

Popular consent and the European Order

Re-imagining Democracy workshop, 17-18 December 2015. Dept of Politics, University of Pisa

Present: Sylvie Aprile (French and European exile and migrations); **Alessandro Breccia** (history of Italian political institutions); **Paolo Benvenuto** (Montanelli; cultural and political relations between Italy and France during 1849-1870); **Gonzalo Butron Prida** (the crisis of the Ancien Régime in Spain); **Graham Clure** (Enlightenment political thought and Poland); **Michael Drolet** (French political thought); **Nico De Federicis** (the political philosophy of German Idealism); **Gian Luca Fruci** (Italian electoral democracy and plebiscites, political celebrities and communication circuits); **Joanna Innes** (co-organiser of project); **Maurizio Isabella** (1820s revolutions in Southern Europe); **Mauro Lenci** (political thought); **Aurélie Knüfer** (liberalism, and just war theory); **Iain McDaniel** (debates about democracy and Caesarism in the long nineteenth century); **Renaud Meltz** (public opinion and international relations under the July monarchy); **Ayse Ozil** (Ottoman notions of popular consent, power sharing at the top and debates about the run-up to the Tanzimat, 1839); **Mark Philp** (co-organiser of project); **Eva Piirimäe** (eighteenth-century debates on patriotism, cosmopolitanism, and sociability; Herder); **Eduardo Posada Carbó** (project facilitator); **Anna Maria Rao** (political and cultural history of eighteenth-century and revolutionary-era Italy); **José Miguel Sardica** (nineteenth and twentieth-century Portuguese and international history); **Glauco Schettini** (sociability as a tool of politicization in Italy during the Jacobin "Triennio"); **Alp Eren Topal** (Ottoman political concepts); **Ignazio Veca** (Catholic church and nationalist cultures); **Yanna Tzourmana** (cultural history, within the categories and narratives of the promises (knowledge, power, identity) both of modernism and post-modernism).

DAY 1

Joanna Innes welcomed everyone to the workshop. She explained the history and overall thrust of the project, and the objects of the current workshop in particular. She would be writing a chapter in the book of the project on this theme – an outline of her thoughts had been pre-circulated. It seemed to her that increasing insistence on the need to found rule on consent, and the development of new practices to institutionalise that, had effects not only on the national but also on the international arena, though this perspective had not generally been applied to the latter. For example, there was no history of the international relations dimension of the 1848 revolutions, which she thought surprising. She hoped to learn from the workshop – and was perfectly open to having her tentative hypotheses challenged.

1. **Graham Clure, From aristocratic republicanism to democratic royalism: popular sovereignty and political economy in the enlightenment debate about Polish constitutional reform 1772-95**

He suggested that, in the final decades of the eighteenth century, Poland presented an epitome of Europe's peace problem. People who contributed to debate about how to fix Poland understood this discussion to have wider significance.

Current interest in republicanism is sometimes linked to the idea that it's to republics we must look to find the origins of the modern democratic state, rather than to monarchies.

However, the distinction is overdrawn. Republics varied greatly, and some (such as Poland) were also monarchies. Republics had their own limits. Rousseau emphasized that in Sparta, although citizens were very free, slaves were very unfree. Rousseau went on from there to think about the implications of this pattern for representative government in a commercial state. He thought that self-concerned people would not make very good citizens.

The affairs of beleaguered Poland drew the interest of Europe from the 1760s through the 1790s. Poland was one of the oldest republics in Europe – as such presenting a contrast with its neighbours, the monarchies of Russia, Prussia and Austria. They all had rulers now known as enlightened despots, who had done well at growing their countries' economies, while the Polish economy stagnated. This entailed an inversion of the previous balance of power in the region and set the scene for nineteenth-century discussion about whether Poland should exist: it was argued that reform of its economy would be a precondition for that.

Rousseau and the physiocrats were interested in this debate. Several travelled there: eg Mably, Mercier de la Riviere. The challenge it presented was how to make an ancient republic into a modern one, and in that context, what should a modern republic look like? Hont has pointed out that Rousseau's Social Contract was meant to be part of a larger work, intended to replace Montesquieu's theory of monarchy. The fact that Rousseau wrote about Poland provides clues to his larger project. Writers' approaches to Poland often provide insights into their larger thinking. Mercier de la Riviere wrote about legal despotism, yet on Poland he was very republican. Dupont de Nemours was awarded a prize by Napoleon in 1809 for an essay in which he talked about having lived in Poland in the 1770s. He noted how both Rousseau and Mercier had apparently written out of character about Poland, Rousseau coming across as monarchical, Mercier as republican.

One problem with republicanism was that it didn't provide resources for criticizing slavery. This mattered in a Polish context because of the many serfs. Republicanism didn't look like a progressive ideology. Modernising the Polish economy was seen to entail moving beyond serfdom. Republican political theory suggested that becoming bourgeois would reduce political engagement.

Rousseau's debt to d'Argenson, whom he cited more often than any other author in his Social Contract, again underlines his debt to theories of progressive monarchy.

2. Eva Piirimae, Europe as a community of nations: Herder and the debates on perpetual peace around 1800

She would be talking about Herder's ideas in a late period of his life (he died in 1803). He has a reputation of being the father of nationalism, though in recent years, it's the contrasting, universalist side of his thought that's received more attention: he's been portrayed as a critic of imperialism. She suggested that he did have a distinctive conception of Europe, and that this had an interesting legacy in the nineteenth century, that hasn't yet been identified.

Crucial to her account would be Herder's debate with Kant, his teacher and mentor, and with the Kantians, especially on the subject of perpetual peace. Herder's Ideas for a Philosophy of the History of Mankind (4 vols, 1784-91) provides background to this debate. In Kant's Idea for a Universal History (1784), he stated that perpetual peace was the goal for man, and necessary for moral progress. Kant suggested that to achieve perpetual peace it would be necessary to establish an international federation of states with coercive powers. Herder however thought that the effect of that would be to legitimate absolute power, state machines like Prussia, which wouldn't be promising in terms of moral context. Such an international order was both unfeasible and undesirable: it would be a state of universal despotism.

Herder's vision was rather of an international *community*, linked by commerce, and underpinned by the activities of an industrious and pacific third estate. He thought that Europe had a common culture which derived from the period of *Völkerwanderungen*. The Hanseatic League exemplified the principles of the European system. He took his account down only to the Reformation. But he observed that the effect of commerce was to undermine machine states. He thought this opened up hope for the emancipation of Slavic peoples.

In the middle of the 1790s, in his *Letters for the Advancement of the Humanity*, Herder commented on the French Revolution and on the Kantian philosophical revolution. He pondered the lessons of the French experiment for the rest of Europe. He said that the problem was how to govern humans, humans as distinct from animals (he thought Kant was too ready to animalise humans). He thought that developments in France had the potential to revolutionise political theory, by showing that a republic could work even in a large territory.

In Europe at large, he thought that the fruitful fiction of the 'balance of power' (which presupposed the slavery of citizens) might now give way to a new system. He wrote in the context of a crisis, in which heads of one dynastic house were claiming the right to intervene in the territories of other houses. Meanwhile, France for its part had renounced the right of conquest.

He welcomed Kant's attempt to order the human sciences according to strict notions, and in this way to lay the right for an improved understanding of natural rights and the right of nations. It would mark a new era if these were generally recognized and practiced.

Later, cultural themes came to dominate his writing. Herder may have been alienated by the execution of Louis XVI – but Kant was put off by that too, and yet continued to develop republican themes.

In his essay on the saying, *It may hold in theory but won't work in practice* (1793), Kant first put forward the idea that the republic was the only state form. He remained in favour of a federation of states, but had new ideas about how this might be constituted. He thought that states were heading for exhaustion under the burdens of war; they would get republican constitutions, under which heads of state would lose the right to make war. He set out these ideas in more detail in his essay on perpetual peace, in which he argued that the republican state form would function well even for devils. In this essay, he said however that no state should force others to join the federation: it would be voluntary in character.

Kant's vision recalls Sieyès' development of Rousseau. It incorporated the idea that it was important to separate powers. Herder by contrast followed a Fénelonian line. He emphasized the democratic and sentimental foundations of politics, whether a state be republican or monarchical. In between essays on Comenius and Grotius, he asked how it was possible to combine national sentiment and peace. He thought that the two had originally been reconciled by Christianity, and increasingly were by science. Nonetheless, he said, one must guard against self-congratulatory prejudice, to which humans were naturally prone. He thought that the people, the Germans, should possess noble pride, and govern themselves, but shouldn't express this through military might or conquest, but rather through the development of science.

Kant's followers Fichte and Schlegel favoured a non-coercive federation. Schlegel defended democratic republics against Kant's criticisms. Fichte's student Heynig said that Kant was soft on despotism. Heynig favoured the kind of direct plebiscitary system espoused by 'Anarcharsis' von Cloots. Görres thought that a republic of peoples could be lawfully imposed on barbarian neighbours; the French could lawfully annexe the Rhineland. Herder

was not sympathetic to these ideas. He thought that the idea of progress towards a better republic was a phantom, and that the ‘happiness of the people’ was a blinding piece of rhetoric. In fact, it was wrong to try to impose on people. The rose of freedom must be plucked by people’s own hands. He increasingly took a critical distance from Kant and his followers. He is sometimes described as conservative – but he didn’t position himself with Gentz, who translated Burke.

Herder said that Grotius was the true anti-Machiavel. For Kant, Grotius, Pufendorf and Vattel etc were sorry comforters, who had in practice legitimated international aggression. Nonetheless, Herder argued, it was necessary to evolve by trial and error. He thought that there was progress in public understanding of the principles of international justice in human history, and that was the only acceptable meaning of perfectibility. Progress arose through interactions, which helped to form what he called ‘dispositions of peace’. Nations needed to develop common feeling towards one another. He hoped for a purified patriotism, rather than a republican imperialism: commerce needed to triumph over barbarism; jealousy of commerce was not inevitable.

How did Herder conceive of ‘nations’ at this point? Herder doesn’t make this clear. He said that the German peoples were entitled to self-government as much as the French nation. In his private correspondence, he was sympathetic to the efforts of the Swiss to assert themselves as a nation, despite French pressure.

