Re-imagining Democracy Workshop, Vienna, 24-5 September 2004

At the Austrian Academy of Sciences

Attending (see also bios at the end)

Innes and Philp; Birgitta Bader-Zaar, Konrad Clewing (25th only), Franz L. Fillafer, Gábor Gángó, Milan Hlavačka, Cody James Inglis, Pieter M. Judson, Jonathan Kwan, Jernej Kosi, Robert Luft, Markus J. Prutsch, Thomas Simon

Apologies: Maciej Janowski, Thomas Stockinger, Balázs Trencsényi

Day 1

Session 1: How to write the history of democracy

Joanna said that she would review how people had approached writing the history of democracy, and some challenges that involved. Mark would then explain how they went about it in their project, and suggest some strengths and weaknesses of their approach.

She began by identifying the first history of democracy in Europe (to her knowledge) as Thomas Erskine May's *Democracy in Europe* (1877). Before this, there were relatively few treatises about democracy. Guizot's history of representative government was perhaps a precursor; she hadn't systematically compared the two. In the following decades, there were a number of other publications about the global history and current approaches to popular participation in government. May, a clerk to the British House of Commons, had written a well-received book about the history of the British constitution, and conceived of this as a sequel. He worked hard on it, and travelled to other European states to discuss recent and current developments with experts. But, as critics noted, the book was not very tightly focused. It was conceived as much as anything else as a history of liberty, starting with early governments in the east and proceeding through the ancient world, barbarians, Italian republics, Switzerland, the Netherlands, France and England (Germany received little attention, except in relation to barbarians).

She suggested that May's problem was a central problem for would-be historians of democracy: it wasn't obvious what exactly they should write a history of. Democracy is an umbrella concept, from the Greeks comprising ideas of both equality and participation. To these original criteria (not guaranteed to go together) had since been added a list of other expected attributes: allocating power on the basis of results in competitive elections on a general adult franchise, respecting the rule of law, maintaining the freedom of civil society, and – in some accounts – being prosperous and peaceful (at least in respect of other democracies). People in the past had not bundled all these things together, however, so probably one shouldn't do that if one wanted to make sense of the past. But then what: did you choose some above others? Study just voting, or popular participation, or civil rights? Any might be traced through time, but better then to describe the subject more precisely, she argued (even if talking about 'democracy' might seem likely to sell more copies). A second problem is that democracy very often functions as a normative concept: now usually an approving one. So calling something in the past democratic might seem to entail giving it a seal of approval. In the present, there was a marked tendency for people occupying different political poles to insist that only their preferred way of playing the political game was 'democratic', alternatives being either elitist or populist. She didn't think that

was helpful as a basis for understanding the challenges of democracy now, and it was difficult to write good history framed by a normative concept. Understanding either the present or the past requires instead that we accept that democracy may have some effects we don't like alongside some we perhaps do.

In fact, historians had not written much about the history of democracy until the 1990s, she suggested – contrasting in this regard with social scientists, for whom it had become a major topic in the post-war period. Social scientists were attracted to the subject because democracy was a major talking point in the post-war world; historians agreed that it was a contemporary form, and worried that to seek it in the past was to court anachronism. RR Palmer who exceptionally wrote a history of 'the age of democratic revolutions', meaning the era of the French revolution, had to defend himself against charges of anachronism. The exploration of the word's history especially in a German context offered by Brunner et al eds, *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe* in vol. 1 (1974 – 90 pages on *Demokratie*) represented another exception – but understandably so, given that work's focus on the emergence of modern concepts. Change since the 90s – when increasing numbers of historians had identified 'democracy' as the focus of their work -- reflected both the concept's even greater salience in post-1989 politics and increasing pressure on historians to demonstrate that their work spoke to present concerns, counteracting worries about anachronism (whether advisedly so or not).

She identified four strands within recent and continuing work which she thought interesting and valuable: new studies of democratic ideas and practices in the ancient world – now across a broader chronological and geographical spread; further work on more countries employing a 'conceptual history' approach; histories of political practices – a genre which had boomed in the 1960s and 70s and never really dwindled since; and multi-dimensional studies of particular democratic political cultures: their lexicons, ideas and practices. Studies of the last kind tended to focus on the post-war world, and were not confined to Europe – there had been several studies with an African focus. Work of this kind on the nineteenth-century had tended to take republicanism rather than democracy as its focus.

She thought that all of these were potentially coherent projects, which had yielded interesting results. But it was worth underlying that they operated with different conceptions of their subject. Attempts to bring work by different authors together in multi-volume surveys of the history of an underdefined 'democracy' underlined the difficulties of simply lumping such studies together and assuming that a coherent picture would emerge.

Mark explained that the project originated with a plan to try to explain how uses of the word 'democracy' changed during the age of revolutions, including its acquiring more positive connotations. He said that a key feature of the approach the project had adopted was that it focused above all on the word. It had its feet in the history of concepts tradition, though that had now fragmented and didn't connote any single approach. He said that a focus on the word and the ways people used it in the past had the advantage of making it easier to resist teleology: the search in the past for the origins of current institutions and practices. Instead, the project revealed the word's varying uses within a great variety of conversations; it explored its embeddedness in diverse particular contexts.

The approach owes something to the methodology of Quentin Skinner, who argued that terms should be understood synchronically not diachronically, and emphasised agency: people use words to do things – or at least words do things, whether or not they're just the things people intended. Skinner has himself latterly become more interested in considering words (such as

'republic') diachronically. The foundational work of conceptual history, the *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe* was centrally concerned with development and change. We are interested in development too, but we stress that it was fragmentary and by no means linear.

Other differences from *GG* include that it, understandably in the context of the non-digital world in which it was compiled – it focused on elite discourse, mainly in the form of significant books. It didn't make use of sources like parliamentary debates and newspapers.

He noted that, though positive uses of the word increased, negative uses always existed too. It was a crucial word in the rhetoric of those resisting change – a crucial one in the rhetoric of Edmund Burke. *GG* focused on meaning, and has little to say about rhetoric and its means and functions.

The project was also now looking at how people labelled themselves, and applied the term to their own commitments and engagements. In that context, the word often did not have much intellectual content, if any. Identities were mainly forged in conflicts, in the context of which people identified with one group and rejected others. Identities might be performed and not just vocalized.

The word gained breadth and depth over time. It was put to new uses, and expressed a changing range of value commitments.

He thought it was better to follow the word than to impute 'democratic' qualities to things in the past, which historians often do, but at the risk of confusing us about how contemporaries understood them.

He said that the project's approach had some limitations. It achieved wide geographical reach through collaboration. This meant other people had to do most of the work.

What it means to focus on the word is also not self evident. What counts as 'the word'. Democracy, democratic, democrat etc all count: that doesn't seem very problematic. But what about when the word is vernacularized: as 'popular government', 'Volksregierung' or whatever the key term may be in other languages? A change in the word used may well be associated with a change in meaning. But each word's meaning may differ by context.

Emphasis on particularity of context also presents a challenge in relation to moving beyond the local. In our second and third volumes, we tried to deal with that partly by supplementing place-specific 'language chapters' with 'thematic chapters', which trace relevant themes – themes that seem important in terms of how the word was used – across each region.

Equally emphasis on particularity doesn't immediately help with thinking about change over time.

And there are more things in the world than words.

Discussion

Markus Prutsch wondered why – as Joanna suggested – interest in the history of democracy blossomed from 1989 and not before. **Joanna** said although she had emphasized the importance of world events in 1989 (not only the ending of the Cold War, but also eg in South Africa), she agreed that wasn't a complete explanation in itself. Because democracy was much employed as a name for what the allies were fighting for in the Second World War, and was more

widely used, in positive senses, after the war than before. And if it's use by historians then was constrained by their fear of anachronism, why shouldn't that equally have applied after 1989? She had suggested that the changing academic environment – more concern to be 'relevant' and have an 'impact' made a difference. But also, she suggested, increased use after 1989 was associated with more use in national and not just international contexts: it came into wider use as a term of national self-definition. In neither Britain nor France was it that common in the post war decades to talk a lot about democracy in a domestic context: in Britain terms like constitutional monarchy and representative government might be preferred – democracy being seen as foreign, American or French; the French talked more about republicanism than democracy.

Pieter Judson asked what Mark and Joanna thought about 'democratisation'. **Mark** said it wasn't a concept he'd use himself – because of the usual danger of imposing our lens on their efforts.

Franz Fillafer noted that an important change in 1989 was that democracy lost what had been one of its important meanings: liberal democracies ceased to square up against 'social democracies'/peoples' republics. Democracy came to mean liberal, pluralist and multi-party democracy embedded in a system of supreme courts that promise to solve logjams and conflicts modes of deliberative, parliamentary decision-finding could not appease, and financial markets-driven "global" capitalism. **Mark and Joanna** agreed. **Mark** noted that other variations in use had appeared since, eg 'deliberative democracy'. **Joanna** added that the main divide now seemed to be between elite and populist conceptions of democracy – with each side denying that the other was democratic at all. She didn't think historians had yet told a good story about the emergence of this bifurcation. To the extent this was charted (eg by Jan-Werner Mueller in *Democracy Rules*) this tended to be in one-sided terms: in terms of how bad leaders helped populist democracy to emerge, and not in terms of how people became alienated by 'elite democracy'.

