debate in the 30s, about how to deal with these tensions.

Simal: to Urbinati, on readership. The picture was complicated by the fact that in patriotic societies, newspapers were read aloud, as a basis for debate. This was also a tradition in tertulias, clubs. It is striking how many newspapers were printed at this time. Papers published abroad were however chiefly aimed at those who wielded political influence.

More questions were taken:

Crosby Arnold: wanted to introduce the idea of the juristic person. Constitutions set up a juristic fiction: the state as person, underneath which existed juristic personalities (such as ‘race’, ‘gender’). Since these are not natural categories, the obligation to conform to them is implicitly coercive: civil law, the commercial code, criminal codes all play parts in this coercive process. The fine print with regard to one's status as a ‘person’ under private law(civil codes) has provided the means of installing and, at the same time, hiding exclusion

and discrimination in 'democratic' societies. She suggested that dependence on fictions made constitutions inherently unstable and prone to alteration.
Davis: to Sanchez Leon - thinks that the question of how liberals saw local government is good terrain on which to think about what was distinctive about the Mediterranean. These issues were major issues 1820-1, but were highly controversial. Feudalism was traditionally associated with local government, which made progressivism centralist by reaction, following the Napoleonic example. But there was a countertradition, in which strengthening local institutions was seen as a way of reviving older forms of democracy. Mazzini did not favour local autonomy. The interesting question, though, is why were these concerns more acute in some places than in others – thus, more in Naples than in Tuscany, Piedmont or Lombardy?
To Simal – wanted to ask about the rise of Catholic media, defending absolutism.
Colley: picking up on the title of the session, 'in its setting', she wanted to probe the concept of 'its setting'. What is this? If exiles play an important role, she wondered if the places in which they were exiled were not also important. She wondered about the influence of eg Bentham, who tried to build up an exile network.
Ertman: was interested in links to later regionalist traditions.
Arsan: noted that in Ottoman lands there were also debates about local autonomy, following the Crimean war. [Historiography: Elizabeth Thompson, 'Ottoman political reform in the provinces', *IJMES* (1993); Milen Petrov, 'Everyday forms of compliance', in the Balkans (2004); Engin Akarli, *The long peace*. Elektra Kostopolou http://rci-rutgers.academia.edu/ElektraKostopoulou has done some interesting work on a slightly later period in Crete]
Drolet: on the same theme, wondered about the influence of the doctrinaires, or of debates around Rousseau which took place in early C19 France.
Hadjikyriacou: in relation to the question posed by Innes – in the 1830s, liberal ideologies were not articulated in the places he studies, but there had in practice been local administration within communities from C17, sometimes from even earlier. These remained quite fluid, though there was some institutionalization by the 1830s, importantly *before* the Tanzimat, in response to socio-economic turmoil.

Answers:

Sanchez Leon: the new literature on Cadiz stresses the translation of old structures into new. During the ancien regime, there were traditions of autonomy, but less of self-government, that is, of popular involvement. At Cadiz, the emphasis changed. Similarly, Cadiz brought the establishment of chambers of commerce. These represented a democratisation of older bodies, Something similar happened within cities.
To Drolet: conservatives certainly picked up on the idea of capacity: they wanted property owners only to wield political power. But it was difficult to erase the memory of the French having been defeated on the basis of the broad franchise of 1812.

Simal: to Davis, on Catholic media. There was a debate within Catholic/royalist milieux about whether one should debate with liberals; it could be argued that to do so was already to grant them legitimacy. But there were also many conservatives in exile, who saw the need to participate in broader debate. The Carlists had to face the same issues. There was also a conservative international. It's important too to keep practical considerations in mind. Exiles had to make a living. Common ways of doing so were by writing or teaching, or by publishing papers, esp if one could get pay by doing so (eg, from the Mexican ambassador). The London publisher Rudolph Ackermann got Spanish exiles to write for a Latin American audience primarily because he identified this as a business opportunity.

To Colley: certainly there were many contacts with English liberals and radicals, eg on the various committees set up to promote national causes.