He thought that the legacy of the French revolution was mixed. In 1800 he celebrated the French experiment, yet also the resilience of the German spirit.

He became more hopeful than he had been in the 1780s about rulers’ potential to follow true self-interest (i.e. the interest of the people). He suggested that succession questions might be settled by a congress of European powers; they should act as guardians of orphaned nations. Law and treaties might reduce grounds for war.

By 1802, he was arguing that Austria and Prussia had to act as a joint middle power between France and Russia in continental Europe, and to protect the German language. He clearly imagined Germany as a cultural nation given expression through existing states. Yet he also called for reforming these states along republican lines and for wide international solidarity all over Europe, hence thinking in terms fundamentally different from conservative political romanticism developing after Vienna. Rather, Herder’s ideas paved the way for the rise of liberal nationalisms like those of Wilhelm von Humboldt or Constant and democratic nationalisms like that of Mazzini. Herder never thought that national popular sovereignty constituted the sole criterion of legitimate government – but it’s hard to disentangle his thoughts on this question, and has been made harder by the way in which he’s retrospectively been recruited into different debates.

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Discussion

Joanna Innes asked Graham Clure to what extent those reflecting on Poland’s position grappled with the international context in which she had to operate.

Graham said that certainly the rise of Russia, esp during the Seven Years War, was really important in putting pressure on Poland. The first partition was an aftershock of that. Rousseau certainly identified the rise of Russia as a material factor. He thought that the Seven Years War raised questions about global order. Marx and Engels equally talked about Asiatic despotism in the context of the Polish problem. These issues were discussed by Marc Belissa

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(who saw Poland as epitomizing a larger problem) and Larry Woolf (who took a different line, in effect tracing the origins of orientalism to the eighteenth century).

Joanna asked Eva about two discourses she was interested in: one about the rights and wrongs of intervention. She said that she had only recently become aware that this debate, often located in text book surveys in the early nineteenth century, had the debate over whether to intervene in revolutionary France as a recent-history reference point. The other was the debate about the spirit of conquest. That phrase was used by Constant: presumably he was looking back not just to the Napoleonic era but to eighteenth-century patterns too?

Eva said that she would like to comment first on the relationship between the two papers. This would lead into remarks that would go some way to answer Joanna's questions.

She said that Herder began to think about politics in the 1760s by considering the theory that Prussia was a form of democratic monarchy, developed by Thomas Abbt against Rousseau, as he was then understood. He invoked the ideas of Fenelon about the democratic potential of monarchy. But later he developed a more critical perspective on Prussia. He thought that Prussian arrangements left no room for true patriotism. Then he changed his mind again, by the 1790s.

Kant's starting point was Hobbesian. He thought that only indirect representation provided an acceptable basis for popular politics. His followers accepted the unsocial sociability premise, implying that conflict was endemic to human society and strong rule was therefore needed. However, they suggested that the gradual development of morality counteracted unsociability, such that people came to need strong rule less. They did not go so far as Fenelon in seeing sociability as natural, however.

On intervention and the spirit of conquest: Herder thought that the roots of the European politics of conquest could be traced back to the Germanic invasions, through Charlemagne. Roman law had been developed so as to support such acquisitions. Colonial conquest grew from these roots, and the balance of power politics of the eighteenth century was just a late, disciplined version of it. The Austro-Prussian intervention in France was also grounded in these foundations.

At the same time Herder saw nations as existing, as historic givens, but also as involved in a learning process. The spirit of conquest could be overcome thanks to the development of international commerce and when nations would have impact on the foreign policy of their states. His ideas were to some extent taken up by Benjamin Constant. There were differences between their positions, but these have not yet been properly explored.

Several questions were collected:

Iain McDaniel asked Graham whether he could clarify how Rousseau applied the categories republic and monarchy to the Polish case.

Nico de Federicis said to Eva that he had a problem with her account of Kant's theory of democracy. He thought that Perpetual Peace suggests that he accepted representative democracy. He also suggested that Kant changed his views on citizenship, which in PP was equated with equal political rights. He thought that the younger Kantians focused more on the legalization of international relations, and in this context more on the state than on the nation (following Kant in this regard).

Mark Philp asked how the fact of destructive war was reconciled with talk about peace. Until recently, literature on this topic mainly stopped with Grotius and Hobbes. If we're now

taking a fresh look at this period, how can we link this theorizing with what was actually happening in the international system?

Michael Drolet asked how changes in conceptions of nature mapped on to changes in how culture was conceived.

Graham Clure responded. To Mark, he said that he agreed with his skepticism. But it was possible to portray Kant as more utopian than he was. Kant talked about perpetual peace not because he was an idealist but because he said only perpetual peace was true peace: the two had to go together, it was like hot heat. Otherwise what was in question was just an interlude between wars. He also said that a graveyard was peaceful too.

To Iain, he said that this was a technical question, but he could give a conjectural answer. Robin Douglas, in his book *Rousseau and Hobbes*, says that Rousseau put law above men. However, he thought this was wrong: in fact, Rousseau said that one could never do that. He thought that there was a contrast to be drawn here with physiocracy. Rousseau said that the physiocrats thought there was a natural order; he did not think that. Rousseau thought that there was a natural tendency for manufactures to profit at the expense of agriculture; this tended to lead to revolution and state dissolution. In his book on Corsica he said that therefore the farmer must give the law to the worker; whereas physiocrats thought that the market would fix the imbalance. In Rousseau's view, law had to express the will of the people. The voting mechanism was conceived as a real decision-making mechanism. It didn't just expose an already given general will, but actually constituted it.

Eva said to Nico that Kant and his followers similarly thought that there was no pre-existing general will: it had to be established through procedures. What was in question therefore, as Hont puts it, was union rather than concord. Nakhimovsky shows how PP affected Fichte's view. Virtue was not the starting point. Rather, the republic comes first; it provides the context in which people moralise themselves. There is an obvious conundrum: how to determine who are the people who decide how they should be politically constituted. She agreed that Kant tried to develop an idea of citizenship as involving voting. Nonetheless it remained the case that the rules and the process constituted who the people were. She agreed that Kant changed his view of citizenship.

To Michael, she said that was a very interesting question. Herder was very attentive to developments in natural science. He read the physiologists, von Haller etc; he knew about theories of organic development, about the trend to increasing complexity etc, and the idea that humans formed a part of that process, so that we can't contrast nature on the one hand and humanity on the other hand. Still, that doesn't mean that humans can be reduced to nature, since people reflexively engage with each other, as well as creatively respond to natural circumstances. Their experiments give rise to traditions.

3. Anna-Maria Rao, *Ordre internationale et consentement des peuples à l'époque révolutionnaire et napoléonienne*

She said that she would be talking about debates about monarchy and republic in the revolutionary decade, especially during the Italian trienio 1796-9.

After the outbreak of revolution in France, there was debate about whether a government of peoples needed to respect the treaties of kings – that was already erway in 1790 in relation to for example Avignon, Spain. Stanislas Leszczynski said that peace was a necessity for a republic. The Genevan revolution prompted arguments against Mallet du Pan, who defended French intervention. Rousseau had said that force was associated with monarchies.

These debates were pursued with more force after 1792. It was argued that a republic in a big territory might unite the force of monarchy with the virtue of a republic. At the Fete de la Federation, Cloots proclaimed the need for a universal republic, to meet the needs of the indivisible human race. He said that the balance of power had been broken since the memorable day of 20 September. In a republic, war would be made only with the general consent of citizens. The Convention 1792 addressed all peoples who wanted liberty. They called for a different kind of war: a war of liberation, not conquest. We find this idea evoked in the correspondence of French agents in Italy. Jean Tilly eg said that there was a need for new procedures in diplomacy in order to win the support of Italian patriots. The object now was to encourage fraternizing among nations.

Also relevant are letters from Italian patriots to French journals, eg one challenging the principle of balance. It was said that this metaphor was invoked by some political pedants to justify the handing of territory back to Austria; it had been the scourge of Europe. It was said that the south of Europe needed to be freed from despotic conquest. Despots only made treaties in order to be able to make war better. There were calls for a new diplomacy. Matteo Galdi took up this question, most explicitly in his 1796 pamphlet. He looked to a federative solution.

The fall of the Italian sister republics prompted criticism of the foreign policy of the Directory. It was said to be following a traditional policy of dismemberment. But not all took this view. Thus, a representative of the Batavian republic advocated a policy of change with compensation [a traditional balance-of-power notion]: he thought that Belgium should be given to France, in return for which Italy should go to Austria. There was a debate between critics of the Directory. It was argued that they should stop trying to republicanise everything. That had been the root of war. Instead, they should return to principles of national autonomy: that was the principle of true diplomacy.

Galdi was named an agent particulier from the Cisalpine republic to the Batavia republic. Previously, Italian states hadn't maintained their own diplomatic representatives. He said that Italian states had been treated like merchandise.

Under Joseph's rule, Italy's dependence on French policy was reaffirmed.

4. Jose Miguel Sardica, Mobilisation, usages, and expressions of 'popular consent' in Napoleonic Portugal

He would be taking a 'history from below' approach, and also attempting to bring Portugal into the general Mediterranean/European context.

Portuguese historiography commonly proposes that the shift to modernity in Portugal began 1807-11 in the context of French invasion. Napoleon sent three expeditions to Portugal: Junco occupied Lisbon 1807-8; Soult descended into Oporto 1808-9 and Massena threatened Lisbon 1810-11, though he didn't succeed in entering the city.

The French, and responding British presence ignited political debate about new ideas. The royal family, nobles and bureaucrats departed to Brazil, fleeing from Napoleonic seizure. Local seaports were opened to foreign navigation (in 1808), and Brazil started down the path to independence (declared in 1822). Portugal felt orphaned. There was a struggle for public opinion, involving a newspaper war, pamphlets and demonstrations. This was the era in which public opinion took on new materiality as a phenomenon.

Following their military conquest, the French attempted to present themselves as liberators. They were assisted by Francophile local elites. They tried to create new forms of legitimacy. Napoleon always advised his agents to try to win over public opinion.