Jonathan Kwan said that he imagined that 1789 represented a comparable turning point. **Joanna** said indeed, probably the most important turning point, to the extent one can make such a judgement. During the eighteenth century, democracy came to look – to educated people who knew the word -- like something confined to history; the ancient Greeks practiced it because they were primitive. Initially democratic aspects of the French revolution were read through that kind of lens: as in ancient Greece and Rome, it was seen to have unleashed anarchy and bloodshed, given rise to demagogues, and finally a tyrant to restore order. But if that was what had happened, why had it happened? Why had ancient barbarism unexpectedly re-emerged at the heart of polite civilization? Was it just an ancient form resurrected, or was it the future in embryo? Those were questions the French Revolution threw up.

Franz Fillafer noted that conceptions of democracy as primitive encouraged the practice of locating it at the dawn of national traditions, whitewashing it from associations with the carnage and turmoil of the French Revolutions.

Birgitta Bader-Zaar wondered about how, within an approach focusing on the word, other words in the same semantic field, like 'sovereignty' should be approached. Should they also be objects of study? How about equality or 'isonomy', used by the Greeks and championed more recently by Stourzh Modern Isonomy: Democratic Participation and Human Rights Protection as a System of Equal Rights, Stourzh, Peck-Kubaczek (uchicago.edu) **Mark** said that indeed, that wider web of terms was interesting, though one needed to disentangle concepts of for example

rights held at the time and ways in which we conceptualise those things now. **Joanna** noted that the semantic field changed over time, eg what Koselleck et all called 'counter-concepts', which in English are traditionally called acronyms of democracy changed over time. In the eighteenth century democracy was often contrasted with aristocracy – and in Britain in 1911 a political clash over the powers of the House of Lords was still argued about in terms of democracy vs aristocracy. Whereas the latter term is much less commonly associated with democracy now.

Cody Inglis said that he thought that in the final decades of the nineteenth century there was less contestation about the meanings of the term. These had broadly settled down. **Joanna** said she thought that might be right: democracy perhaps increasingly connoted 'representative government' and less other things, and as more and more European states adopted some form of representative government, on broadly 'modern lines' (Italy, Austria, Hungary and Sweden added in the 1860s), the term may have been normalized. Which isn't to say that it was a preferred term or had lost any dangerous edge. However, she also thought that from that point new polarisations developed, including challenges from both left and right-wing popular movements to liberal centres. In that context, new variations on 'democracy' were developed, including sometimes vernacularized forms. **Jonathan Kwan** stressed that he thought it continued to be seen as a problematic term. **Joanna** said yes but even so perhaps in less sharp ways. Thus, perhaps not threatening anarchy so much as over-generous welfare legislation and the dominance of a debased mass culture. **Mark** agreed: he said perhaps it came to be conceived as a populist political form that elites could nonetheless fairly well control, so long as they could channel popular energy with the aid of a developing set of 'representative' institutions and practices. **Markus Prutsch** said indeed, institutionalized democracy perhaps came to be conceptualized as useful in the face of the challenges of governing a mass society. But he too thought that it remained a relatively unfavoured term among political elites.

Pieter Judson said that democrats emerged as a political grouping with a continuous existence, and laying claim to that name, in Vienna from 1870. But around 1848 they were super-important, even if much less institutionalized. Contemporaries found it hard to get to grips with what was going on at that time: to know how to conceptualise it. And whether to use the word in positive or negative ways.

Franz Fillafer agreed that in the later decades of the century the challenge was seen as one of developing adequate institutional means to control emerging social phenomena. Taaffe's mastermind for the creation of a novel mass-electoral curia, Emil Steinbach(Eduard Taaffe, 11th Viscount Taaffe - Wikipedia) said the way forwards for conservatives was to tap the unspoilt masses – unspoilt in the sense of not being ensnared by liberalism.

Session 2: Talking about democracy in specific central European contexts

Two presentations were taken at a time, followed by discussion

Thomas Simon on German contexts (esp S Germany and Austria).

He said that people called democrats were involved in constitutional struggles in both S Germany and Austria in the 1830s and 40s. He said that Germans across the Habsburg lands were also aware of and participated in broader German political discourse.

He said that 'democrat' acquired sharper definition in the Vormärz, 1830s and 40s. The term was linked to a cluster of political ideas that themselves acquired sharper definition at this time.

Politicisation was more advanced in other German states than in Austria.

He stressed that the term itself was not much used; at this period, we're talking more about currents or communities of opinion than about well-defined parties. However, parliamentarians did form groups and had some sense of group belonging.

He said that there were three basic currents: conservative (they were basically anti parliaments) and liberals and democrats (who both favoured parliaments). Both the latter currents were really currents within liberalism, whom historians have distinguished as 'moderate' and 'radical' or 'democratic'. The latter two differed in terms of how far to push the notion of the equality of citizens, though all opposed an ancien regime founded on inequality. Equality did not however imply that all people should have equal political rights. It was widely agreed that women should not have them. Moderates added that those who did not enjoy independence in making a livelihood should not. They feared the despotism of the masses, *Pöbelherrschaft*. Democrats commonly supported universal male suffrage and popular sovereignty as a principle. They thought the form of the political order should be agreed by the people via a constituent assembly. And that great effort should be directed to solving the 'social question'. The two groups had different social bases. Both were primarily bourgeois groups, though the radicals were more petty bourgeois, and esp included petty bourgeois intellectuals, such as students

When liberalism began to split, there were initially no names for the different groupings. The moderates were sometimes called constitutionals or compromisers. Names for radicals varied by region, but included the resolute, *entschiedenen*. In S Germany, where there were functioning parliaments, they formed parliamentary groups, which seated themselves in patterns echoing France 1789. The radicals sat to the left of the moderates. The same terminology and seating plans were followed in the Paulskirche. Extreme factions on the left were sometimes called democrats. In the Austrian Reichstag 1848 there was a 'democratic left' in parliament.

His thesis on the use of the term democrat was that it emerged when tensions between moderates and radicals came to the fore, in 1848. The democrats then emerged as an independent political movement, and the term began being used in self-designation. In that context, 'liberal' also took on new meaning.

Following the reactionary phase, when political parties reformed in the 1860s, no party used 'democrat' in its name, not even left liberal parties. They called themselves the Progress party (*Fortschrittspartei*) or the *Freisinnige* (freethinkers). The word democrat reappeared in party names only under Weimar, when we find the German Democratic Party.

Avoidance of the word probably reflects the sense that it had been contaminated by the events of 1848. Democrats were seen as enemies of order. Also, the emerging labour movement came to occupy the term, giving it social revolutionary connotations.

Gábor Gángó on Hungary

He would distinguish between two periods, 1770-1830 and 1830-70. In the first period there was no reform movement, and tellingly no word really corresponding to revolution; the word used meant riot (FLF asks: is forradalom a neologism – as opposed to lázadás?). People learned about democracy at school, as the name of a form of government in the ancient world.

The 1830 July revolution marked a watershed. It prompted a Hungarian challenge to central government in Vienna. At this time, participants retrospectively recognised the significance of the French revolution. 1848 marked a new beginning for constitutionality but not for democracy. Political fractures that became visible at this period had taken shape earlier, but became visible at this time because of freedom of the press.

In 1830, a new Hungarian political elite emerged. Its members occupied key positions until at least 1870. This period saw the democratisation of the public sphere and the emergence of dissidents within it, including nobles. In practice it was quite a narrow public sphere: the lower classes were not expected to participate in policy making. József Eötvös was the most prominent liberal. He wrote in 1831 about 'the democracy of my body revolting against the tyranny of reason', which conveys how democracy was understood. In his 1857 novel *The Sisters* he wrote that our democracy handles every man of higher birth as a devil, but should acknowledge that they are a higher thing: devils are after all fallen angels.

The word democracy was monopolised by its opponents. They linked liberalism to democracy, arguing that even the smallest concession to liberals would lead to democracy.

Travel literature provides interesting insights into attitudes to democracy (although the term does not appear in Bertalan Szemere's diary, and neither in József Irenyi's travelogue of Britain, Germany, and France).

In 1848 in Hungary constitutionalism was often linked with democracy. Revolutionaries used the term approvingly including of themselves, but their impact was marginal. Sandór Petőfi said, for example, in a letter to Lajos Kossuth, that democrats are the poorest people in Hungary and I am the poorest among them because I have been one of the most adamant since my first public appearance. [He was in effect boasting that he resisted corruption. Though ironically the context was that he was asking for money to join Józef Bern's army Józef Bem - Wikipedia. These are two of the only three times in which the word appears in Petófi's correspondence]

But we shouldn't exaggerate its currency. Eötvös became minister of education and was involved in a huge volume of correspondence. The word doesn't occur once within this.

Until the end of the first phase of constitutional government, other words were more common, esp constitutional.

Enthusiasm for democracy was associated esp with the further left, but Petőfi's language was by and large buried by posterity. Mihály Táncsics's *Who are the Red Republicans?* is a swashbuckling call for changing the existing order. Republicans, radicals, socialists and communists were linked by their desire for radical change. The republicans wanted elected presidents in place of kings. They were prepared to precipitate bloody revolution to achieve their goals.

The term had no place in ordinary party discourse even after 1867. Terms such as radicals, independentists and far left were preferred. It was however used in the wider public sphere, eg in the press.

So overall we can link its appearance to the democratisation of the public sphere.

Discussion

Joanna said that the idea of democrats as emerging from a split within liberalism was a familiar one. She wondered if these people set themselves in an international context: did either

moderates or radicals identify themselves partly by aligning themselves with others elsewhere, eg perhaps moderates with Guizot and the doctrinaires? **Thomas Simon** said that revolutionaries in 1848 certainly looked to France. Revolution there was associated esp with the desire for social revolution. **Joanna** wondered if Guizot's pamphlet on the horrible prevalence of democracy was translated or excerpted in the region. **Gábor Gángó** said that during the first period of the uprising, in 1848, groups distinguished themselves partly by which foreigners they looked to as models: English, Germans or French. Anglophiles valued individualism, entrepreneurship and juries. Some Germanophiles valued efficient administration; others looked more to the liberal values of Rotteck and Welcker; Gans Eduard Gans - Wikipedia developed a left-Hegelian historical perspective on the significance of the French revolution for Hungary. Francophiles admired the doctrinaires Constant and Guizot. They took from Guizot ideas about how to stop revolutions.