Imagining the political community in its setting: II

Nadia Urbinati: The beginning of representative democracy in Italy: the Roman Republic 1849

The term representative democracy has been used by a variety of people to mean a variety of things. It was sometimes contrasted favourably with pure democracy, sometimes the reverse. The constitution of the Roman Republic was unusual, though, in pinning the label 'pure democracy' on representative democracy. Mazzini and others of the triumvirate responsible for the constitution affirmed 'democracy**'** without distinguishing forms. Mazzini always took democracy to imply representative democracy.

Sismondi made it a project to collect republican constitutions from the collapse of the Roman empire onwards. His way of constructing the story might make us think that modern constitutions exist outside empires. As he saw it, a constitution is a set of rules designed to regulate equality and liberty. Sismondi wanted to extract the idea of a constitution from a specifically French-revolutionary context. In his view, equality was more a problem than an ideal.

Italy between 1796 and 1848 was a laboratory of constitutions. At least 42 were written, in many different settings, including city states. One constitution written for Bologna had more than 300 articles. By contrast the Roman constitution had only 60 articles. The 1948 Italian constitution paid rhetorical deference to its example.

All these constitutions looked to French constitutions as models (or so Luciano Guerci says). The antiquarian Scipione Maffei had started collecting constitutions as early as 1736. Montesquieu influenced eighteenth-century constitutional thinking, with his emphasis on the need to balance and limit power. Following the revolution, constitutions were also expected to empower the citizen. The post-revolutionary period saw a hyperproduction of catechisms. At least one such followed Rousseau in equating representative democracy with elective aristocracy.

Following the collapse of the Napoleonic empire, there was a debate about forms of government, which became entangled with the debate about national unification. Between the Congress of Vienna and 1848, representative government of a very limited kind was introduced in many Italian states. In the early C19, the merits of representative government were celebrated on both left and right.

Republicans linked representation to the power of the people. Mazzini identified equality as the basic condition on which liberty rests; he wanted equal treatment of women among others. This was the mental frame in which the founders of the Roman republic. This republic was founded on universal suffrage; it lasted only a few months. Time did not allow a government to be established, but some laws were passed to organise life. Rights to work and to housing were proclaimed (a system of rent control was instituted). Also a right to admission to a hospital. These rights were not written into the constitution itself, but

constructed in law. The constitution made only a general promise to promote the welfare of citizens. Sovereignty was said to lie by eternal right in the people. Republic was understood in its classical meaning, as the state; it was stated that the republic should be organised democratically. Democracy was understood to comprise equality, liberty and fraternity, in that order. Universal suffrage was recognised as a right. Clear rules were laid down as to how the constitution itself might be changed – by supermajority, an important development, emphasised by Kelsen. There was seen to be a problem in practice, however, because of the decadence of the electorate.

Viviana Mellone: The liberal discourse against absolutism in southern Italy following repression of 1848-9

Her question was how the Bourbons became disreputable in the judgment of European opinion.

Beccaria said that punishment should serve not just the good of the convict; the criminal law provided a framework for defining relations between the state and the individual. In the 1830s-40s, criminal law acquired more political resonance, as jurists and economists wrote about it as an aspect of good government.

1848, debate over the south of Italy developed a focus on propaganda against the Bourbons. Revolutionaries exiled to Piedmont, France and England produced militant literature in which they denounced what they portrayed as a criminal judiciary. These texts made some groundless accusation. They aimed to destroy the Bourbons on the terrain of criminal law.

She highlighted two examples of this trend. One was a newspaper article which made criminal justice the basis for its criticism. It was argued that the government had ignored the judicial immunity of members of parliament (though in fact in the context in question, the members had met as private parties, so they were not protected). The other was a text by Mancini, who held the first international law chair at the university of Turin. He had been asked to draw up a revised criminal code. In this context, he raised both the issue of immunity, and that of the role of special grand juries, which were said to be contrary to the constitution (though in fact the constitution did provide for their use in the case of political crimes). Exile debate focussed on features of relatively little importance in order to make a case.

These attacks however served a precise political strategy, which sought to undermine absolutism. A similar strategy was followed in the development of anti-absolutist propaganda in other pre-unification Italian states.