During this period the press was boosted. There were 25 new newspapers founded 1800-6, 42 new ones in the era of the invasions. There are estimated to have been about 150,000 literate people. Other publication forms included broadsheets and pamphlets. Junot took control of the Lisbon Gazette and filled it with praise for Napoleon, who was portrayed as a supporter of Catholicism, order, justice and public instruction. The press covered the trip made by some Portuguese dignitaries to Bayonne to ask for a constitution like the one just given to Warsaw. When Junot was expelled, the Lisbon Gazette urged people to rally round the cause of the king. In Oporto, the French sponsored a paper called the Oporto Diary, which published letters of supposed Portuguese citizens, praising Soult's actions. In his *Memories*, latter published, Soult said that he had attempted to address crowds in a language they understood (in French: "*entrer dans les moeurs locales et parler la langage que les foules comprennent*").

There was popular anti-French action. The weakening of the censorship rule allowed a variety of opinion to be expressed.

In the new public sphere, the subject became a citizen. The abundance of written material however also reflected the extraordinary circumstances of the times. On the eve of Massena's failure, the printer of the Lisbon Gazette commented that the war was being fought was not only one of arms but also of opinion.

Attempts to mobilise the people against French rule encouraged the idea that rule depended on consent.

This period marked an apprenticeship for public opinion, and an important antechamber for the coming (in 1820) Liberal Revolution.

Discussion

Several questions were collected, initially from those who hadn't asked a question yet:

Eduardo Posada Carbo asked about responses to the exile of the court in Brazil.

Sylvie Aprile said that she had two questions. To Anna-Maria: what links were there between the press in the north and the south? To Jose: did resistance use local institutions as a base?

Luca Fruci asked how they dealt with Napoleonic diplomacy.

Anna-Maria said to Sylvie that journals were very important. This period saw the appearance of the first political journals in Italy. The French were sometimes portrayed as undertaking a political and economic conquest. To Luca, she said that diplomats in Naples mainly tried to get their ends by traditional means. Under Napoleon, there were no autonomous diplomats, even from the sister republics. There were agents, but they didn't have the status of diplomats.

Jose said to Sylvie that institutions used as bases for resistance were more local than national. The ideology of the nation did not play a large part. The French invasion also made use of the Spanish army. The intention was to divide Portugal into three: a part of France, a part for Spain, and a part for Junot – to be used as a bargaining tool in peacemaking. The Spanish rising in 1808 prompted a rising in Oporto. But Junot managed to control Lisbon until late

August 1808. Church leaders helped to mobilise the people. There was talk about regenerating old liberties.

To Eduardo he said that the retreat to Brazil was an old strategic plan, first formulated in 1640. Joao's response unfolded in four stages.

- First, he went to Brazil, leaving a Regency Council. He told them to seek good relations with Junot
- Junot however toppled the Regency Council: he and Soult both wanted to be kings. Joao then appealed to the British, who sent Beresford to head a new Regency Council. At this point, the plan was for Wellesley to go to Argentina.
- When the French were defeated in 1811, it seems that Joao had relinquished Portugal. He even considered surrendering southern Portugal to Spain in return for grants of Uruguay and Chile.
- The final stage came with the revolution of 1820. One aim of Vintismo was to recover Brazil for Portugal. This failed: Brazil was proclaimed independent in 1822. At this point the first Portuguese constitutional revolution lost its legitimacy.
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More questions were collected.

Maurizio Isabella asked about the relevance of this period to the birth of Portuguese liberalism. How do the circumstances of its birth compare with those operating in Spain and Italy? Did this period in fact mark the birth of liberalism – he had suggested that the language used emphasized not change but the recovery of old rights. He remembered from discussion in Lisbon that, according to Fatima Sá, the *manifestos* issued by the Juntas were quite traditional in content. There was no Portuguese equivalent of the Cadiz constitution.

Renaud Meltz asked if the new diplomacy embodied primarily new principles, or were there also changes in practice: was there change in the profession of diplomacy. Were negotiations conducted with more publicity? Were new sources of information used? Who did diplomats see themselves as representing: did they represent the nation?

Jose said to Maurizio that there was an emotional reaction against the novel ideas of the French. This found primarily military expression. However, the period was also marked by a power vacuum. In that context, new middle-rank elites formed, who didn't want subsequently to accept the reestablishment of leadership by old elites. This played in relation to censorship. After 1811, Don Joao ordered that censorship should be reimposed. But the new elites were very opposed to this. Some began to say that they could only hope to secure their power under constitutional rule. As early as 1816, Don Joao thought of granting a constitution, to avoid revolution. Emigrants played an important part in politics: newspapers were published in both Brazil, London and even Paris. They talked about liberty, the common law and the constitution; they talked around the issue of republican monarchy. That was to be a common theme in Portuguese thought throughout the nineteenth century.

Anna Maria said that all the things that Renaud had suggested applied to French diplomats. But these practices weren't institutionalized in Italy, because Napoleon was quite traditional in these respects. In 1744, Maria Theresa had promised the nobility of Naples that she would restore privileges that had come under attack from the Bourbons. This was not the kind of rhetoric used in the new era.

5. Gonzalo Butron, From hope to defensiveness: the foreign policy of a beleaguered Spain (1820-3)

He said that the 1820 revolution in Spain inaugurated three years of political tension, within the liberals, and between them and counterrevolutionaries. The moderates ruled until 1822. At the beginning, foreign policy was not a problem; the main worry was rather that the clubs might push for a more radical revolution, or that there might be a popular revolution. Another preoccupation for the regime was the creation of a new political order in the provinces. Federalism had been seen as a problem since the Peninsular War.

Liberal principles had been forced on an unwilling king. The liberals expected that there might be an adverse European reaction, but were inclined to be optimistic. The Spanish constitution of 1812 had after all been recognized in the past by many European powers, including imperial Russia. The Spanish hoped to find a place for themselves in the European order. They stressed that their revolution had been peaceful. The first report from the secretary of state to parliament followed this line. It was stated that political change had resulted from the unanimous wish of the nation, and the paternal concern of the king; it claimed that peaceful conduct had attracted the admiration of other nations.

However the scenario changed as the Spanish revolution attracted imitators: there was then more concern within Spain that the great powers might react adversely. Eusebio de Bardají in Piedmont expressed confidence that other regimes would just react preventatively; he thought that Spain's geographical position should protect it. The Duke of Frias, ambassador in London, by contrast suggested taking pro-active measures. He saw a need to strengthen Spain's defensive position, perhaps via alliances with Portugal [For Frías, Spain united to Portugal would be respectable, even without America; while Portugal and Spain divided would be the victim of foreign nations] In the 1821 report of the minister of state to parliament, he stressed Spain's neutrality and respect for the law of nations. He said that they had had no involvement in revolutions in Naples or Portugal (the Neapolitan revolution had recently been condemned at the congress of Laibach). He said that what had happened in Spain had been good, and it wasn't surprising if it had produced imitations: the Spanish had shown that it was possible to reconcile order and freedom, and to conciliate the causes of people and kings.

In fact, some Spanish diplomats had played a part in revolutions elsewhere. Thus José María Pando in Portugal – who was said to be involved in masonic circles there; Luís de Onís in Naples – he had been in Rome when revolution broke out, but was accused of having links with the Carbonari; also Bardají in Piedmont, who played the most important role of the three; it was suggested that the Spanish embassy in Piedmont had been at the centre of the conspiracy.

Once the Austrian decision to intervene in Naples was known, there was fear in Spain. Diplomats complained about the policy of intervention. Some argued that Spain should play a more courageous role within Europe. In 1821, there was a long parliamentary debate on the matter. Some argued that what happened in Italy would determine the future of Spain. Spain sought allies elsewhere: with Portugal, and also approaches were made to Britain and France, considered as free nations.

However, in 1823 diplomatic notes to Spain were signed by Russia, Austria, Prussia and France. It was stated that the regime had an insurrectionary origin, and that the king had been forced to take an oath to the constitution, and that Spain had been instrumental in spreading revolution.

By this stage, the Spanish regime was dominated by radicals. They saw their position as weak: militarily, they had few troops, regiments were often unpaid, and there were problems with loyalty; economically, the country was indebted; politically: they were internally divided, and there was a danger of counterrevolution. From 1822, counterrevolutionary forces enjoyed support from the French, and the moderates withdrew support.

After the congress of Verona, it was clear to the Spanish government that they were the great powers' next target. Four of the five powers had broken diplomatic relations. A French army had gathered on the border. They tried to develop links with Britain and Portugal, offering a trade treaty to the British and an alliance to Portugal, but failed; they did make some progress, but the proposed alliance with Portugal was not finally signed. They hoped for support from British public opinion – but Britain (that is, the government via the ambassador, see extract of San Miguel speech to the Cortes) focused on modifying the Spanish constitution, so as to avoid pretexts for war: they suggested that the constitution should be presented as a gift from the king; that his sovereignty should be preserved; that the council of state should be appointed by the king, and should have a role in forming policy.

In fact the French invaded and restored royal rule in 1823.

6. Yanna Tzourmana, The London Greek Committee: Dissenting views, oppositional politics and the European order

The London Greek committee was formed to assist the Greek War of Independence. It has usually been interpreted within a Philhellenic framework. She wanted to challenge this account, by placing it in relation to other London associative practices. She would focus especially on its formation, and on the forms of political action it pursued. Philhellenic literature tends to set the committee's activities in the context of state-building - a background assumption that seems to bind together discourses of the Greek state formation with the revolutionary war itself. She by contrast would be concerned to situate its members socially. She noted that the vocabulary they used was one of universal benevolence and political philanthropy, a vocabulary that shows, arguably, how new politics were effectively built upon the old. Sympathy for foreign patriots could be expressed in a variety of ways. Close attention to the properties of these broad categories and values may offer linkage to the debate on the wars in Spain, Portugal, Greece and Latin America and reform in London.