Cody Inglis said he had a question for **Gábor.** He wondered about the legacy of so-called Jacobin conspiracies. Some of those who took part in them survived. How did their views develop? He also wondered whether contemporaries conceptualised the abolition of serfdom in Hungary 1848 as a democratising development. **Gábor** said that if one dug into the documentation associated with the Jacobin conspiracies no doubt one would find many things that would resonate with the project. But in his view they were not important. Martinovic was a complicated figure: an imperial agent but maybe a Jacobin too. Táncsics's works were used to make liberals nervous as late as 1867. The discourse of republicanism was effectively instrumentalised by its enemies.

Thomas Simon said that in German discourse, 'democracy' came gradually to be associated with universal suffrage. He wondered whether there were some in Hungary who aimed at that? **Gábor** said that came later. He said one obstacle was a disinclination to enfranchise Jews.

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Milan Hlavačka on Bohemia

He surveyed the process of democratisation under the late Habsburg monarchy, with special reference to Bohemia. This had six elements: elections, government functions, participation in politics (included in delegated self-government), political tradition, civil freedom and gender balance.

Elections: although opportunities to achieve liberal reforms were limited before the 1860s, cultural work began from the 1840s. The liberal period saw curial elections introduced, and the property tax requirement gradually reduced. From the 1890s, the populace was represented as an interest group. The electoral system was developed to distinguish German-speaking and Czech-speaking voters. In 1907, the first elections to the Vienna Reichstag under universal suffrage were held – but the curial form shaped results. 1874 had seen the formation of the Young Czechs. They were the first to put universal suffrage on the agenda.

Government functions: after 1867, dualism prevailed as between Austria and Hungary. Powers were also divided between levels within Austria. In Bohemia, central and more local bodies did not work together well. Moreover, German and Czech bodies stopped cooperating. Local self-government came to an end in the 1930s, as a result of German political developments.

Participation: opportunities to participate were limited by age, personal integrity, tax, sex and occupation. Under the curial system, voters were divided into three classes Elections to

regional institutions and the Diet were very complicated because of this splitting up of the electorate. Elections often involved fraud.

Political tradition: the liberal tradition remained powerful for only a few decades. The state regarded the liberalisation of public of public life with great fear. The acquisition of political skills was something the state sought to supervise; and the principle was that nothing ought to jeopardize the regime.

Civil freedom: the constitution of 1867 guaranteed civil freedoms. But the perception was that the rural population had not yet reached the point of being able to enjoy such freedoms. The administrative court (*Verwaltungsgerichtshof*) established in mid 1870s marked the maturing of both citizen and state. Conflicts in society began to be resolved through jurisprudence. Fully one third of submissions to this court came from the Czech lands, many of them concerning the right to use the mother tongue. (see para 19 of the December constitution – but maybe not as I cannot find it!)

Gender balance: women gained the vote in 1920. In 1912, Božena Viková-Kunětická was elected to the Bohemian Diet – a writer known for her radical dramas. However, she wasn't permitted to take her seat.

How to evaluate the overall picture without simplification? Democracy has limitations and is potentially in conflict with civil freedoms. He thought that local self-government played a crucial role in the creation of a civil society. Also important were the tax system and the existence of a well-functioning bureaucracy – even if this was in the hands of the monarch.

The consociational theory of politics (Aaron Lijphart) says that it is vital that elites should want to preserve the political system, and that in this context they should bridge the boundaries between subcultures, facilitating the corporate mediation of interests. The Habsburg monarchy provides a good historical model in this regard. The most difficult conflict lines were between state and church, centre and periphery, and labour and capital. It was difficult to establish consensus on certain matters. Minorities tried to get their way by obstructionism. This was difficult to deal with through parliamentary procedures. It was however ultimately effectively addressed by the creation of special parliamentary committees, representing those holding opposed opinions.

Robert Luft on Moravia

He said that in 1848 radicals called themselves democrats, thereby indicating that they saw themselves as in line with the French model. In the public sphere they were also known as republicans or plebeians. But the word then disappeared from use.

He had looked at two Moravian newspapers to establish patterns of use, one German ('Tagesbote aus Mähren'), one Czech-Moravian ('Morawanské nowiny'). Both newspapers show similar statistics for the word 'democracy / democratic'.



As sent to *Tagesbote for possible publication*.

However, most of these references to democracy refer to parties and events outside Austria: in France, Italy, Germany, the US, even Russia.

In rare cases, the word can also be found in a domestic context, but then only in a negative sense. It was used to refer to a precarious section of the population – 'the democracy'. 'The dark side of our associational life' was also said to be a product of 'our democratic times'.

Distinctive in that context was the use of the term in connection with social democrats – in both German and Czech. From its foundation in 1889 until the beginning of the First World War, the Moravian section of the 'Austrian Social Democratic Labour Party' was the only party with the word 'democratic' in its name.

More common adjacent terms included constitutional, freethinking, liberal, progressive, national and volkish. The nation/nation/národ connoted a political community of equals, expressed elements of democratic ideals and referred more strongly than the other terms to a collective community..

Bohemia and Moravia were different in that Moravia was a few years behind Bohemia in terms of party formation. Whereas in Bohemia the word nation dominated party names and discourse from 1860, in Moravia the word Volk/lid appeared in party names as a modern and more recent term from 1890 onwards. Patterns in German and Czech were much the same.

The Moravian Diet was organised on corporate principles. Its political culture was quite pragmatic and middle of the road. This pragmatism was also characteristic of the long-standing extra-parliamentary Social Democratic Party, which split along ethnic lines later in Moravia than in Bohemia or Vienna.

The Moravian compromise of 1905 reorganised the electoral system and also the political structures in the diet. Each voter was assigned to a nation: their vote counted towards the election of a representative for that nationality. German and Czech parties were no longer pitted against each other in an election campaign. The separation pacified national tensions. The number of seats was increased with the effect that from 1906 a majority of deputies were Czech. Some of the German and Czech seats were allocated according to universal and equal suffrage, so that for the first time the Social Democrats came to be represented in the diet.

In the Moravian diet, the group of nobles and the group of German members, which were now both in the minority, now had a functional veto. Positions in the provincial administration were to allocated according to a proportional system. This made it possible for the Diet to function again. The democratisation of the right to vote was incomplete, however: privileges remained in favour of the nobles as large landowners, the rich urban burghers and the large farmers. The regulations were to be reviewed by the court instances of the monarchy which took place in the following years.

The Moravian Compromise was one of the few political reform attempts under the Habsburg monarch to be successfully concluded – and it was the work of parliamentarians not the government. Research has not yet provided a convincing explanation explanation as to why such a compromise proved workable here and not elsewhere in the empire, but some factors may include: that the political actors, despite their strong links to the centre of power in Vienna, conducted their negotiations autonomously, in private and in confidence, as members of parliament. Also Moravia was relatively prosperous, on the basis of textiles and engineering; provincial government was decentralised; it was a land of cities, towns and large villages – overall, relatively urbanised; despite the conservative class structure, literacy across the population and the level of education were high, and there was an active civil society and an associational life dominated by conservatives, but not by fundamentalist hardliners. In other words, a compromise at the level of elites, who were able to partially integrate the new political and social forces, was able to solve problems in the medium term.

Moravia was largely Catholic, though with some Protestants and Jews. Catholics had been associated with change: the enlightener Joseph Sonnenfels was a Moravian. From 1851, the Church organised Catholic days, on bi-national lines. In Moravia there was a strong Catholic-conservative party with a nationalist orientation, and there were many young political priests.

There had been a university in Olomouc, but that was discontinued and precarious. Its status was downgraded in 1778 to that of a three-year Lyceum, because the Emperor [Joseph II] decided to retain only the universities in Vienna, Prague, and Lvov (Lviv). In 1827 the university was reopened, but in 1851 the Faculty of Philosophy and in 1860 the remaining parts were dissolved again. After that, there were in Moravia only theological and technical colleges. Could the absence of a university have helped to create space for political compromise?

The Moravian Compromise, even if only partially implemented, contained strong democratic elements (equal suffrage, equality of languages, mandates proportional to population, protection of minorities from the majority). In addition, the negotiation of the reforms was a rare example of successful democratic practice in the Habsburg monarchy. Overall, he saw politics as driving culture, more than the reverse.

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Discussion

Joanna noted that Kurunmäki and Marjanen argued in 'Catching up through Comparison: The Making of Finland as a Political Unit, 1809–1863'. *Time & Society* 30, no. 4 (2021): 559–80. https://doi.org/10.1177/0961463X21990349 that references to politics in other countries in Finnish newspapers represented a covert form of comment on Finnish options. She wondered if that could be the case with Moravian newspapers? **Robert** said he couldn't be sure, because his search method hadn't involved looking in detail at the context of uses, but he thought probably not. Most passages in question were extremely brief. The journalists and politicians in Moravia were very sceptical about the word democracy in these times.

Milan Hlavačka said that compromise depended on willingness to compromise. Political minorities had usually an interest in obstructing. **Robert** asked if he was talking about Czechs in Bohemia. He said yes. Robert said in the Moravian case the Germans were a numerical minority but still had a majority in the provincial parliament. They gave up that position in exchange for a veto right.