These attacks had an impact on Italian criminal policy after 1848. The category of political crime disappeared in favour of that of the crime against the state.

Several questions were collected:

Drolet: to Urbinati – he wondered if she saw the Roman constitution as marking a Rousseauist moment, with its emphasis on equality?

Hadjikyriacou: ditto. Wondered what she meant in referring to the 'discourse of modernity'?
Innes: to Mellone – wondered how distinctive this Italian critical rhetoric was: wasn't criticising rulers for abuse of power in the domain of criminal law a pretty standard criminal tactic; certainly there are instances of this in England throughout C17 and C18 as well as C19.

Answers:

Mellone: to Innes – she thought Italians were unusual in adopting this line of attack post 1848. **Innes** said Chartists in England also used it, and would be surprised if it had not been used elsewhere. What about in France post 1851?
Urbinati: to Drolet. Mazzini was certainly not Rousseauian because he endorsed representation.

Further questions were collected:

Simal: to Urbinati – asked if a learning process was taking place if constitutions were getting shorter. The Cadiz constitution was also very long.
To Viviana – wondered what she meant in talking of the critics of absolutism displaying scientific credentials.

Ertman: to Urbinati – wanted to know if women voted for the constituent assembly.
Urbinati: no, but it was agreed to give them the vote in subsequent elections – which didn't however take place because of the fall of the republic. **Ertman** found it surprising that this move should not have stirred up the usual worries about the influence of the Church.
(Urbinati was asked to reserve her answer for the general round-up of answers).

Sanchez Leon: thought there was a surprising lack of reflection on the concept of representation, what it meant to 'represent' something at this period.

Answers:

Urbinati: to Sanchez – they did discuss representation, and saw both continuities and discontinuities across time. Some said that the Gauls and Germans had sent representatives to Rome. Others stressed discontinuities, seeing representation as a practice that had developed initially within the church, or pointing to the Cortes in Spain. In the nineteenth century, the term was strongly associated with democracy.
To Ertman: Mazzini saw himself as the priest or pope of the republic. He thought that religious feeling might focus on him.

Mellone: to Simal. As she saw it, jurists used to addressing a specialist public continued to employ the same kinds of arguments as they had before but now aired them in the public domain. By so doing, they exploited their intellectual credentials for political ends.

There were further exchanges:

Crosby Arnold: in relation to Mellone, agreed with Innes that there were other instances of criminal law ideas being invoked in political controversy.

Philp wanted to pursue further clarification of Mellone's argument. Why weren't the jurists worried about whether their charges stood up; Mellone seemed to be suggesting that their claims were flimsy, but this didn't worry them.
Mellone said the object was just to make propaganda; also to teach readers juridical instruments. There was another object of bringing legal procedure into public debate, eg in Germany we find debate about the relative merits of inquisitorial and Anglo-Saxon traditions of process.
Isabella noted that there was a discourse earlier around the Carbonari trials. One implication there was that the restoration regime had a constitution, though a faulty one
Mellone noted that the liberal argument was that the liberal constitution continued to be valid; it had been disregarded, but it had not lost validity.

Davis asked what we knew about European reactions to Mazzini's constitution.
Urbinati said that we know how the French government reacted: they regarded it as very radical, and crushed the republic.

Imagining the political community in its setting: III

Michalis Sotiropoulos: Democracy and the limits of the "state under the rule of law": Political economy and reforms in modern Greece c. 1830-1860

Noted that in Greece two complications arose in relation to 'democracy'. One, its association with the Greek classical world. Two, the fact that the same word covered the ground covered in other European countries by two words, 'democracy' and 'republic'.

Democracy came to the fore as a topic for discussion in the 1850s, when it was criticised as not being an appropriate form for the modern world. By the late 1850s, attitudes had changed. European political economy and the revolutions of 1848 both played a part here.

Greek economic thought first took shape in early C19. It was influenced by wider European currents, esp. by Say's ideas about *industrie*. But Greek thinkers removed industrie from the specifically republican framework in which Say originally placed it. They preserved only his stress on the importance of personal values: manners. Greeks made use of this, portraying themselves as corrupted.