The London Greek committee met at the Crown and Anchor Tavern. Its members included independent MPs and Dissenters. Their preoccupations were varied, and they developed no systematic theory. It was not an association of Benthamites. It shouldn't also be seen as the pure product of a liberal political and intellectual main line expressly set against conventional mainstream. Their ideal was independent civic virtue, indicative perhaps of central nineteenth century continuities and transitions from an assertive to a more progressive improvement respectable form of public support and political action. Although their membership was open in terms of political communication, it was selective. Leading Whigs were invited, Orator Hunt was politely and positively refused. Anxiety over the names was a recurrent matter in the London Greek Committee's procedures. Many expressed concerns about the difficulty of finding members whose politics weren't too set or too decided. They organized ritualized public meetings, with speeches. They hoped to get Wilberforce to take the chair, and in this way get Christians involved, though he declined. They consulted other subscription lists to identify possible supporters. Some of the same people were in the committee to support Spain – indeed, the two committees run in parallel for some time and held a joint public dinner. They hoped to attract moderate support, and pitched their speeches accordingly.

The Crown and Anchor was a venue also used for other high profile reform events. The importance attached to public meetings of the Committee at the Tavern maybe crucial if we move from an exclusive concern with ideas to an analysis of political communication and the geography of politics.

If they wanted to do no more than express sympathy, why did they form a committee? Potentially this was a way of dramatizing interest, that might have encouraged political intervention and marked British influence on international order. Hobhouse told Byron that there weren't enough resources to make a practical difference; mobilizing sympathy was all that they could hope to do. They could hope to make an impact both on public opinion, and on MPs directly. Canning was seen as a particularly important figure: he was instrumentally thought to need alerting to the fact that the French were intriguing; it would be better for the British to take a lead.

Their stance did not require them to have specific information about Greece's future and in fact they didn't agree how Greece should be governed. Burdett and Hobhouse gained a platform for their views. James Mackintosh wanted to draw attention to the importance of trade partnerships. Dissenters were concerned about the balance between liberal and other impulses. There was no far-sighted, agreed conception of what should happen.

It's useful to consider who declined committee membership. Some expressed reluctance and discomfort. The Spanish Committee noted a lack of encouragement from great Whigs, who thought that everything in Britain was rotten, corrupt and backward and thus sacrifices to foreign causes would be hopeless. A rhetoric against wasteful, corrupt and oppressive governments both at home and abroad marked the language of the appeals to support.

They didn't go in for a rhetoric about modern Greeks learning to live up to the standards of the ancient.

The committee was formed in 1823. It has been repeatedly suggested that Canning's politics facilitated its formation. Canning's role may have been crucial, although he suffered attacks on numerous occasions from the part of certain MPs of the Committee for his policies. Apart from Canning's foreign policies, interest in the Spanish and developments in the Greek revolutionary war itself should also be taken into consideration.

The military successes during these years, mostly in 1823 when the Committee was formed, saw new groups emerging, and the committee showed some awareness of this. Stanhope said that they might include democrats.

Overall, she advocated a fresh approach to Philhellenism. It has been portrayed in too instrumental a way. Later, it raised money for the Greek cause, but that later development has overshadowed discriminating consideration of its earlier character.

Discussion

Eduardo Posada observed that it seemed pushing the principle of popular consent too far could frighten off support, indeed, attract hostile attention.

Joanna agreed that in practice it was crucial for revolutionaries to try to keep kings on board: foreign powers tended not to intervene unless they thought they could claim that the monarch had invited them.

Maurizio said to Yanna that it was common for foreign causes to have a catch-all character, and to attract miscellaneous support – this was true eg of support for Garibaldi. So was her

point something about the particular kind of moment this was in British politics? Might it be illuminating to compare support for Greece in Britain and France?

Yanna said that her primary intention was to deconstruct Philhellenism and draw attention to the spatial and temporal context of the formation of the Committee in London. She thought that interest in the Greek cause in Britain by and large reflected ‘commercial humanism’.

[She adds that it would be illuminating to compare support in Britain and France. It could also be useful to explore the French committees themselves in the same light; that is, suspending for a while their relation to philhellenism and move towards an analysis of the complex relationships among space, politics in action and the use of sites of discourse in the exercise of political authority. The Philanthropic Society for the Greeks in France was founded at the same venue along with other committees: e.g. the committee for prisons, the committee for orphans, the committee for the abolition of black slavery etc.]

Joanna asked if the Greek Committee had a press strategy?

Yanna said yes, there was a sub-committee specifically concerned with that. There were also conversations about forming a trade partnership with Latin America. Their thinking wasn’t necessarily state-centred, though in fact they tended to entail an extension in the power of the state.

Michael Drolet asked, picking up on the theme of commercial humanism, whether the term ‘civilisation’ was used?

Yanna said that they used the term. The notion of civilization with its built-in sense of cultural superiority was commonplace. Their agenda highlighted issues like the need for a free press and educational system – even if the latter seems absurd, given what an underdeveloped country Greece was. The development of a civilizational narrative by means of free press and education (Lancasterian schools), by way of the march of public mind - all were cliché and all formed part of their critique for the Spanish and the Latin Americans as well.

Ayse Ozil noted that the Greeks of Istanbul were also concerned to advance education in Turkey: Teachers were sent to Britain to be instructed on the Lancasterian system. Lancastrian schools were set up in Greek communities in the Ottoman empire in the 1840s.

Jose Sardica recalled Metternich’s speech of 1822, in which he talked about a just repugnance to intervening, but that it might be necessary to do so given the contagious character of revolution. Was that how they saw Spain, as a source of contagion?

Gonzalo said in fact the revolutionaries’ project was very much a Spanish one. However, most had been in prison or in exile in London in the first years of the Restoration, and those in London had come into contact there with other would-be national leaders. So it wasn’t impossible for them to take a broader view.

Iain McDaniel said that he had been struck by the term ‘universal benevolence’ that Yanna had cited. That was a key phrase in late eighteenth-century British discourse. It was associated with a good, non self-interested form of patriotism. It was invoked in Richard Price’s sermon *On the love of one’s country*, and was used before that by Francis Hutcheson. He wondered if the phrase had links to an understanding of patriotism on the part of the committee members?

Yanna said that Unitarian dissenters were well represented on the committee, and provided a possible line of continuity. Use was also made of the new political economy: it was argued against the Ottomans that they were failing to promote industry and commerce. They

publicized a dissident form of patriotism that could be legitimized by the constant reference to a British tradition of popular resistance to tyranny. A common target of criticism was the ‘unpatriotic’ official commercial and financial policies that served large landowners and ‘Old Corruption’. They used words such as independence and self-standing taken perhaps from the vocabulary of reform.

Eduardo Posada asked whether the Latin American connection helped the Greek cause at all? Latin American ambassadors expressed puzzlement that the Greek cause got support when theirs did not. Perhaps the Greeks wouldn’t have wanted to embrace them?

Yanna said that military chiefs and rebel leaders that she is mostly interested in were not very much concerned with the mechanics of creating new regimes, more with notions of justice. [She adds that, apart from intellectual political circles, for which solid theoretical and ground work is available, there is much work yet to be done on the political role of the military chiefs and their understanding of what was going on in Latin America or the Iberian peninsula. Revolutionary Greece was a society and an economy of violence, not just in violence. Within the rapid changes that occurred in the political ‘construction’ of the revolutionary cause, Latin America, mostly Bolivar (*Bolivaris* among the Greek chieftains) but perhaps others too served as iconic figures in the production of leadership, but not so much in terms of the political engineering of a new regime.]

Maurizio Isabella observed that the Greek revolutionary press had quite a lot of coverage of Latin America, which they saw as presenting a parallel case to theirs

Ayse Ozil said that the composition of the Committee seemed to present a contrast to the supporters of the Greek rising in the Ottoman empire and asked whether a class dimension to the story should be brought out. These London committee members were upper-class intellectuals. In the Ottoman context, supporters of the Greek revolution were not on the whole the big men and great merchants, but small merchants and losers.

Yanna said that Marxist accounts of the Greek revolution tended to stress the role of losers in terms of class struggle, but that wasn’t entirely fair, esp at the start, when elements of the Church hierarchy and lay notables were also involved. It was only in 1823-4, that new people came to the fore. Things changed quickly afterwards, with two consecutive civil wars and the almost immediate success of Ibrahim in reconquering the revolted regions.

Maurizio Isabella similarly noted that some Phanariots backed the rising.

Ayse Ozil said that the Phanariots who backed the rising were mostly those with a foreign connection like Ipsilantis, and not necessarily those who had a stake in the system.

Mark Philp said that Foucault in his writings on Biopolitics might be taken to have been suggesting that the internal order is primary in terms of the logic of modern state development and organization – though there is an alternative view which has it that the logic of state building is driven wholly externally by the need to sustain credibility in the international order, by whatever means. Consent was not necessarily a key concept in that context. He suggested that the Greeks might have seen mobilizing international support as a primary objective in itself.

7. Renaud Meltz, Les opinions publiques contre leurs gouvernements. Du refus de l'ordre européen au refus du bellicisme d'État

His recent work focused on the dynamic of Anglo-French relations between the Belgian revolution and the Eastern crisis, with particular reference to the role played by public opinion. In both countries, there were bodies of opinion which rejected the Vienna order. In 1830, criticism focused particularly on Russia's stance in relation to Poland and her refusal to allow self-determination; in 1840, opinion focused on the contest for influence in the eastern Mediterranean, in which context Britain and France were arrayed against each other, but the role of public opinion remained an important theme in debate. The Anglo-French relationship was conceived as an *entente cordiale* which linked not just governments but peoples.

In his remarks now, he would be focusing on the years 1830-1.

In this period, Belgian efforts to encourage a model of transparent diplomacy, in the public eye, were repudiated.

The Belgian revolution of 1830, which entailed refusal to accept their incorporation into the kingdom of the Netherlands, aroused concern in Britain. Conservative voices illuminated what were seen to be problems with the ideal of self-determination. However, the tendency was not to appeal to the Vienna Treaty, but to the notion of a balance of power.

Diplomats agreed that the Belgians couldn't be left to determine their own fate; they were equally determined that public opinion within their own countries should not drive their policies. They were prepared to give Belgians some voice, eg in the choice of their king. Since they did not want the prince of Orange, an alternative was needed. The French were interested in, the British opposed to, this being someone from the Orleans line.