Pieter Judson thought that we should be careful to represent obstructive tactics as performative displays by parliamentarians. They were not the work of language groups as such. He thought that it was also very important to look at how administration operated. In that context, he thought that the extent of local self-government in Moravia probably mattered.

Thomas Simon asked whether the Moravian Compromise was discussed in terms of enabling democracy? Or perhaps as an effort to achieve justice?

Robert (perhaps responding more to Peter) said that all these conflicts should be seen as power plays. They arose from the pursuit of advantage, and often didn't reflect underlying social conflict. All groups represented their position as disadvantageous and wanted improvements and justice for their group. Theoretical concepts such as cultural personal autonomy (as developed by the Viennese Social Democrat Otto Bauer) played a role; such discussions were absent from the negotiations for the Moravian Compromise and from the debates of the Moravian Diet.

Markus Prutsch repeated in more general terms the question of whether 'democracy' figured in these discussions. **Robert** said no.

Jernej Kosi on Carniola

Carniola - Wikipedia

He said he wasn't going to talk about discussions in the Carniolan diet – where the main concern was to position oneself in relation to the emperor – or about regional noblemen with Jacobin ideas. Instead he would focus on patterns of use in Slovenian newspapers, 1843-67.



He had also found some early mentions in the late eighteenth century.

Carniola was a predominantly peasant region at this time, with low levels of literacy. The German language dominated the public sphere. During the period, the Slovenian language began to be standardised and an ethno-linguistic Slovenian nationalism emerged, initially as an idea, then as a political movement.

In that context, one can look at the formation of political concepts in an emergent language setting.

His digital search (in which he'd been assisted by digital humanities colleagues) had only turned up 309 mentions – about one a month over a 25-year period. The word appears in different form: democracy, democratism, also ultra-democrat, monarchical democrat, constitutional democrat.

The first mention he had found was in a 1797 newspaper, where it appeared in a negative sense, in a comment about how democratic forces are set to destroy a perfectly functioning government (of the aristocratic-oligarchical city republic of San Marino!). From the beginning democracy was associated with something bad.

It gained much more importance from 1848, when the term entered the Slovenian public sphere largely through entering the Parliamentary field. Like the rest of Slovenian political discourse, it was basically translated from the German (*Volksherrschaft*, ustavno vlada, constitutional government of the people). Eeven in 1848 it begins as a scare term – and it only re-surfaces in the 1860s. And it is seen as something you can have too much of!

The meaning of the term varied by context. Those who could be classed as liberal – including lawyers, schoolteachers and officials – sometimes used it positively. Those who identified as Catholics tended to use it more negatively, to deliver warnings.

In the 1860s, it came to figure in nationalist discourse. A medieval period was evoked in which Slovenians had gathered under the linden tree and discussed political matters together, before Germans subjected them to hierarchy, feudalism etc. Later it was used in related ways by professional ethnographers.

Often it related to other countries, but in those contexts it can be interpreted as a form of indirect comment on internal affairs.

Maciej Janowski on Poland. He had been unable to attend at the last moment because of travel disruptions, but had sent some comments, which were read by Franz, as follows

1. The historian Adam Naruszewicz in the last decades of the 18th century used the term gminowładztwo ("Rule of the common people") to describe the form of government of the ancient Slavs.
2. The term was popularized in the first half of the 19th century by a classic of the Polish historiography, Joachim Lelewel (1784-1861). Whereas Naruszewicz was a supporter of a strong enlightened and reformist central (royal) power, Lelewel shared the Romantic belief in the common people and idealized the gminowładztwo.
3. "Demokracja" exists in the Polish language already in the 16th century (Andrzej Frycz Modrzewski "De republica emendanda", Latin original 1551 and the Polish translation from 1577)
4. The first dictionary of the Polish Language by Samuel Bogumił Linde, (6 vols, Warsaw 1807-1814) has both "Demokracja" and "Gminowładztwo". Both are valued neutrally/positively, so there is no trace of seeing them as "ochlocracy" or "demagoguery". "Demokracja" in Linde has related terms "Demokrata" and "Demokratka", masculine and feminine form of "one who defends democracy", but also "a common person". As an example of usage Linde gives a fragment of a late 18th century (no exact date given) poem "The virtue that makes democratic ["gminowładne"] countries strong, has vanished" – a clear reference to Montesquieus's connection between democracy and virtue.
5. The terms are not very popular in the political language before 1830, but they exist. It seems to me that the noun "gmin" (the common people) in the late 18th century had both positive and negative connotation (could mean both "the People" and "the mob") and in the first decades of the 19th century the negative connotation grew stronger. This may explain why eventually it is "democracy" not "gminowładztwo" that has won the battle in the Polish language (but demokracja is also easier phonetically and simpler to build various related terms from). The term "Ludowładztwo" [The rule of the people], by contrast, is most probably younger – only after 1830. It was popular in the late 19th and early 20th century, but never succeeded against the term "demokracja"
6. The triumph of the term "Democracy" comes after 1831 with the emigrants in Paris and their organization "Towarzystwo Demokratyczne Polskie" (Polish Democratic Society). Piotr Kuligowski is now the best living specialist on the subject.

Discussion

Joanna noted with interest in Maciej's comments on the coexistence of vernacular and Latinate forms, and the relatively late (1830s) triumph of the latter.

Jernej Kosi wasn't sure if Maciej's findings contrasted with his own – given his emphasis on the positive. He said that in Slovenian from the 1840s one could also always find positive uses, though what it was used positively about changed, from representation to more general political freedoms.

Milan Hlavačka asked whether the word was used in Slovenian before the codification of the language. **Jernej** said it was hard to answer because codification did not denote a single moment. The development of more standardised forms can be traced from the sixteenth century, eg in a liturgical or semi-official context. What was lacking before 1848 was a language in which to express abstract political concepts. When such words were first coined, newspapers used German words to explain them.

Franz commented on various points. He said that one could surely expect polyglotism among readers, facilitating the introduction of new terms. On the theme of ancient freedoms, he said that Slavs and Germans told similar stories about their loss, just identified different villains. On the phrase monarchical-democrat, he said that he had looked at Kálmán Benda's edition of the writings of the Hungarian Jacobins and found the term used positively only when in this kind of fusion, but at the same time, in Gergely Berzeviczy's (and Adam Ferguson's!) usage, as the very *bête noire* epitomised by the development of France after 1789. **Joanna** said that 'democrat' was advantaged over 'republican' in this context, by this time, in that republican connoted wanting to get rid of monarchy; in the case of democrat, that was not so clear.

Gábor Gángó regretted that in the absence of Maciej we couldn't pursue the Polish angle much further. He suggested that countries with traditions of mixed government would have found the word easier to digest. (**Joanna** agreed. She said that they had found that it was consequently more easily used in Spain and Portugal than in Italy). He said that in the Austrian part of partitioned Poland, the school system kept a variety of traditions of discourse alive.

Markus Prutsch said that in Germany even liberals might make a case for needing an emperor in the picture.

Thomas Simon wondered why Slovenian use dropped off after 1848. And to what extent was it employed in connection with projects of 'national rebirth'. **Jernej** wasn't sure about why it dropped off. In relation to national rebirth, he said that it was employed rhetorically to conjure up a vision of good old days as context of arguing for more autonomy for a Slovenian crown land under the Habsburgs.

Pieter Judson wondered why Erskine May hadn't devoted more attention to Poland. **Joanna** said perhaps because his focus was to quite a large extent on peoples who he saw as feeding into modern democratic traditions. That made the Swiss, who revised their federal constitution in arguably a more 'democratic' direction in 1874, of continuing interest. The Poles' ability to contribute to European democratisation looked much more dubious at the time he wrote. Though she said the Poles did play an important part in promoting democratic discourse in Europe 1830-48 especially. **Franz** said that Michelet acted as a publicist for the Polish cause.

Mark Philp said that one thing that had struck him during work towards the Mediterranean volume in the series was that contemporaries didn't always clearly distinguish between thinking that the constituent power should be democratic and wanting regular governmental processes to be democratic: their arguments for democracy might relate to the first and not the second. And socialist advocates of democracy weren't necessarily thinking of building it into an ongoing political system either. They might have in mind rather some kind of political form that would get

rid of social problems: it would be democratic in terms of substantive outcomes, not so much processes. He thought that it might be helpful to keep these contrasting possibilities in mind when exploring patterns of use.

DAY 2

Konrad Clewing joined the gathering.

DEMOCRATIC DISCOURSE BY TIME PERIOD

Discourses of democracy in the French revolutionary era

Joanna said that the word democracy had entered European languages from Latin in the early modern period. Across the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries it was naturalised into modern European vernaculars. It had a range of meanings, from the analytical to the utopian on the one hand, the pejorative on the other (pejorative was more common). It could refer to political institutions (not tightly defined) or to a political culture. The French Revolution could be seen as fulfilling old prejudices about democracy: people on the streets, demagogues, bloodshed, followed by the rise to power of a tyrant. But the revolution also changed the word's associations, and not just because revolutionaries used it in new ways: in truth, it seems to have been less prominent in their discourse than words and phrases such as popular sovereignty, republic, liberty and equality, though it was sometimes used to talk about social divides or popular participation, and, after Thermidor, was sometimes employed as a synonym for, rather than the name of an ancient analogue of, representative government. German 'Jacobin' exiles in Alsace nonetheless debated whether the republican regime *was* democratic; some in the sister republics, the Netherlands and Switzerland, claimed to know more about democracy than the French. But in the longer term, French institutions and practices helped to redefine expectations of modern democracy. It came to be associated not only with representative government, but also with the abolition of corporate institutions – an approach to promoting equality that arose from European, not ancient circumstances – and, again with the French model in mind, centralisation. The last was not how everyone thought about the forms modern democracy might take: the United States and many Latin American states associated it rather with federalism, devolution of power. But in central Europe some of these new associations made people argue not only that democracy was bad and dangerous for all the traditional reasons, but also that it didn't fit central European institutions and ideas.