The Saint Simonians played an important part in reviving the idea of the Mediterranean as a civilisational space. This discourse was also endorsed by Greek elites

From the 1830s, state authorities focussed on the creation of the state under the rule of law. They were influenced by the tradition of *polizeiwissenschaft*, which identified the goal of government as happiness. Education was seen in this framework as providing a means by which to develop industrial manners. The criminal code identified lack of industriousness as a problem.

Soutsos was influenced by these currents, but in this context his views shifted. His 1843 constitutional tract marks a move away from his previous exclusive focus on economic virtues. He began to advocate active participation in the economic. In the late 1840s, as democracy became the focus of extensive discussion in Greece, Soutsos wrote extensively

about the issue. He was influenced by a progressive view of history, but went beyond the liberals in his negative account of democracy, in his view a system whereby the individual disappeared in the mass. He responded to the 1848 revolutions with alarm. He saw them as jeopardising private property and individual liberty.

The historian Gekas characterises Greece in this period as a debt colony (Sakis Gekas (2013), The crisis of the long 1850s, Historical Review, [journal of the Institute for Neo-Hellenic Research] forthcoming) . It did not play a significant role in the eastern Mediterranean during the Crimean War. Exports fell off; the economy became increasingly monocultural, focussing on the production of currents. Europeans failed in their attempts to solve Greece's debt problem in 1859. The place of Greece among civilised nations was seen to be in jeopardy

In 1859, Soutsos started to credit democracy with Athenian achievements. He portrayed Solon as a hero who had diffused the liberal spirit and consolidated democracy, seen as a social condition characterised by wide property ownership. Two scholars (Pierre Vidal-Naquet, *Pera apo tin Arhaia Elliniki Dimokratia* [Beyond Ancient Greek Democracy], (1990), pp. 183-239, and (in French) P. Vidal-Naquet, Nicole Loraux, 'La formation d'Athenes bourgeoise: Essai d'historiographie, 1750-1850, in R.R. Bolgar, Classical influences in Western Thought, A.D. 1650-1870 (1979)) showed many years ago that this was a common European discourse.

From the late 1850s, the demand for reform from both elite and people intensified. The monarchical state was failing to reform itself. In the background to this debate lay a novel conception of the state as the agent of political reform. Though Soutsos talked more about democracy at this time than previously, the concept was still not central either to his own or to others' discussions.

In the Greek case, international crisis seems to have played an important part in forcing attention to reform.

Andrew Arsan: Re-imagining political community in Mount Lebanon 1830-60

He said that he had reshaped his intended paper in the light of discussions in the conference thus far.

These were tumultuous decades for France and for Mount Lebanon. France was beset both with internal problems and with diplomatic crises: in 1840; at the time of the Crimean war; in the Syrian crisis of 1860. During this period, Lebanon acquired its own loi organique. It had undergone rapid political changes since the end of Egyptian occupation in 1840, in which Bashir II had represented the chief face of authority in Lebanon.. In the aftermath of that, a direct Ottoman administration was installed. In 1856 there was a rebellion in the central region against an overweening local family. In 1860, Maronite-Druze conflict drew in the great powers.

In this context, a wide range of actors formulated new political visions. The French were attentive to the geopolitical implications of what happened in Lebanon. To local, the geopolitical context was more a source of opportunities. Both European and Lebanese actors had ambivalent attitudes to 'the people'. Both wanted a veneer of representation, but thought ordinary people a disruptive presence in the political domain. They sought a way forward

within the context of larger schemes for international protection of the Lebanese political and social order.

Lamartine in the Chamber of Deputies called for a 'general protectorate of the Occident upon the Orient'; Napoleon's dream would then be realised. Syria was seen as a bridgehead for the realisation of this vision, especially because of the strength of the Catholic Maronite community there. It was mooted that the Pope might be installed in Constantinople, leaving Rome to the Italian state.