Diplomats depended to some extent on the public sphere for information, learning more from the press than from official gazettes. They increasingly discussed public opinion. They did not however want to concede too much power to the press. Though they might think it would be an advantage to have the Vienna treaty rewritten by liberal powers, they remained clear that control of policy should lie in the hands of governments.

8. Sylvie Aprile, Popular consent and European projects 1820-70

She explained that in her talk she would in effect be presenting a collective project, which had recently appeared in book form, edited by herself and others: *Europe de papier. Projets européens au XIXe s* (Villeneuve d'Ascq, 2015). The early nineteenth-century saw the end of slavery and serfdom, and in this sense the enfranchisement of Europe. But European states continued to operate as imperial powers overseas. Europe was moreover fragmented. The French historian Jean-Baptiste Duroselle argued that democracy found a new role for itself as a way of dealing with European diversity.

Many projects for a new Europe were utopian, but this doesn't mean that they were unreal. Projects were devised at many different scales. Questions about popular consent arose in this context.

Saint Simon was the grandest of all projectors. One of his works had the subtitle: on the necessity of bringing people together in a great federation while retaining their nationality. Saint Simon and Thierry both entertained the idea of a European parliament, both to provide visionary leadership and to exercise power. They suggested that it should have as its members the most distinguished men from a variety of different fields.

After 1848, and the perceived failure of universal suffrage to solve political problems, there was a search for alternative forms of reason. In this context, it was proposed that one role for such a parliament might be to supervise European education, and cultivate European

patriotism. Napoleon in St Helena had held out the hope that Europe might come to operate as one country.

Mazzini's pamphlet *Faith and the Future* was subtitled 'Europe and its condition in the 1840s'. He suggested that Europe might be seen as a faith, a fraternity.

The Christian origins of Europe were often stressed: this was seen to provide the basis for a common culture. Laponneraye said that Christian principles lay behind all the revolutions of the last century. Ecumenical councils were needed.

Attention was given to the possible role of 'association' in uniting Europe. Association européenne connoted a workers' association.

The idea that the Greeks had founded European civilization suggested that a basis for fraternity might be found in equality

Intermediate projects tended to be more realistic. Their sponsors recognized the need to found new forms of association in public opinion.

The question was raised, where might Europe be centred? In Paris? Rome? Or perhaps Jerusalem – a centre for three great religions. To site it in Constantinople might reduce the risks of east-west conflict. Or Alexandria was proposed, if it could be detached from Egypt and given neutral status.

Some projects were on a reduced scale: they proposed the unification of parts of Europe, eg France, Spain and Italy.

What if any role did ordinary people play in these processes? There were no pro-European meetings. The journals which discussed such matters were elite journals, including exile journals. The popular press didn't discuss schemes of federation. There was a proposal for a congress to discuss issues of subsistence.

Proudhon, in 1848, was an enthusiast for the European movement, though he was against centralization in Europe as in other contexts.

Discussion

Joanna Innes wanted to make comments on both papers. In relation to Sylvie's paper, she wanted to make a link back to Eva's paper. She noted that Eva had contrasted more institutional schemes for Europe (associated with Kant and Kantians) and more cultural visions, of a European community (associated with Herder). That split also seemed to run through the projects discussed by Sylvie. She had also been especially interested by Sylvie's questions at the end about whether there was a bottom-up part of this story. In an article she had recently read about the development of identity documentation in Italy, it was noted that migrant workers were among the people who needed that kind of documentation. There was a mobile working class, which crossed frontiers. Indeed, as she understood it the impetus for the foundation of the First International was to make sure that migrants could not be imported as strike-breakers.

In relation to Renaud's paper, she noted that the Belgian story provided a nice example of how consent and opinion both did and didn't matter. France and Britain weren't prepared to have their actions determined either by Belgian wishes or their own domestic public opinion. But they thought that both needed to be taken into account. Mark had suggested that the European order continued to be an order of sovereign powers, with consent very much a second-order principle, if that. She thought that was right – but in this period the order of

sovereign powers wasn't working: bits of it kept failing, so other imaginative resources were needed to reconstitute it.

Renaud elaborated his ideas on 'international public opinion', not a concept he had invoked in his presentation, but one that did play a part in the argument of his recent monograph. The phrase as such wasn't used in this period, but we do find equivalent concepts serving as a kind of reference point. Opinion in Europe is mentioned in correspondence, but its role was never theorized: it served as an imaginary arbitrator.

Sylvie said she thought the working classes did make some attempt to appropriate and rework elite ideas. Indeed, there was international labour mobility, and 1848 saw violence against migrant workers, illustrating the limits to fraternity. Some argued that it would be necessary to mix populations to get true fraternity.

Mark Philp wanted to respond to Joanna's remark about what he had said. He thought that states couldn't rest only on consent: that involved a paradox [how to decide whose consent is needed and by what process, if there is no state?]. Consent was at best sometimes part of a solution. Governments were not prepared to relinquish to others their right to make decisions. The forces in play, and therefore appropriate solutions, varied from instance to instance.

Joanna said that she mostly agreed with that, but wasn't sure what view he was defining himself against: it seemed to be a straw man, because no one was proposing that popular consent was thought to let alone did determine all aspects of international relations. She reiterated that it was all very well for governments not to want to relinquish power to others, but sometimes they just didn't have the power they thought they should have – and that was particularly often true in this period. Their position could therefore amount to little more than that something wasn't true until they recognized it: thus, the Spanish denied for decades that former Spanish American states had rights of self-determination, but in the end they had to recognize that de facto they had exercised them.

Several questions were collected:

Michael Drolet said that he thought association was importantly linked conceptually with alienation: association was a way to overcome alienation.

Anna-Maria Rao was struck that ancient Greece apparently continued to be invoked as an example of popular participation.

Luca Fruci wondered who they thought would have helped to choose members of a European parliament. Would European domestic governments have had to be homogenized first?

Renaud Meltz commented in relation to Sylvie's paper on the question of how texts were circulating and who was reading them. He said he thought that Saint Simon had read Bentham, and took up the theme of arbitration from him.

Sylvie said to Michael, that she thought association had different references at different moments. To Luca, she said this was a good question, but answers weren't really worked out at the time. The tendency was to think that this might unfold in a future when universal suffrage would have been established everywhere.

She noted that the Saint Simon pamphlet she had discussed had little influence because just after it appeared Las Cases' Memorial of St Helena was published and entirely eclipsed it.

DAY TWO

9. Ayse Ozil, Provincial actors, the Ottoman state and the international order in the age of revolutions

Ayse said that she would be focusing on the early nineteenth century, and especially on the run up to the era of reconstruction, the Tanzimat, in which some reforms already under way were formalized, and other changes inaugurated.

The initial Tanzimat edict of 1839 itself surprisingly represents the least understood part of the process. There was a follow-up edit in 1856, following the Crimean war: the two are usually paired, although there were some important differences between them. The international context was very different in the two cases (though in each case there was an international crisis; the 1856 edict was incorporated within the Paris Peace Treaty: it was built into the post-war settlement.

She wanted to begin by thinking about equivalents of the phrase ‘popular consent’ in Ottoman Turkish. There was an established concept of consultation (mesveret), associated with (and having the same root as) shura, gathering or assembly. What was envisaged was some kind of gathering of learned men to discuss matters of public significance. There’s no clear answer to whether they were part of the administrative system, nor do we know much about how they related to any popular power base. The issue has been examined mainly at the level of political thought.

At the centre, the first formal acknowledgement that power should be exercised in consultation with councils came in 1839. Councils at the upper state level had long existed, but now their role was formalized. Provincial councils were also formally established. They are often seen as an extension of state authority, but they also represented a form of power sharing. This marked the first formal incorporation of notables into the political system [though de facto they had long played an important part].

To see what these changes came out of, we need to look at the power networks that had operated over the previous three centuries: around or against the sultan. The larger context was provided by transformations that had been going on since the seventeenth century. The seventeenth century marked the end of ‘feudal’ structures’. Three changes took effect at that point. The make up of the elite: viziers came to play an increasingly important role. The military system: the janissary corps was politicized; it came to be linked to viziers. Thirdly, the nature of the authorities involved in tax collection changed. Among recent historians, Baki Tezcan has been keen to identify this set of changes, more specifically the seventeenth century, as a turning point. In classical historiography, the ensuing period was seen as an age of degeneration, as one in which a succession of weak sultans inadvertently opened up space for the rule of viziers and women of the harem. Tezcan however sees it rather just as a period of change.

Not coincidentally, these years saw the long process of expansion in the Balkans brought to a halt. New Balkan territories had served as an important source of manpower, and the fact of expansion had helped to legitimize the regime. As expansion tailed off, the region became the site of endemic conflict. The child-levy system was abandoned in favour of other sources of recruitment, including to supply personnel to the vizier’s and other ruling ‘households’. As janissary corps were integrated into the domestic population, many of them came to double as artisans and shopkeepers. Tax collection was increasingly delegated to local notables, providing them with a new support role.

These changes provided a background to the political struggles of the early nineteenth century, which the Tanzimat edict sought to resolve. The edict proclaimed that the lives and properties of subjects would be respected – it sought to restore domestic order. A reorganization of both tax collection and the military system were proposed. The system of council was to be formalized. The edict was addressed to all subjects, Muslim and non-Muslim. It has often been interpreted as a call to end discrimination. At this point, the Russia government was exerting pressure on behalf of Christians; Greek independence had recently been confirmed.

With its emphasis on life, honour and property, the edict has been seen as something like an Ottoman bill of rights or proto constitution. Abu Manneh, Deringil and Anscombe have however all demonstrated that it was not essentially about rights or equality. Rather, it represented a response from the sultan to demands from notables both at the centre and in the localities for a more ‘just’ regime. According to the old theory of the ‘circle of justice’, sultan and people had a reciprocal interest in fair government. Now the notables drew on this tradition to argue that government failed to live up to this standard.

Justice was a key concept in this political ideology. Ottoman commentators were aware of new European values, like liberty, equality and fraternity, but treated these with disdain. Justice remained a key value in the early twentieth century Ottoman constitution.