Jonathan Kwan wondered what work had been done on the Austrian response to the French revolution. **Franz** said that there was work on the alleged 'Jacobins' (though that was rarely a term they used of themselves). He said that there was an excellent study on "Jacobins in cassocks," *Jakobíni v sutaně. Neklidní kněží, strach z revoluce a konec osvícenství na Moravě*, by Daniela Tinková. It looks at Kantian priests trained at the general seminary of Olmütz/Olomuoc by Josef Dobrovský, who had interesting discussions among themselves about the revolution, drawing different lessons from Kant's political and philosophical writings when it came to the desirability of a republic, the threshold prerequisites for its maintenance (civic virtue, public education), and the place of France in exporting its – still rickety – form of state. They were looked on as conspriators. He said that among Hungarians, Jacobin was also rarely a term of self-description. During the early nineteenth century popular mobilisation

against Napoleon, people were very cautious about the kinds of words they used. When the Viennese citizen militia wrote to governor Count Saurau to express their allegiance on 3 May 1979, they thanked God that the Revolution had triggered popular mobilisation as a good catalyst for their exuberant, gushing patriotism (that might otherwise have gotten out of hand). **Joanna** said that in the British Parliament during mobilisation against threatened French invasion circa 1800, the most common context in which the word 'democracy' appeared was in the phrase 'military democracy' – which MPs were a bit anxious about, even if it seemed that people were being mobilised in the national cause.

Joanna also noted two recent-ish books on German discourse in this era: Joachim Herrgen,. *Die Sprache der Mainzer Republik, 1792/93: historisch-semantische Untersuchungen zur politischen Kommunikation*, 2000. https://www.loc.gov/item/2020717579/ and Susanne Lachenicht, *Information und Propaganda: Die Presse deutscher Jakobiner im Elsaß (1791-1800)*. Munich 2004, reprinted 2014. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783486835281. In both cases it was striking that the authors used the word democrat and variants much more often than it appeared in any passages they quoted. Lachenicht reports an interesting discussion in the Alsatian press about whether the French revolutionary regime was a democracy.

Gábor Gángó thought it was important to consider the flow of information. In Hungary, newspapers were not allowed. People derived information from books and personal contact. There were a number of first hand accounts of the French Revolution published post 1810. The news they received about the French revolution was always accompanied by interpretation. They experienced it moreover not just as a political event, but as involving social change: the emergence of parvenus, the rise of individualism – they witnessed that if they went to Paris. It was seen as threatening to society.

Mark wondered if Marie Antoinette's Austrian background coloured Austrian perceptions. He also wondered if there were French emigres in Austria. **Franz** said there were large numbers of emigres of all political persuasions, who helped to frame the revolution in certain ways for Austrian audiences. There were French emigres in Prague who circulated caricatures of philosophes, but there were also sgraffiti showing impaled heads and portable pocket guillotines made from playing cards circulating in the city.

Franz also mentioned as an important mediating figure Friedrich Gentz, who translated Burke into German, and became Metternich's right-hand man. He developed a Kantianised reading of Burke. It's interesting to see what aspects of Burke's arguments were taken up. He wasn't sure if or when Burke was translated into Hungarian. **Cody Inglis** said there was a late nineteenth-century translation.

Joanna suggested that one thing travellers in revolutionary France often did was to go to meetings of clubs, which they had heard about and wanted to see for themselves. This gave them new ideas about the club form. **Konrad Clewing** said he didn't think that there were many travellers from Austria, but **Gábor Gángó** disagreed. He said that the *Grand Tour* continued to operate, if with modifications. There were dozens of Hungarian travellers. **Pieter Judson** thought that clubs became important at the end of the Napoleonic wars. There were many misapprehensions about them.

Responding to Mark, **Pieter** said that one shouldn't assume that the Austrian regime was very sympathetic to the French monarchical one. They saw them as having made many mistakes. Important to remember that major reforms had gone on and were going on in the Austrian

monarchy: there was more support for liberty and equality in governing circles than we might think. He mentioned Sonnenfels address as rector of the university in 1794. Sonnenfels talked about the inalienable right of a nation to make itself happy.

Milan Hlavačka said that the *Brünner Zeitung,* a private newspaper published in Moravia, was the best source on French revolutionary developments at the time. Moravian 'Jacobins' learned a good deal from it. He mentioned also Scipione Piattoli, a co-creator of the May 3 1791 Constitution in Poland, who was later arrested by the Austrian police and interned in Prague for several years. Scipione Piattoli - Wikipedia

Franz said that the kernel of the Viennese Jacobins subscribed to *Le Moniteur* together. In relation to clubs, he said that the authorities fantasised about clubs springing up in Austria. Conspiracy theories originally developed under Enlightenment auspices against the Jesuits were repurposed against masonic lodges.

Liberalism to 1848

Joanna suggested that following the rise of Napoleon, democracy ceased for a generation to be the subject of so much talk. It became rarer to advocate it, or to criticise it, because the challenge that Napoleon presented wasn't obviously best attacked as democratic. The idea of being 'liberal' took over much of the ground that democracy had previously occupied – but also distinguished itself from it by stressing its primary commitment to liberty; liberals abjured both monarchical and democratic forms of tyranny.

This is not to say that the term was never used to discuss current events in the period. It could be used relatively neutrally to outline constitutional options. We find it being used in that way in Latin American states in the era of independence, and, she thought, just a little earlier in the lands of the former Holy Roman Empire, in the context of post-Vienna constitutional discussions. Could and should monarchy be tempered by the building of some democratic principle into the constitution – that was the kind of thing contemporaries sometimes debated. Some thought that would clearly be a mistake, but not all took that view.

In some parts of Europe, talk of democracy revived as liberalism's fortunes rose. Left critics of the moderate liberalism that increasingly held sway across parts of Europe sometimes called themselves democrats – though her impression was that in Germany at least, before 1848, a more common differentiating term was 'radical'.

Markus Prutsch questioned whether terms such as monarchical principle and democratic principle were being deployed so early. He thought that it was only later that they developed into concepts. He noted that Napoleon was careful not to position himself as a republican. Constitutions were able to spread insofar as they were not seen as democratic. **Joanna** said she would send him some references.

Cody Inglis noted that Leopold had experimented with constitutions for the various crown lands. He talked of the rights of estates. But these constitutions were not implemented.

Konrad Clewing wondered about the impact of Philhellenism. He questioned whether 'democracy' really came into European languages from the Latin: wasn't it a Greek word? **Joanna** said that the immediate source of the word in European languages seemed to be Latin.

People encountered it esp in the Latin translation of Aristotle. They understood it as both a Greek and as Roman concept. The fate of the Roman republic was often ascribed to its democratic characteristics. In the eighteenth century at least people tended to know more about Rome than Greece, so it was a favourite source of examples. Interest in ancient Greece grew in the nineteenth century, partly she thought against the background of the revival of independent Greece. In Greek usage at this time, to complicate things, demokratia stood for both republic and democracy, and connoted especially the former. Once Greece became a monarchy, it was no longer in the eyes of Greeks a demokratia (though in the 1860s they revised the concept and in their new constitution claimed to be instituting a democratic monarchy – or, alternative translation, a monarchical republic).

Gábor Gángó said that the *Augsburg Allgemeine Zeitung* was a key source of liberal ideas in Habsburg lands. It was the only such paper allowed in. **Franz** noted that it carried detailed reports of debates in the French Chamber.

Franz suggested that Destutt de Tracy was important as a proponent of representative systems: of representative democracy in a post-Sieyesian sense.

Thomas Simon questioned the efficacy of press controls. He suggested that in Vienna it was possible to get hold of most German newspapers.

Markus Prutsch wanted to emphasise how closely debates in France were followed. The big question was, Could France overcome the legacy of the revolution?

He agreed that the Vienna Act's recommendation that German states establish a *Landständische Verfassung* was open to many readings. Inasmuch as it was governments that drafted constitutions, they didn't see the need to encourage any public discussion of them, though there was some.

Konrad Clewing noted that Austria didn't have one. **Joanna** added that of course Prussia didn't either – though there was talk at the top of issuing one before the murder of Kotzebue.

Pieter Judson drew attention to the importance of travelling journeymen as conduits for information. The passports they had to carry recorded where they had travelled, and we learn from these that they might cover huge distance, eg from Timisoara to Geneva. Journeymen's societies were prominent among the secret societies that Habsburg authorities worried about.

Milan Hlavačka noted that in the early 1790s Metternich was with his father in London, and went to see the British Parliament in action (he was particularly fascinated by Edmund Burke's oratory skills). He wrote in his diary that it would be the end of the Habsburg state if it had to accept this constitutional life.

Jonathan Kwan thought controls were important. He cited the case of a Protestant who came to study in Vienna, but needed to seek permission from Metternich to go on to Berlin. **Franz** noted that a Calvinist-Lutheran high school was founded in Vienna in 1821 precisely so that Protestants didn't have to go abroad to study.