Maronites developed their own strategies. The clerical party had links to the legitimists in France. Some wanted restoration of the old pattern of Christian self-rule. In this context, statistics were manipulated and perverted. Religion provided a basis for new forms of political mobilisation. Maronites presented petitions to European consuls and the great powers. They used the language of popular representation while denigrating the views of the common people. In the 1860s their claims were taken up by a would-be Christian prince, Youssef Karam, who in 1866 led a rebellion against Ottoman rule (via an Ottoman Christian governor), demanding self-rule for Lebanon. His pamphlet *Joseph Karam aux gouvernements et nations de l'Europe* (n.d) [Gallica http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k1158882] invoked the right of nations to self-government. This represented a creative attempt to address the quandaries of Lebanese political life.

Julia Clancy-Smith: How Democracies may have come to Mediterranean Africa: Protection, Migration, Imperialism *[her paper was read in her absence by Philp]*

She suggested that it was possible to talk of revolutionary Mediterraneans from the 1790s (the subject of Ian Coller's work in progress). People in motion were key transmitters of novel political and social ideas.

Clusters and circuits

Some examples: among the impacts of Napoleon's invasion of Egypt was the scattering of people. The French invasion of Algiers 1830 changed views in Tunis. In 1833, considering making war on Sardinia-Piedmont [which, along with Naples, was pressing them to agree to a treaty of peace and friendship, formally renouncing slavery and piracy], the Tunisians observed that Sardinia had progressed as they themselves had not. The French presence in Algeria helped to bring in Saint Simonians, through whom freemasonry penetrated the Ottoman empire. The Moroccan-Algerian leader Abd el Kader was in prison in France during 1848; he made wide ranging contacts. Later in exile in Syria he travelled to perform the hajj. Europeans also affected the region through their educational efforts and abolition campaigns: the first Ottoman state formally to abolish slavery was Tunisia in the 1840s.

Nodes

Example of Finzi, an Italian Jewish political refugee who came to Tunis 1829 and set up a printing press, though he had to depend on outside supplies and labour (provided in part through the Rubattino Sardinia-Tunis shipping company). [His descendants still run the printing press]

Localities

Finzi built on longstanding links between Livorno and Tunis. Until the rise of Alexandria, Tunis was the only Ottoman North African port to trade across the Mediterranean. It also had the largest European expatriate community.

Municipal councils deserve attention as sites for change. They increasingly accepted responsibility for the wellbeing of an emerging 'public'.

Patronage and protection

Social change endangered older vertical relationships of protection. Tanzimat reforms challenged these older forms.

Themes

Circulation of ideas: paradoxical as it might seem, Napoleon's attack on the Pope horrified the Ottoman world, and may have helped to promote anti-democratic sentiment.

She has a book in progress on what she calls 'coastalisation'. It's concerned with human pressure on the vulnerable shore.

Also encourages attention to the Woman Question.

Some questions were collected:

Drolet: to Sotiropoulos – wondered if Soutsos read only Say? There were many others he might have read on the industrie theme, including Dunoyer, Thierry, Chaptal and Saint Simon, representing a broad spectrum of political and economic views.
Zanou: to Arsan – she was interested in the way in which religion and national identity fused in the Lebanon; religion also played an important part in shaping the identities of ethnic Greeks working for the Tsar.
To Sotiropoulos – his account suggests that intellectually Greece looked primarily to France and Germany. Does this imply that the utility of the Mediterranean frame is limited?
Isabella: to Sotiropoulos – the discussion he sketched sounded much like one circulating in Italy in the same period. He wondered if they were reading Romagnosi or other Italian writers?

Answers

Arsan: to Zanou – interpretative schemes generally stress changing ideas about the identity of the Lebanese nation. He wants to suggest that the meaning of religious identity was also in flux, among other things it was changed by becoming a statistical category.

Sotiropoulos: to Drolet – Soutsos continued to respect Say, Blanqui etc, but his own views were changing. Another name that does come up is Sismondi's. He followed a Sismondian, anti-Ricardian reading of England. He read widely in French writings, but rejected Saint Simonianism and what he called socialism.
To Zanou: in terms of legal thought, Greek judges drew on all kinds of sources, Ottoman, German, French – it was a total mess. Greece didn't acquire its own civil code till 1946. Important in this context was the attitude of Romanist jurists [some but not all of them

Bavarian], who were reluctant to adopt French codes. Drawing on Savigny, they argued that it was important first to shape a course of legal development before attempting codification. By contrast the Ionian islands used the Code Civil.