What was particular to the early nineteenth century were tensions caused by the autocratic rule of Mahmud II. He had to cope with a very turbulent political landscape: he came to power against the background of two depositions of sultans; he had to deal with the Greek revolution and the war arising from that, and with the increasing power and unruliness of such notionally subordinate figures as Ali Pasha and Mohammed Ali of Egypt. He set about destroying the janissaries, not just because he needed a professional army, but also because they had become a major political force, with the power to make and unmake sultans. Early in his reign, Mahmud had signed a ‘deed of agreement’ with provincial notables to stabilize his position. But he did not found his rule on that basis. As soon as he was more confident of his position, he embarked on a radical modernization programme. But the effect was that he was increasingly viewed as unjust.

His successor issued the Tanzimat decree on his accession. In effect, he was promising to return to a circle of justice model. But, in the wake of the modernization programme, which wasn’t reversed, this didn’t mean reverting to the ‘feudal’ system of rule. The state now rested on a very different infrastructure. In that context, work continued to need to be done on developing mechanisms of rule.

Discussion

Joanna Innes asked two questions. First, if the story was that the notables were pressing for justice and the new sultan needed to respond to that, how did they press? What channels did they use? Secondly, for a new sultan to start his reign by making concessions sounds par for the course. After all, Mahmud did that too, but he later changed his tone. So the really important question seems to be, why did his successors stick with the new programme?

Ayse said in relation to the second question that she thought Mahmud was exceptional: the question isn’t why other sultans weren’t like him so much as what circumstances made him take such an exceptional course. Not until Abdulhamid II did another sultan adopt such a strong-arm approach.

Joanna added that she supposed one thing his strong-arm approach had done was to clear the ground, eg by removing the janissaries, so it just wasn't necessary to continue in the same vein.

Ayse agreed. Moreover, the foundations for a different approach had been laid over the previous century, with the development of notable households as power bases, strengthening of their local power through their role in tax collection etc. This has sometimes been portrayed as weakening the centre, but she agrees with the historiography which sees this as a matter of reconfiguring power. As to how they could make their views known, some with roots in this world were in the upper state administration; others were absentee landlords, resident in Istanbul.

Joanna added that even if not resident, they were likely to have agents or patrons in Istanbul.

Mark Philp asked what constellation of interests supported Mahmud's power? He could only be an effective autocrat if he had enough support and help to give effect to his commands.

Ayse said first he had to bring in a new class of ministers who supported him. One could think of these as enlightened ministers. He also had to get the religious authorities on side.

One perception was that he gave too much space to non-Muslims. This led him to be attacked as an infidel, one element in the demand for just government.

Eduardo Posada asked how Europeans read this process of centralization, and changing relationships with notables.

Ayse said that the older historiography represented the Tanzimat as something extorted by European pressure, missing its domestic roots. Indeed relations with European powers were changing. In 1838, a free trade treaty advantageous to the British was agreed; Europeans gave the Ottomans military help against Mohammed Ali, who had occupied Syria. And they were able to achieve some of their policy aims: eg in the mid nineteenth century Stratford Canning helped to remove the ban on Muslims converting; that was resented by the Muslim populace, and higher religious authorities weren't very keen either.

Alp Eren Topal added that he thought it was important to recognize that the restoration project had a variety of motivations. Bureaucrats had already supported such a project under Selim: they wanted efficiency. They believed that good rule required a strong ruler, a man of the sword. Popular religious movements such as the Nakshibandis supported reforms.

On the other hand there were also various sources of resistance. The ulema were not very supportive: they had traditionally allied with the janissaries, and didn't want too strong a sultan. Mahmud didn't stop his reconstruction process with the destruction of the janissaries: he went on to attack the ulema, and to eg abolish cash vakfs. Some members of the bureaucracy were also brutally executed. Recent historiography has stressed how brutally the new system of conscription was enforced. 300,000 people are thought to have died in Anatolia, half during recruitment, half from diseases once recruited.

People might support reform in principle, but they didn't always then like the form it took.

Renaud Meltz wanted to comment on how the French viewed these reforms. There was much writing about the Ottoman world in France in 1840. Two points of view were represented here. Some thought the sultan should be supported, others the pasha of Egypt, Mohammed Ali. The question could be approached strategically (what was best for French interests in the region?) or politically (whose rule was better in principle?). Republicans tended to oppose the sultan and support the pasha, but so far as he could see they knew nothing about these reforms – though they did have some reservations about Mohammed Ali

too; they noted that his style of rule in Syria had been far from liberal; also that he had done nothing to help European political refugees. But no such intimate knowledge of what was going on within the Ottoman heartland was displayed. He wondered why not.

Ayse said within the Ottoman empire they weren't very concerned with what went on in Egypt. They saw it as an outlying territory.

More generally, she wanted to suggest to make a differentiation between the concepts of 'international order' and 'international relations'. She thought that what went on in the Ottoman heartland, debates about how administration should be, 'just' rule etc might be seen as relating to 'order'. By contrast, what went on in places like Lebanon (with reference to Joanna's draft paper) was more a matter of international relations: European states did in that case get involved in brokering political change.

Joanna said in response to Renaud's observations that she had just been checking occurrences of the word *Tanzimat* in the Google Books corpus of French-language texts. Of course it would have been possible to discuss the reform programme without using that word. Still, she thought it was interesting that the word first appears (in this corpus) in 1849. And it was used much more in the years of the Crimean War, when presumably there was a revival of interest in the nature of Ottoman rule. That was when the British started sometimes writing about it.

Mark Philp said of justice that in Europe people seem increasingly to use it in a retributive, rather than a distributive context. Whereas in the Ottoman context it seems that the latter remains common. He wanted to hear more about comparisons over time – how much continuity with earlier usage was there? Was the term used because it was a traditional term – was there always implicitly a reference back to older debates? Should one draw a contrast with western Europe?

Ayse said that as the new historiography argues, what was voiced by provincial notables was the need to reinstate just rule where everyone should keep their traditional place (such as non-Muslims as secondary-class subjects) and the need for the sultan to protect all subjects from losing more land in the Balkans and to restore order after decades of upheaval in the region. Despite the rhetoric, it could not be a return to the older practice of circle of justice as the latter was modernized in the process: the notables got more of a feel for the populace. We can talk about a struggle for the reorganization of the just order in the form of provincial and central councils where the voice of the 'populace' could be heard.

Iain asked if these ideas about justice drew on ancient Greek ideas, or if they were wholly Islamic. **Ayse** thought they were Islamic, but **Alp Eren** disagreed: he said that he thought Greek ideas did have some influence, but via Persian texts. The idea of a politics of virtue was reworked in this tradition. Linda Darling discusses this in her recent *A History of Social Justice and Political Power in the Middle East: The Circle of Justice from Mesopotamia to Globalization* (London, 2013). **Ayse** emphasized however that it was important to look at what earlier Islam did with the Greek tradition, and which parts of the Greek tradition earlier Islam (not Ottomans) took especially with notions of the benevolent ruler.

10. Michael Drolet, Popular consent and the feminisation of international political discourse: the Saint-Simonians, the East and a new world order 1832-5

He said that there were some questions in the Saint Simonian literature that had never been answered to his satisfaction. Also there remained much untouched archival material. He

wanted to explore how an idea of empathy, and ultimately one of respect for the equal dignity of peoples, was used to challenge the rationality of states in the 1830s. This was a weak challenge which didn't last. It encouraged individuals to act directly. It was grounded in an idea of individual social and sexual reciprocity against amour propre, and 'perpetual conflict'. An ideal of equality and an ethic of care were said to emerge from the experience of women.

Various Saint Simonian writers offered a kind of feminist critique: Including, Claire Demar, Jeanne Deroin, Marie-Reine Guindorf, Pauline Roland, Jeanne Désirée Veret, and Suzanne Voilquin. They criticized the established pattern of domestic relations, which they saw as a source of moral decrepitude, threatening to annihilate all sentiment. The problem at base was a crude instrumentalism, which also shaped national and international politics. They proposed a new public morality. They thought that humanity was on the cusp of a new, harmonious order, hinging crucially on the role of women, and their educative and formative roles: they had the potential to shape a new humanity.

Another Saint Simonian theme was the conquest of the earth. They thought that the current time was characterized by dichotomies, characteristic of a critical era of transition.

In 1831 there was a rupture within the movement, often seen in terms of a clash of personalities. Enfantin took the movement in a less revolutionary direction. But feminist influence on his thought has been underplayed. His male followers retreated to an all-male community, where they played both masculine and feminine roles. The object was to cultivate their maternal qualities.

Associated with this shift was a change in the characterization of international politics. The orient was seen to possess feminine qualities. There was a hope that a female messiah would arise in the east, perhaps Jewish. Enfantin could marry her.

The first of Michel Chevalier's essays was about the need for union among European peoples. The function of an extended communication network was seen to be among other things to liberate oppressed peoples and bring them together. A Mediterranean system had the potential to link east and west. The Mediterranean had provided a field of combat. Now it could provide the matrimonial bed between east and west – marriage being conceived by the Saint Simonians as a union of equals.

Barrault was sent to England and Lyon to try to get support for this project, and raise funds. A group led by Émile Barrault, included Thomas Urbain and Jean Prax. They were accompanied by the composer Félicien David, the sculpture Frédéric Alic, the agronomist Jules Toché, three engineers and polytechniciens Félix Tourneux, and Pierre-Théodore Decharme. Then sailed for Constantinople. Garibaldi, having volunteered, was first mate. Felicien David, who was on board, composed the symphony Le Desert. Other passengers included a sculptor, an agronomist and three engineers. They were detained by the Ottoman authorities in Constantinople, when their exotic costumes caused a sensation. They arrived in Alexandria in 1833. However, they failed to locate the female messiah. Attention switched towards Mehmed Ali's infrastructure projects. Some converted to Islam; some left for the Russian court. Barrault returned to France. Enfantin later advised on French policy in Algeria, and joined a railway company

11. Aurelie Knufer, 'International morality and public opinion in the works of John Stuart Mill (in particular in 'A few words on non-intervention')

She would be focusing especially on an article by John Stuart Mill published in 1859 in Fraser's Magazine. Here he commended non-intervention, seeing it as a device to allow peoples to change – in contrast to the function traditionally assigned to it, which was to protect existing states. Mill saw it as a means to create an international morality favourable to transformation, triggering dissent from a Europe of despots. The challenge was how to make popular dissent really free. Dissent needed to give rise to consent.