Franz also said that he had recently found an interesting debate in the Lower Austrian estates about whether the estates were a representative body or could be made representative. Here Kaspar Reyberger, former ardent Kantian, abbot of Melk and head of the estates' prelatial curia locked horns with Franz von Heintl, pomologist, association founding busybody and ennobled entrepreneur, who contended that the estates could be turned into equivalents of French and

British representative institutions. Reyberger objected, which was a result of the estates' post-Revolutionary recantation of their ideas about representing the people raised in the 1790s (a slippery slope as this easily led to the corollary of numerical, arithmetic representation which would have whittled away the special standing and corporate power of the estates' noble and clerical members). He said that in the 1830s there was some discussion about giving the estates a more civic character, reflecting the increasing membership of "new money" and ennobled commoners (businessmen, promoters of science and cultural activities) in their ranks.

Thomas Simon said that by the 1840s at the latest one can find constitutionalist discourses in both the Lower Austrian and the Bohemian Diet. Many members thought that reforms were needed, including bourgeois members of the Lower Austrian Diet and in Bohemia some noblemen. **Joanna** noted that of course the diets had no timeless form; their membership had been revised before.

Konrad Clewing noted that when the Hungarians abolished the use of Latin in Diets in 1844 Croatians first argued for its retention, then for the right to use Croatian. He argued that the nation emerged early as a major point of reference.

Joanna asked about the impact of 1830 revolutions in the region.

Thomas Simon said that there was a strong reaction in South German states to the 1830 revolution in France. It prompted a new wave of constitution-making in Germany, and some intense public discourse on constitutional themes. German parliaments, where they existed, provided key sites for this discourse. It was in that context that the moderate/radical distinction emerged.

Jonathan Kwan said that Polish developments made what was happening in Galicia of special concern to the Habsburg monarchy. The Polish governor there was sympathetic to the rising in Russian Poland; he was later dismissed. Though he (JK) said Metternich didn't panic too much. He said that in Austria, the question of the succession emerged as a pressing question at this time. Ferdinand was intellectually limited. The chance to make changes was lost.

Cody Inglis mentioned the 1830 constitution in Saxony as one of the new constitutions of the era. Hungarian liberals published a copy of it in Leipzig. **Gábor** didn't think this was quite right. He thought what happened in Budapest was more important for liberals; it was the democrats who looked to Leipzig. By that point, liberals were tolerated; the position of democrats was more dicey.

Democracy and the 1848 revolutions

Mark, introducing the session, said that he wanted to put six questions.

1. When and under what circumstances did the word come into use? And when did the moderate/democratic split shape debates?
2. What did living as a democrat involve? Did it just connote being something different from a moderate – was it just a mark of allegiance? Or did it have substantive content? How were ideas about being a democrat squeezed by the emergence of socialism? Was its heyday relatively short-lived?
3. How important was freedom to ideas about democracy in Austria and Hungary in 1848?

4. There were clubs before 1848. What was the impact of 1848 upon them? Did they divide, spawning new, more polarised political identities? Or did they change in a more evolutionary way?
5. He thought that calls for democracy in conjunction with the summoning of the Frankfurt Vorparlament should perhaps be understood in terms of ideas about constituent power, and not as calls for democratic government.
6. In Germany we do find the term also applied in the private realm. Was it used of conduct in organisational settings – as when the admission of women to debating societies was seen as a democratic development? And linked with this, how do you recognise a democrat if you encounter one? What do they say, what do they do?

Thomas Simon addressed Q1, on the question of a split within liberalism. He said it developed in the context of constitutional debates from 1830: about how the constitution should develop going forwards. Progressive liberals were called by various names, often radicals, or *Entschiedene*. In the case of moderates too there was no one term. The split deepened over 10-20 years. At Frankfurt, there were different assemblies for people aligned with different groups. But still, the terminology was not fixed. It developed further during 1848. There was no club with the official name democrats, but the term was used for the radical wing of the radicals, those who liked to invoke Rousseau and the US constitution, and seventeenth-century natural lawyers like Locke. Sometimes Montesquieu. They were seen as uncompromising. The moderates were not so theoretical. They believed that the constitutional order should develop slowly, through agreement with monarchs. Democrats were sometimes close to socialists – they were at least open to the socialist movement, even if not part of it.

Gábor Gángó said he had found Mark's ideas revelatory. He agreed that being a democrat became an identity, which people tried to manifest in speech. They might adopt new modes of address, such as citoyen. Among characteristics of democrats he said that for them the nationality question was more important than it was to liberals.

Konrad Clewing wanted to offer a Croatian perspective. He thought historians should return to an old-fashioned question: who was part of the nation. In Dalmatia, the area he knew best, he thought that true democrats were very scarce, and might not dare to speak out. They tended to be Italian nationalists, supportive of a republic. They often went to support the Venetian republic. Whereas German and Austrian democrats tended to be pro German. They were more interested in Frankfurt than the Vienna Reichstag.

Franz did not agree. He thought constitutional issues were more important to people than nationality. People thought that there might be constitutional solutions to problems of nationality. So the Czechs sent three delegates from Prague to the Viennese committee of public safety (!!! "Sicherheitsausschuss"), seeking to dispel rumours of a Slavic conspiracy designed to extirpate or expel German-speaking Praguers. *Rechtsboden* (the legal fundament, soil, ground) was a common expression. Those who challenged it were called *Wühler*, rabble-rousers.

On women, he noted the emergence of the Women's Democratic Union in Vienna founded by Karoline Perin von Gradenstein in August 1848 https://www.geschichtewiki.wien.gv.at/Erster_Wiener_Demokratischer_Frauenverein The association argued that women deserved equal education and full political rights, also that they might bear arms (in fact they sent a delegation to the Reichstag that demanded a levée en masse to deflect the onslaught of Windischgrätz's army, but were ridiculed by the assembly as

“Amazones”). Leading women might shun marriage (Gradenstein’s partner, the radical journalist Alfred Julius Becher was summarily tried and executed by the victorious imperial army algonside Robert Blum, https://www.geschichtewiki.wien.gv.at/Robert-Blum-Gedenkstein).

Pieter Judson said of clubs that they were worlds with their own procedures, modelling a possible political world in the way they operated. There were almost immediately clubs with the word democrat in their name. Uprisings in Vienna produced a radical suffrage law, in which votes were not organised by curia, as they would be later. Democrats in Vienna were seen elsewhere as a problem. The clubs nonetheless had their own implicit hierarchies.

He thought that public works programmes should not be forgotten. By the standards of other parts of Europe these were quite radical. Government was moreover vested in a Committee of Public Safety. The name was a conscious choice.

The problem with focussing on national affiliation, as Konrad urged, was that that might lead one to overlook more local differences.

By the autumn of 1848 he thought that the constitution had emerged as a more important issue than German unification, which had come to look like a lost cause.

He recommended that Joanna and Mark read the works of Wolfgang Häusler [b. 1946, esp his Habilitation *Von der Massenarmut zur Arbeiterbewegung. Demokratie und soziale Frage in der Wiener Revolution von 1848*. Jugend und Volk, Wien/München 1979, ISBN 3-7141-6550-9. See also (Hrsg.) mit Ernst Violand: *Die soziale Geschichte der Revolution in Österreich 1848*. Österreichischer Bundesverlag, Wien 1984, ISBN 3-215-05479-5. (Hrsg.) mit Ernst Bruckmüller: *1848. Revolution in Österreich*. Österreichischer Bundesverlag, Wien 1999, ISBN 3-215-13631-7. *Ideen können nicht erschossen werden. Revolution und Demokratie in Österreich 1789–1848–1918*. Molden Verlag, Wien/Graz/Klagenfurt 2017, ISBN 978-3-222-15009-8.]

Konrad Clewing said that he recognised the need to modify his position. The constitution was also important. But he thinks that in newspapers nation was more often mentioned than democracy. [The project leaders think that’s entirely likely. They don’t claim democracy was the most prominent concept. They just want to understand how its uses varied over time and space].

Birgitta Bader-Zaar said it was important to distinguish different periods within the years 1848-9. The Vienna Women’s Democratic Association appeared in late August 1848, demanding emancipation for women, especially political rights. Its members showed solidarity towards workers, however, they, like the working class, were treated with condescension, at times also outright sexism. When the constitutional committee of the Kremsier parliament (*Kremsierer Reichstag*) planned to include popular sovereignty into its draft of a constitution, the Emperor reacted and imposed a new constitution on 4 March 1849 that had been drawn up by his Council of Ministers also due to other differences with the Kremsier parliament. This constitution planned a decentralized unitary state with a certain degree of federalization (separate constitutions with diets for each crownland and new statutes for Hungary). The Lower House of the Imperial parliament was to be elected. However, this constitution was abolished at the end of December 1851. She noted that in the Provisional Municipality Act of 17 March 1849 that followed the imposed constitution (the Act was finally in force from 1862) both women and minors were included if they met property and tax qualifications, however had to vote by proxy (in contrast, women’s suffrage had been dismissed by the Kremsier parliament).

Thomas Simon said that in debates both in the Paulkirche and at the Reichstag adjourned to Kremsier the national question was seen as at least as important as the constitutional question. German democrats were generally keen on German unity. When it became clear that German unity would not be achieved, then Austrian democrats started saying better to concentrate on constitutional questions at Kremsier. In that context too they preferred centralisation.

Milan Hlavačka said that the Kremsier constitution tried to solve the national question by building consensus, but this didn't work.

He thought that the identification of a 'democratic party' in the Prague revolution was a construction of Marxist historiography, classically presented in a book from 1950 on Czech radical democrats by Karel Kosík.

Robert Luft wondered if the idea of nation was compatible with a constitutional monarch, or did it require democracy. Could there be a nation of estates? By the 1890s he thought those were clearly incompatible concepts, but he was less sure about the 1840s.