More questions were collected:

Paquette: to Arsan – would like to hear more about the petitions he mentioned.
Hadjikyriacou: noted that there is a rich secondary literature on Ottoman petitions. He wanted though to comment on Clancy Smith. True, Ottomanists tend to exclude the Ottoman world from the age of revolution: he has done this himself; there was not much in the way of revolutionary activity based on values of liberalism or democracy. But if instead one looks at changing practices of political participation, she is right, there is a lot to look at. He also thought freemasonry a promising topic for investigation. Ionians carried it to Cairo, Cyprus and Bulgaria.
Innes: wondered what vocabulary Soutsos used when he talked about what Sotiropoulos rendered 'participation'.

Answers:

Arsan: to Paquette. There's a long history of the use of petitions. From 1890 they were used to interpellate the international order, thus to achieve a revision of the organic law.
As to the issue of whether Ottoman lands experienced an age of revolutions [the following incorporates subsequent clarification of his comment]: from the 1790s onwards, local chroniclers were aware of European revolutions (as they had long been aware of events in Europe more generally); some regarded them as dangerous precedents, others as interesting curios, but most tended to view them through the prism of their own political culture (unsurprisingly enough). In Mount Lebanon, the Greek war and the July Days were invoked as precedents in the 1830s and 1840s. By the 1900s, the tumultuous events of 1840, 1842, 1845, and 1858 were explicitly described by some anti-clerical liberals as echoes and/or analogues of the French revolution, which carried the same anti-clerical, anti-feudal and, yes, democratic charge. [P. Jouplain is a good example of this (his very long tome *on La Question du Liban* is on Gallica)].

Sotiropoulos: to Innes – on reflection, not sure Soutsos was necessarily conceiving of participation in terms of voting. He could just have been making a point about association.

Closing remarks

Innes said there were certain themes which she had raised earlier from the chair, but which had never been pursued very tenaciously in discussion. She would like to try again to get people to focus on them now. One was the relative importance of international and national contexts. The other the question how far down the political scale significant political agency was exercised.

Philp suggested that it was very possible most popular agency would be found at the local level. For his part he also wanted to highlight two themes as deserving of further attention. One was change in forms of opposition to authority. It might be important further to disaggregate public opinion, to identify different strands of public discourse (eg legal challenges to authority). He also thought that, though some papers had engaged with the

concept of democracy, it was rarely clear quite what practices people had in mind when they used that term. He thought the contexts in which contemporaries saw democracy as being at work needed more careful attention.

The floor was opened to whatever final comments or suggestions participants might want to make.

Posada Carbo: to Innes – suggested that both might be false dichotomies. [**Innes subsequent comment:** perhaps the question is best phrased as, what role do we want to assign to each in explaining change? The people may eg always be involved in politics, but do we think any given set of changes in political practices can be attributed primarily to them?]

Sanchez Leon: suggested that in mid C19 Spain, a big issue was whether it was possible to reduce hunger for state positions so as to open space for a sphere of disinterested public discourse.

Andrew Robertson: emphasised the importance of locality in politics as a post-imperial phenomenon in both North and South America.

Philp suggested that empires, as highly layered polities, might keep more options open than national states.

Ricardo Rossolino?? - was reminded of Italo Calvino's 'Baron in the trees', who wouldn't come down from the trees until the republic was declared. Thought that political opinion could only exist when people had achieved a certain level of education. Technology had a role to play too, esp print technology; there were also techniques of argument to be considered.

Zanou: thinks localism tends to be associated (in the historiography) with landlord power, and seen as something negative, anti-modern. In relation to the convenors' notion of 'layered communities', she thought though that there was something more interesting to explore. Vocabularies of nationality were developing, but it wasn't immediately obvious to people at what level they should operate. Moreover, such perspectives opened up the possibility that those not seen as members of the 'nation' might be excluded. Again, this goes to the issue of whether 'transition' is a useful concept, and what it means to think of certain attitudes or practices as conservative.