He had first addressed the question in his *Vindication of the French Revolution*, 1848, where he defended Lamartine's international policy. He said that the French republic had the right to help other peoples, even by force. So in this instance, he defended intervention.

A right to intervene to free a people from oppressors had been defended by Godwin [Chapter XVI in *An Enquiry Concerning Political Justice* – MP suggests he was drawing on Vattel II. iv, §56] and by Burke at the time of the first French revolution. At the Congress of Vienna, non-intervention was favoured.

Mill didn't think that the law of nations was natural and universal, unlike eg Burlamaqui. He understood it rather as the custom of nations. He didn't think law should be subscribed to blindly; rather consent must be conditional.

He saw non-intervention as part of the doctrine of the balance of powers, and questioned whether it was still relevant in the nineteenth century, or anachronistic. Now he argued it was necessary to consider the interests of nations, not of rulers. Those liberated should be able to help each other, in the same way that Catholics and Protestants sometimes helped each other across national borders. This analogy with religion had previously been made by Burke: he said that if Europe was divided between two antagonistic parties, the law of nations had limited relevance.

Why did Mill change his mind? Was it to make his philosophy more coherent – given that he had made a case for non-intervention in domestic policy. Or did he fear the outbreak of a European civil war? She argued that neither applied. His argument was that the violence necessary to achieve emancipation bred the attitude needed to sustain freedom.

She did think that his changing views on representative government were crucial. He was very disappointed in the outcome of 1848, and tried to conceptualise why the revolutions had failed. Bagehot addressed the same question, explaining the pattern of developments in terms of national character. Mill rejected that approach as essentialising. The problem as he saw it was how people could truly desire popular institutions, then fall back into slavery. Consent was not sufficient; what was needed was a positive readiness or aptitude for freedom. This was the chief argument against military intervention: it would not achieve its aim.

In conclusion she summarized similarities and differences in the two works. In both cases, he saw a need for change in the European order. He thought violence would inevitably have a role to play in achieving that. But he changed his ideas as to how a stable new order could be created.

He thought that only a great power could be effectively non-interventionist: could discourage intervention on the part of others. Such a stance would itself be a threat to despots.

She identified two problematic features of Mill's thought. It is notable first that he now envisaged non-intervention as a policy that a great power might unilaterally adopt, and impose on others; he didn't argue that it had force from the law of nations. Moreover, in principle this view was reversible. It depended on an assessment of effects, so it remained possible to argue that in some circumstances one should intervene and enforce.

Carl Schmitt saw the emergence of the US as a great power as posing the same dilemma.

Discussion

Eva Piirimäe said to Michael that, coming at this material from the eighteenth century, she was struck by the fact that, as he described it, these qualities were ascribed particularly to women. She wondered how Saint Simonian accounts related eg to Fenelonian accounts, in which such qualities of character were not gender-specific?

Michael said they weren't reworking earlier traditions of thought, but building up their own model in which the domestic setting was crucial in forming the attitudes of the two sexes. He noted that if you looked at Saint Simonian relationships, there were class and cultural differences between the men and the women. The men had in many cases studied at the Ecole Polytechnique, while the women were often from the working classes. Saint Simonian women who developed ideas about the role of women did so by working from their personal experiences.

Eva also wondered about how they dealt with something most eighteenth-century theorists would have seen as a problem: how significant affective relationships could be formed with distant strangers. Hume eg said that we love our offspring, but not strangers.

Michael said they didn't acknowledge this as a problem.

Eva then said to Aurelie that she had also enjoyed her paper. She saw a parallel between Mill's view as she had described it and Herder's view that freedom must be nurtured in a national context; people could only pluck freedom with their own hands.

Sylvie Aprile wanted to know from Michael why some Saint Simonians took service in the Russian empire: what was the attraction? **Michael** said not a decision in principle; one of them was offered a job as an organist.

Several questions were collected:

Joanna asked Aurelie why Mill wasn't worried that a liberationist French foreign policy would recreate Napoleonic domination: did he address that. To Michael she observed that the Saint Simonian notion of reciprocity contrasted with the common civilisation/barbarism dichotomy, or at least reworked it in different terms. She wondered if they explicitly engaged with that other formulation.

Iain McDaniel said to Aurelie that the 1848 pamphlet sounded weird. One might have thought that the parallel with the Reformation should have suggested that this was by no means a recipe for peace. He wondered if the model depended on British hegemony in Europe: did it presuppose a great-power peacekeeper?

Aurelie noted that Mill continued throughout his life to defend intervention in the case of barbarian peoples.

Mark Philp said that as a utilitarian Mill could justify judging actions by their effects, rather than their intrinsic character. He didn't need to have a position on 'intervention' as such, but instead on intervention in given sets of circumstances.

Michael Drolet said in relation to the civilizational argument that Mill read Guizot carefully, and drew on Guizot's reflections on civilization in order to justify paternalism and intervention in certain circumstances.

Eva said that you could win the war and yet not win the peace.

Aurelie said that Mill thought that if a civil war went on for too long, it might be appropriate for other powers to intervene, to try to reach a settlement.

Michael said that Chevalier thought the problem with the 1820s revolutions was that no one had had the capacity to stabilize outcomes. That was why a trading infrastructure needed to be built, to underpin other kinds of change.

Mark Philp said he thought Mill was not interested in promoting civic virtue, but rather self-interest rightly understood. That was potentially more demanding in terms of the kind of institutional infrastructure needed to underpin a stable society and polity.

Maurizio Isabella said of the Saint Simonian position that, despite what might seem to be a reciprocal rhetoric, in fact this ideology helped to legitimate colonialism.

Michael said that in the period he was talking about, they were genuinely envisaging reciprocal relationships. Later Chevalier would favour European intervention in Mexico eg, but that was from the 1850s.

12. Iain McDaniel, Caesarism/Bonapartism and the international order in German thought after 1848

Iain said that the paper he would be presenting grew out of a larger project on Caesarism. He thought that this project provided an interesting perspective on questions of consent in international politics.

Caesarism is a modern state form, in which rule is conceived of as grounded on popular sovereignty. The obvious modern reference point was the expansionist project of conquest associated with Napoleon.

He argued that it was important to avoid teleologising the politics of consent, in the sense of imagining that it necessarily led to international peace. A pointer to the contrary is the fact that the term 'imperialism' was originally coined to describe what Napoleon did.

He wanted to connect the topic of Caesarism to debates about the structure of German politics in the 1850s. At that point, France offered a negative model. He said that he would be focusing on one theorist in particular, Constantin Franz, who wrote between the 1840s and the 1870s. He was an interesting theorist of French politics in the 1850s. Koselleck saw him as a German Bonapartist, but Iain said that he could on the contrary be seen as a major theorist of German federalism, and a critic of Prussia.

In 1852, when Louis Napoleon, having effected a coup, was ruling France, Franz was in Paris as a kind of diplomat. In 1859, in his *Investigations into the European Balance of Power*, he used the term 'Napoleonismus'. What interested him was Germany's place in the European state system. He identified Bonapartism as a form of republicanism, but a distinct form, unlike Greek, Roman, Swiss or American republicanism. It was a republicanism fitting an atomized society. It combined democratic social forms with a Napoleonic governmental form. It was a distinctive form of modern dictatorship, a permanent institution as opposed to the classical model of emergency dictatorship. He noted that its reliance on notions of popular sovereignty and popular will confused so-called democratic critics, but it did rely on notions of popular sovereignty, just not on parliamentarism. In this ideology, parliamentarism was seen to entail appropriation of rule by an elite, not truly committed to serving the interests of the people.

He explored its implications for European politics in *Der Napoleonismus und Europa*. He said that European politics had become stagnant, but French developments would revive life

in the system. Napoleon I had been a Hercules who had cleaned out the Augean stables of old Europe; the rise of France would counterbalance the power of Britain and Russia. But the regime of the new Napoleon would not be a regime of conquest, because it was explicitly grounded on a domestic political project, and focused on social reform.

He didn't endorse this system as a model for any other state. In general he thought that Tocqueville was wrong to suggest that it was possible to take foreign constitutions as models. France in particular was on a Sonderweg; French experience with neo-Roman, Caesarist or Napoleonic regime types distinguished it sharply from the 'Germanic' states of England, Germany and America. In fact, many, many nineteenth-century thinkers identified France as the unusual case, rather than Germany (as tended to be the case among twentieth-century thinkers).

In his 1859 text, Franz provided a more elaborate account of democratic constitutionalism, Caesarism and the European state system. It was at this point that he intervened in debates about the future of Germany. His stance was anti-Prussian: he was not sympathetic to the national liberal idea that Prussian ambitions could be turned to liberal ends. He didn't want to see Germany under Prussian leadership. He looked back to earlier writers who had reflected on Germany's place in Europe, included Gentz, Fichte, and von Ranke (notably in his book on the nature of the great powers, 1833).

By this time he had changed his mind about Bonapartism in the light of the French intervention in Italy, in favour of nationalism and liberalism. Moreover, as he saw it the age of European politics had come to an end. There was now a world politics, in which the great powers were the US, Russia and Britain. He said that Europe needed to be reconfigured in this new context. Russia and France presented the two greatest obstacles to European stability. Franz responded to an obscure book of 1839 which represented Europe as a pentarchy and advocated that Russia should act as the protector of smaller German powers. He hated that idea. But he now saw the French Second Empire as a problem too. He said again that what it represented was a distinctively French take on democracy. But now he linked Bonapartism with European instability. In another book, two years earlier, the *Vorschule zur Physiologie der Staaten*, he had criticized the idea that every nation should have a state. He said that the Napoleonic regime was now becoming a regime of conquest. Its domestic legitimacy was so shallow that it had to embark on overseas adventures to shore itself up. The question was how to deal with this. In this context, it was very important to get the political structure of Germany right. He argued that Germany should be a Staatenbund, not a Bundesstaat. Prussia and Austria should surrender their claim to be great powers. In saying this, he was responding to Ranke, and also to Treitschke who argued that what was needed was a unitary nation state. He also did not think that liberalism was appropriate for Germany. A form of republican politics grounded on individual units would, he thought, deliver Caesarism.