The 1860s

Jonathan Kwan introduced discussion. He said that the key issue in this decade was how to reconcile monarchical power and the demands of the people. In the words of the revolutionary, turned Minister, Alexander Bach the issue was to find a path between 'the majesty of the throne' and 'the majesty of the people'. (19 July 1848)

In late 1848, a draft constitution from a constituent committee had said, in effect, that the people were sovereign. The government and the Monarch could not accept this formulation, so the decreed Stadion constitution (March 1849) placed the Monarch as ultimate authority within the state. It never became fully operational and was suspended indefinitely in 1851. During the 1850s, the government attempted to reconcile people to the crown by good rule. There were some internal governmental discussions of representative bodies, especially from Bach's office, but nothing eventuated for a decade. The government increasingly faced financial problems, exacerbated by a lost war against Piedmont-Sardinia and France. Talk of a constitution and structural reforms could calm domestic discontent and concerns in the financial markets.

When summoned, however, the expanded *Reichsrat* soon started discussing the need for wider reforms. Though their role was not to draft a constitution, there was much talk about a potential *Verfassung*. The actual documents – October Diploma (1860) and February Patent (1861) – were issued by the government and did not contain the term *'Verfassung'*. Nevertheless, the liberals co-opted the concept and called the new representative bodies and new regulations, the February Constitution. Any potential sovereignty of the people was cross-cut and divided by different regulations for the various lands and separate curia for voting. Parties gradually began to form, eg among the Czechs, which generally began with pro and opposition parties. This was a gradual, vague process that took a number of years. Jonathan has looked especially at the formation of the *Verfassungspartei*, or constitutional party; the umbrella party of the Austro-German liberals. [The Formation of the 'Constitutional Party' in Austria, 1861-1867. In Judit Pál, Vlad Popovici and Oana Sorescu-Iudean (eds.), *Elites, Groups, and Networks in East- Central and South-East Europe in the Long Nineteenth Century* (Paderborn: Brill, 2022), pp. 237-73.] Against this background, regular elections began taking place for the first time. There were also elections within the Länder, which embedded the new system alongside pre-existing institutions and

practices. Forms of negotiation between parliament and government began to develop on a formal level.

However, it proved difficult to absorb Hungary into the developing system: the memory of 1848 was still powerful and Hungarian resistance continued with a tax boycott. War with Prussia provided the background to the Dualist Settlement of 1867 (the term 'basic laws' was used, not constitution), which established separate states in Austria and Hungary. The government wanted to integrate Hungary: in finance, foreign affairs and the military. At the same time, the new system facilitated the possibility of passing contentious and necessary reforms. For example, the Austro-German liberals were prepared to pass the laws for universal male conscription, in exchange for a liberal constitution and a parliamentary government, the *Bürgerministerium* (citizen's ministry). These 'understandings' were part of bargaining in the new politics (Galician autonomy in 1868 was another example).

He finished with two case studies. The Jewish writer Heinrich Jaques [about whom Jonathan has written in Politics, Liberal Idealism and Jewish Life in Nineteenth-Century Vienna: The Formative Years of Heinrich Jaques (1831–1894)1 | The Leo Baeck Institute Year Book | Oxford Academic (oup.com)] was no democrat but addressed some aspects in his book on Tocqueville. He agreed with Tocqueville that democracy was no utopia. Jaques also wrote about emancipation of the Jews, stressing the integration of Jews into the state and the need for progressive equality before the law. He wrote many articles for newspapers and journals of the time, gaining a reputation in legal and financial matters. He stood repeatedly for election and was finally elected in 1879 for Vienna's first district. Jaques thus participated in 'democratic' practices, though he was no supporter of widespread democracy.

Ferdinand Kronawetter Ferdinand Kronawetter - Wikipedia founded the *Demokratischer Verein* in 1873, around the time of the first direct election to parliament. His democratic discourse emphasised the need to fight corruption and targeted the liberal establishment. He was an avowed democrat and oppositional figure. His associates included Karl Lueger (later Christian Social Mayor of Vienna) and Engelbert Pernerstorfer (later prominent amongst Social Democrats).

Birgitta Bader-Zaar thought some elements of this picture needed clarification. She said that official speech emphasised the right to vote as a representation of *interests*. These were represented by 3-4 curiae in the crownland diets (great landowners, chambers of commerce and industry, cities and towns, rural communities), with unequal representation. The Lower House of the *Reichsrat* was not elected by voters in the 1860s but was composed of delegates from the *Länder.* Direct elections of the Lower House were only introduced in 1873. She thought that there were no well defined parties in the early years, and they were slow to develop. She thought that the word democracy was rarely used in the 1860s. She said that there was a wonderful book by Christa Hämmerle, *Ganze Männer? Gesellschaft, Geschlecht Und Allgemeine Wehrpflicht in Österreich-Ungarn (1868–1914)*. Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag, 2022, which showed that though military service was not tied to voting rights, nonetheless it was described as embodying democratic principles. {Birgitta has since provided more detail: On p. 84 Hämmerle quotes the Polish deputy to the Imperial Council from Galicia, Florian (later Freiherr von) Ziemiałkowski to show that it is not possible to establish a general relationship between the discourse of "universal" conscription (introduced in Habsburg Austria in 1868) and political participation. This relationship was, at best, vaguely hinted at in her sources, e.g. by Ziemiałkowski, who had belonged to the Democratic Left in 1848 and said in his speech on 10 November 1868 in the Imperial Council:

"It has already been recognized by the other side that the principle of universal conscription was a democratic principle. Since the moment when the principle that all men are brothers had become an article of faith, the democratic principle has become more and more valid in all areas of social and state life. The introduction of universal conscription is, I believe, an assertion of this principle also in the area of the military constitution [*Wehrverfassung*]." [Birgitta's translation]. The original quote is in the *Stenographische Protokolle des Abgeordnetenhauses*, 144. Sitzung der 4. Sess. (10. November 1868), p. 4441.]

Pieter Judson said that he thought liberal rhetoric of the 1860s didn't leave much room for democrats, because it positioned itself as quite radical. There was no large democratic movement. In some ways the regime of the 1860s was the most radical in some time. It planned to change everything, in large part by centralising measures. There were debates about where power should lie, and about the place to be given to Hungary. He thought it was only possible to understand what was happening in Austria in this period in relation to Hungary.

Milan Hlavačka said that its not just that Austria can't be understood without Hungary – you also need an account of Morravia and Bphemia.

Robert Luft said that if you had asked Moravian people in the 1860s who the democrats were, they would have said the ones who care for the people.

Franz Fillafer thought that at this point democracy was tied to ideas of social transformation. It could not be achieved by voting alone. Attention was needed to things like the universal rights to welfare, schooling and work. These were the ideas of early social democracy – though the formation of a social democratic party took place only in the 1870s. The question was, What kind of community of equals can meaningfully be established. That question was not fully answered by the concept of nation. The linguistic rights of different peoples were generally enshrined by this point, but that didn't exhaust what was seen to need doing either.

Konrad Clewing didn't think that at the local level it was thought that the language question had been resolved. In Dalmatia, it remained a struggle to be able to use the majority language in schools, local government etc.

Joanna thought that perhaps one couldn't generalise about the importance of national questions. From her reading it seemed that they had more and less importance at different times and places, and the prominence they were given might be determined by the kinds of political alliances people sought to build. **Konrad** indicated that he did not dissent from this.

Thomas Simon said that in Austria the key word was *Nationalität.* It was that concept that brought the nation to the centre of political discourse. The nation was understood as a community of equals. The word was strongly connected with principles of legal equality. That made it attractive to democrats.

Cody Inglis noted that socialist associational life increased after 1867, with the relaxation of restrictions on association. In Hungary, the earliest such association was formed in 1868. Allied newspapers soon appeared.

Markus Prutsch said that in the constitution one finds such terms as *Volksstämme* [ethnic groups or tribes], which had as elements Nationalität and Sprachrecht [language right]. The courts recognised the rights of historic nations as collectives.

SOME THEMES

Histories.

Joanna explained that one chapter in the book, to be written by Béla Kapossy, would look at how democracy was written into history in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Sub-topics the chapter might cover (it might not be able to cover all of them) include rethinking democracy in the ancient world; stories about barbarian democratic ancestors; construction of medieval institutions as democratic; the reformation and democracy, and rethinking the 'enlightenment narrative' of historical progress to accommodate the emergence of democracy.

Pieter Judson said: Franz has written a book about this (his *Aufklärung habsburgisch: Staatsbildung, Wissenschaftskultur und Geschichtspolitik in Zentraleuropa, 1750–1850*. Göttingen: Wallstein, 2020).

Franz said that from a Hegelian perspective it was easy to see revolutions as quintessentially Catholic, emerging in polities bedevilled by unreformed and irredeemable faith. Enlightenment could be seen as springing only from Protestantism, which reveals the confessionalist underbelly of secularism (something not attainable for Catholics or Jews). In this narrative, Catholics were forced out of the enlightenment. In relation to democratic barbarian ancestors, he said there was clearly a rich interaction between accounts in different places and much cross-fertilising. He mentioned Monika Baar's book in this connection: *Historians and Nationalism: East-Central Europe in the Nineteenth Century*. Oxford Historical Monographs. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2013.

Jonathan Kwan said there was a book by Fritz Valjavec (Die Entstehung der politischen Stroemungen in Deutschland 1770-1815 (Munich, 1951)) which traced the origins of liberalism to the 1790s. This was an example of a form of retrospective construction and selection of material to show the development of liberalism and conservatism.