Arsan: noted that in Arabic the same word is used to cover both 'national' and 'international' affairs: they can't easily be disentangled.
In relation to Clancy-Smith's notion of coastalisation: this had set him thinking about contemporaries' use of geographical categories, sometimes on the surface odd, eg Lebanon as like Switzerland.
He also thought the concept of a population worth pausing on: a body of people who might be expected to cohere, though they might in fact be moved about, deported etc.

Davis: thought that there should be a lot more to say about property rights. The period saw massive changes in these in a relatively short space of time. That's one context in which 'the people' were important players. One reason for hesitating about mobilising the people was the fear that they might then challenge property rights.

Simal: thought that any account which, as suggested, linked popular politics with education was basically a liberal story. This was unlikely to be the best way to conceptualise the political formation of those who opposed the liberal state.

Drolet: noted that engineers at the time commented on environmental degradation and its political implications. Thus, Le Play wrote about people and forests.

Hadjikyriacou: also wanted to say something about the importance of environmental issues. He called attention to Faruk Tabak, The *Waning of the Mediterranean, 1550-1870: A Geohistorical Approach* (2008). His own view was that famine, dearth etc were central to processes of political change. In his work on Cyprus, he talks about cycles of sustainability. Natural disasters were precipitants of revolt, alongside other political/social factors.

Crosby Arnold suggested that new forms of exclusion may have prompted new forms of resistance.

Paquette: thought more attention should be paid to public instruction.

Posada Carbo: suggested that one important theme we had failed to engage with was that of Roman Catholic mobilisation: ultramontane visions of 'democracy'. The Catholic Church emerged in the longer term as among the opponents of state absolutism.

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[i] Bibliography on these issues from Antonis:

Ali Yaycioglu, "Provincial Elites and the Empire in the Late Ottoman World: Conflict or Partnership?" In _The Ottoman World_, edited by Christine Woodhead.(London: Routledge Press, 2012) (Yayciolgu, of Stanford University, also has his monograph forthcoming, and is someone who may also want to have in mind Partners of the Empire: Communities, Notables and the Crisis of the Ottoman Order (1770-1820) (Princeton UP).

Canbakal, Hülya, Society and Politics in an Ottoman Town: Ayntab in the 17th century, Leiden: Brill , November 2006 (Hülya is someone you may want to contact, she has presented the following paper at a conference I was at: "The Age of Revolution in the Ottoman Empire." Short summary of her paper here: http://www.asia-europe.uni-heidelberg.de/de/forschung/a-governance-administration/a7/veranstaltungen/conferences1/heidelberg-2011.html

Eleni Gara "In Search of Communities in Seventeenth Century Ottoman Sources: The Case of the Kara Ferye District" _Turcica_30

Charles Wilkins, _Forging Urban Solidarities: Ottoman Aleppo, 1640-1700._ Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2010.

Bogac Ergene, "On Ottoman Justice: Interpretations in Conflict (16th -18th Century)" _Islamic Law and Society_, 8:1 (2001), 52-87.

Antonis Anastasopoulos, of the History Department of the University of Crete, is another person you may be interested in. His doctoral thesis (which he did not publish) is on the communal organisation of the city of Karaferye (Veroia) in the 18th century, and is well-versed on modes of representation.

Molly Greene has edited a volume called _Minorities in the Ottoman Empire_ (Markus Wiener Publishers: Princeton, 2005) Also published a a special issue of _Princeton Papers: Interdisciplinary

Journal of Middle Eastern Studies_, volume XII. See especially the contribution of Socratis Petmezas in that volume.

Sia Anagnostopoulou, _The passage from the Ottoman Empire to the Nation-States. The Case of the Greek State_ Istanbul: Isis, 2004

Older generations of Greek scholars working on that issue have included, e.g. Kostas Kostis, Spyros Asdrachas, or Yorgos Kontoyorgis.