He wanted to see a pacification and remoralisation of European politics, which had, as he saw it, been premised on *raison d'état*. This outlook had been inherited from the Romans, via Machiavelli and Louis XIV. He thought Germany should strive to eradicate this approach from the European scene. He agreed with Fichte in criticizing balance of power politics, and endorsed his view that Germany was originally a federal state, and that it had the potential to provide a model for an *Abendländischenvolkegesellschaft*, a western community of peoples. This would offer a moral, cosmopolitan alternative to neo-Roman politics grounded on *raison d'état*.

13. Alp Eren Topal, The Young Ottomans and the Cretan uprising of 1866-9: popular consent and the law of peoples

His presentation would focus on the Young Ottomans, a small but effective group of young bureaucrats who made their voices heard in the 1850s and 60s. The Cretan uprising of 1866 coincided with the peak of Young Ottoman criticism of the Ottoman regime.

He would start in 1836, when the British diplomat William Churchill killed a child while out driving. He was arrested, but Pisani from the British embassy demanded his release. When the Ottoman translation bureau cited the law of nations, and said that it was the right of nations to protect their own subjects, Pisani said, that book is not for you. This gave rise to a huge row, at the end of which the British got their way. Churchill was later granted the right to publish the first Ottoman official newspaper.

The Young Ottomans were from a generation born into the Tanzimat era. At the time of the Cretan uprising they were in their late 20s or early 30s. They had been schooled in Istanbul, but were otherwise a mixed lot. They were bureaucrats who felt alienated from the bureaucracy. They knew French; some had worked in the Translation Bureau. They were alienated especially by higher ranking bureaucrats, who came from similar backgrounds, but were older, and had risen on the basis of their personal connections within the palace. In effect, the Young Ottomans were exiled. Mustafa Fazıl Pasha, heir to the khedive of Egypt invited them to France. They then went to London, where they published the newspaper *Hurriyet* (Liberty). In this they were especially critical of Ottoman policy in relation to Crete.

These men were in some ways comparable to figures in the Arabic cultural revival, the *Nahda*, but they were more politically engaged. Their ideas about popular consent and democracy were quite liberal. They read Rousseau and Montesquieu, but more works from their own culture, which they began to reinterpret. For example, they interpreted the tradition of *baya*, an oath of allegiance taken by high officials, as a tradition of popular consent; the tradition of *shura* or counsel they interpreted as proto-parliamentarism. They thought that legislative and judiciary should be separated, having been put together under the Tanzimat. They interpreted Ottoman early modern history as quasi constitutional, but saw that tradition as having been overturned by Mahmud's policies (as described by Ayse). They thought that a people's parliament was essential, to address problems of deficit, corruption, poverty and bad urban government. They blamed recent misgovernment on leading ministers, pashas, not on the sultan, but they thought the sultan needed to reconnect with the people. They called for a constitution. They thought that some of the ideas of the Tanzimat had been good, but their promise had not been fulfilled. They thought that the constitution should be based on sharia law, but on the other hand that non-muslims should also take part. Problems had been exacerbated by foreign intervention, which had helped to keep the pashas in power. Non-muslims sought protection from foreign powers, and this created problematic inequalities. The 'capitulations' (granting favourable terms of trade to Europeans), imperialism and foreign loans had all caused problems. Conscription applied only to muslims; there had been an attempt under the Tanzimat to extend it to non-muslims, but they tended to buy their way out.

When Cretan Greeks rose up against Ottoman rule, the Young Ottomans initially supported the government against the rebels – this at a point where they were still themselves based in Istanbul. The government refused to discuss the situation with European powers. France suggested that if the Ottomans would cede Crete, they would get a better deal on their loans – but at this point the Ottomans had recently lost Belgrade; they weren't prepared to accept further losses.

When the Young Ottomans were in exile in Europe, their stance became more critical. The uprising was ended: the Ottomans presented an ultimatum to Greece, to stop them aiding the rebels, and European states intervened, fearing a clash between Greece and Turkey. At an advisory council in Paris, Greece was reprimanded, though the Ottomans were instructed to appoint a Christian governor. The Young Ottomans believed that the Ottoman regime should have taken a tougher stance at the start. Their failure to do that had laid them open to European intervention. They believed that it had taken personal intervention by the sultan to get the ministers to issue the ultimatum.

The Young Ottomans did have some personal grievances, but in general what they focused on was legitimacy. They thought that was best achieved through constitutionality. In the absence of that, arbitrary rule at home and abroad was likely to undermine authority.

Others didn't agree with their analysis. *Hurriyet* also published various anonymous objections to its editorial line. Some said that, in the face of hostile Europeans, a strong leader was needed. However, Namik Kamal responded that strong leadership would gain resources from the support of the people.

Later the Ottomans did briefly experiment with parliamentarism, but Abdulhamid II then decided instead to appeal to muslim sentiment, emphasizing his role as caliph; he also promoted investment in infrastructure, economy and education.

Discussion

Eva Piirimäe said to Iain that she was interested in the link to Fichte, who as he said was also anti-nationalist, and critical of the French model. She wanted to know more about how Franz criticised liberalism.

Iain said that this became clearest in his text of 1870, the *Naturlehre*, which looked back on the North German Confederation. There, he associates liberalism with Bismarck. He saw it as inherently individualistic. Like Schmitt, he was less concerned about how representation was implemented, by one or many.

What form of monarchism he wanted isn't altogether clear. He was critical of Stahl, and his ideas of Christian monarchy, and also of Treitschke, who said that monarchy was compatible with freedom. He rejected Imperialismus in favour of the concept *Kaisertum* – where the difference lay certainly isn't immediately obvious from the words. It may be that he looked back to someone like Schlegel.

Michael Drolet asked if he extended his concept beyond German states. Also, did he anticipate a clash between France and Prussia?

Iain said that he did see France as a threat. He thought they wanted to 'imperialisieren'. This also presented a threat to Russia, as discussed by Bauer, in *Russland und das Germantum*. He also recognised that the unitary nation-state model would create a crisis for Austria.

Joanna remarked to Alp Eren that Midhat Pasha [a key supporter of the Ottoman parliament project] had a different line on history: he saw the early modern era which they saw as proto constitutionalist as feudal and particularistic.

Alp Eren agreed, but noted that he wasn't a member of the group. They generally liked him, and their newspapers praised him. But he was more identified with the regime than they were. Cevdet Pasha was similarly pro reform. He thought the Young Ottomans took a more serious and scholarly interest in history than either of these men.

Joanna also asked about the Young Ottomans' view of the proposal, floated in Europe, that Crete's future should be settled by a plebiscite.

Alp Eren said that they explicitly opposed this. They didn't think plebiscites were appropriate in heterogeneous states. The issue wasn't who was in the majority, but how diverse people were to live together. They asked if the British should rule only Protestants and the French only Catholics? If the different groups were all properly represented, they thought that the problem would go away. In fact, when the Ottomans did try parliamentarism they however incorporated only a few non-muslim notables: it's not clear that that could have made much difference. The same discussion took place in relation to the Bulgarians and the Serbs.

Joanna then asked Iain about the origins of the refrain that the object of foreign adventures is to distract from domestic issues. She thought that there were earlier examples of the same charge being brought, eg against the younger Pitt at the time of the French revolution. (Mark Philp agreed that some of Gillray's cartoons take this line).

Iain said that he himself couldn't think of earlier examples, although there are plenty later, eg it was said about Disraeli.

[**Mark** later said that he thought this idea could be found in Suetonius and Plutarch's accounts of Caesar: they saw him as using foreign policy to distract from domestic needs]

Luca Fruci said he would be interested to hear about Italian analyses of Bonapartism.

Iain said that the name Villari had come up in that context. In his book on Machiavelli, he said that Bonapartism was a modern version of Machiavellism. Ferrero in his book *Militarisme* might tell the last chapter of the story. He predicted Italy's fate as a debtor nation.

Maurizio noted that there was a local Italian Bonapartist tradition dating back to the first Napoleon, in the form of Muratismo.

José Miguel Sardica asked about the relationship between the two names, Bonapartism and Caesarism: was Bonapartism seen as a French variant of a larger phenomenon?

He also noted that these ideas reached Portugal in the 1880s and 90s, after the monarchical consensus broke down. We can find variants of it expressed by both monarchical and republican theorists. But in the Portuguese case the word 'Bonapartism' was rare, because its direct French resonance reminded people of the French Invasions of 1807-11. Instead, 'Caesarism' had much more success, and it was associated with calls for the strengthening of royal power. There was talk of the need for a 'direct handshake' between king and people, bypassing sterile parliamentary demagogy. He wouldn't himself call it proto-fascist, because he thought it was a product of a different intellectual world. The idea was that a temporary saving dictatorship might be needed to prepare the way for a future democracy..

Iain said that some contemporaries thought that Caesarism was an anachronistic term. The term that Franz initially used was Napoleonismus. He switched to talking about Caesarism in the 1860s, when that term had become more firmly established. In the 1860s, there was debate in Germany about whether it was possible to have a democratic monarchy? Or a social monarchy?

Maurizio Isabella asked Alp Eren if he could say more about this notion of a past constitutionalist tradition. He noted that in early nineteenth-century Europe observers sometimes credited the Ottomans with a form of constitutionalism – in the context of enlightenment debates about the nature of their polity. He wondered if the Young Ottomans

were aware of that.

Alp Eren said that they knew about Von Hammer's pioneering history of the Ottoman empire. Namik Kemal thought that it was rubbish. They were the first people to engage critically with orientalist scholarship. Namik Kemal wrote a book against Renan. They knew about the Urquhartites [who favoured the Ottoman empire over Russia] but thought that Urquhart was too romantic. Ali Suavi became an Urquhartite and publicized his ideas, but others were more critical.

Concluding remarks

Joanna thanked everyone for taking part. She said in some ways it was a pity that the project was ending at a point when there clearly remained so much to discuss. On the other hand it was always said of children's parties that it was best to end while everyone was still having fun.