Pieter Judson said that there were histories of 1848 written at the time, one by a journalist, which emphasised its democratic elements – though more in the form of an account of what happened than an interpretation.

Konrad Clewing said that Anton Springer, who later became an art historian, wrote a book about the age of revolutions [*Geschichte des Revolutionszeitalters* (Prague, 1849 based on a series of lectures delivered on the spot, i.e. during the Revolution in Prague). It was also translated into Czech]. He thought that Herder exercised an important influence on conceptions of history held by both Austrian and Slav authors.

Franz wondered where Herder got his (long influential) idea of the Slavs as peaceful and democratic (communal ownership etc.). An interesting starting point might be Gelasius Dobner's edition of Václav Hájek z Libočan's *Kronika česká*!

A Göttingen historian was Heeren Arnold Hermann Ludwig Heeren - Wikipedia, who interested himself in the question of how to "preserve the nationality of oppressed peoples." His work was translated into many languages, with the Archive of Joseph von Hormayr serving as the chief conduit for that translation process (it was here that a – in all likelihood – pirated copy of the original essay by Heeren appeared), as traced in Helmut Keipert's admirable study https://rep.adw-goe.de/bitstream/handle/11858/00-001S-0000-002C-DB8A-0/9783110217636_AdW-7_Helmut%20Keipert%20%20Arnold%20Heeren%20als%20F%C3%B6rderer%20der%20sogen

annten%20%E2%80%9ENationalen%20%20Wiedergeburt%E2%80%9C%20bei%20den%20Slaven.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

Joanna said that in relation to the challenge of working out why the ancient political form democracy had reappeared in the nineteenth century, there were, very crudely, two possible approaches. One being that things had gone wrong: this was a symptom of breakdown. Another was that it was a manifestation of progress. Insofar as the people were cast as repositories of national spirit, these two accounts could to some extent be reconciled. The emergence of the untutored people on the political scene might be problematic, but in fact they represented an alternative, lost culture struggling to emerge.

Pieter Judson suggested that one version of the 'what went wrong?' story was that the state became too overbearing. The challenge was to tame the state.

Franz said that the conservative historian Alexander von Heifert Joseph Alexander von Helfert – Wikipedia only managed to get to the end of 1848 in three volumes. He said that the foiling of pan-German hopes made the whole experience hard to historicise. Liberals adopted a self-pitying tone and represented the whole thing as a failure, which was not the whole truth.

Mark said that during discussions around the Mediterranean volume in the Re-imagining Democracy series, what had emerged as a contemporary story about the shape of history was that it was progressing, but some people were getting left behind. It was common to talk about the need for regeneration (or resurgence), perhaps to be achieved in part by rallying the people. He wondered if that kind of story was also told of this region.

Jonathan Kwan said that in the 1860s, the monarchy was asked to play a regenerative role.

Franz was interested in Mark's question. He said he had been struck by the liberals tendency to say, in 1848, that they did not intend to repeat someone else's history. They insisted they were acting within local traditions. In that context it was probably no accident that the revolution broke out on the anniversary of the birthday of Joseph II. They aimed to indigenise the reform tradition, meanwhile learning from other people's mistakes. Natasha Wheatley's book (*The Life and Death of States: Central Europe and the Transformation of Modern Sovereignty*. Princeton NJ, 2023) has interesting material that shows the extent to which Habsburg jurists and administrators came to perceive their state not so much as an exception or latecomer invalidated by general theories of statehood (whose procrustean grid they sought to dismantle), but rather as a crucible of a new legal world order that posed afresh

Konrad Clewing said that Joseph II was seen in retrospect as very much an Austrian-German. **Franz** agreed. He said that one could be anti-Josephinist without being anti-reform.

Government structures and representation.

Markus Prutsch introduced discussion. He said that it was not easy to centre the term. It was used less than later, and mainly negatively, except in relation to ancient models. Democrats and radicals were fringe characters.

More significant key words were constitution and representation. Even these words had their problems. Constitution could be seen as problematic, and avoided, as the French did with their Charte. In German, Verfassung was more naturalised, though 'Constitution' during the

Napoleonic period. In Austria, the cameralist tradition supplied another term, *Staatsgrund* (political foundation).

The Vienna Final Act mandated every state in the German Cpnfederation to establish a *Landständische Verfassung*. There was no agreement as to what this term meant. Did it imply a traditional estates-based institution, or might it include modern forms of parliament? In practice, most new German constitutions were not estates-based.

Monarchical constitutionalism was a phrase that above all said something about monarchs: that they were in some sense constrained. In practice, constraints on raising funds without the support of some kind of representative body were the most important.

He had been through his documents about people involved in constitution-making. He had found democracy referred to in only five instances. The reference was usually to Montesquieu to the idea of including a democratic element.

Democracy did not strongly connote representation. In terms of institutional arrangements, it more often connoted direct democracy. The term was used retrospectively in thinking about Napoleonism. The question in that context was whether there could be a modern governmental form which linked the people directly to their leader. Among those who suggested that there was a way out of Vormärz stagnation by linking government to the people was Heinrich Heine. In his book on Shakespeare (1838) he noted: “Die beste Demokratie wird immer diejenige sein, wo ein Einziger als Inkarnation des Volkswillens an der Spitze des Staates steht, wie Gott an der Spitze der Weltregierung; unter jenem, dem inkarnierten Volkswillen, wie unter der Majestät Gottes, blüht die sicherste Menschengleichheit, die echteste Demokratie.”

After the Revolution of 1848, it was especially Napoleon III who attracted interest in both Germany and Austria. He seemed to unite monarchical and democratic elements in one person. This potentially solved a problem for France. Parliamentarism was seen as producing demagogues. By mid century there was more interest in dictatorship than in democracy.

He also contrasted Romanic and Germanic forms of democracy, which were discussed throughout the 19th century. In those discussions it was suggested that in Romanic lands, forms of democracy adopted gave rise to dictatorship. In contrast, a more reasonable Germanic form of democracy was already being practised by the German people

Discussion

Jonathan Kwan asked whether there was interest in plebiscites. Markus mentioned that initially, people talked about Napoleonism; later, Caesarism. There may have been implicit reference to plebiscites in this context, but not usually spelled out. It wasn’t very clear how to define this form of government. Germans also described Napoleon as a dictator or demagogue. They debated whether a German Napoleon was needed to help Germany emerge from conservatism and stagnation.

Franz wanted to bring in Hans Kelsen. One important institutional innovation introduced in 1848-9 was the idea of constitutional justice (and local courts of arbitration to solve conflicts over language usage etc.), implying a counter-majoritarian institution to protect the constitution.

He thought another interesting question about democracy was whether it was better served by federalism or a unitary state. The Kremsier parliament produced much interesting discussion

around these options. There was a conception of a *Reichsproblem*, that didn't hark back to the Holy Roman Empire, but was a debate specifically about the Habsburgs and the people under them.

Markus said that there was a real fear of domination by a majority.

Pieter Judson said the courts become central to the way in which people experienced government.

Franz said that Metternich said it was impossible to revive the centralism of Joseph II because that would now entail a central parliament.

Jonathan Kwan noted the complicated effects of curial voting for election outcomes. Also, that those interested in constitutions wanted to see whether a constitution could act as a way of getting rid of a government.

Liberalism, individualism, socialism and democratic discourse

Gábor Gángó said he wasn't convinced that these were representative concepts through which to understand the political culture of the time. These reflect the state of the art in Austrian historiography. He thought that for less developed parts of the Habsburg Monarchy other terms were more useful. He emphasised the need to consider supposedly modern and democratic arrangements from other perspectives.

Thus, one effect of the emergence of public opinion as a force in politics was anti-semitism.

Democracy was a term that people encountered at the time mainly in school as a form of government in the ancient world. The French and English however gave it new meanings in the course of the nineteenth century. He wanted to emphasise that when modern concepts were adopted, this was not in the context of a semantic vacuum. There were prior forms of participation which had their own vocabularies. Elections were not experienced as benign: they were associated with bribery, intimidation and violence.

Classically, the bourgeoisie have been associated with individualism. But in Habsburg lands the bourgeoisie were underdeveloped. But after 1867 there was talk of industrial and socialist democracy – and they appear in novels which give some insights into ways in which these were imagined – alongside a sense of the need to resist the bourgeois life.

He thought that liberals negatively evaluated the results of 1848 revolutions – for all that Franz said about their not being a failure. Liberals wanted the Habsburg empire to progress, but often didn't see democracy as progress.

Conflicts over the role of churches could divide liberals and democrats – effectively two camps among liberals.

He said that socialism was both a real and an imaginary challenge. People looked to the west and saw a danger that the proletariat would undermine society. Liberals saw socialism as a French political doctrine. There were theoretical responses to it.

Discussion

Pieter Judson wanted to offer a different picture of economic development in Habsburg lands. He didn't think they were very different from many other parts of Europe, eg Spain and Portugal. They weren't even that different from France. They only looked backwards in comparison to Britain. There was industrial development, but it took place in little islands of activity.

Gábor noted that guilds survived in Hungary until 1848. And in that respect were different from other parts of Europe. He also thought that socialism was experienced in part as a new anthropology – a way of treating in terms of their needs and long-standing traditions – but very similar fears were associated with socialism as with democracy.

Joanna said that she agreed with Gábor that socialism was to an important extent an imaginary bogey: a spectre haunting European imaginations. But if the fear outstripped the reality, why did it? What sustained it? What was the function or meaning of such fears? She thought that this bogey was linked with other, partly fantastical notions, such as that Britain was sinking beneath a tide of pauperism associated with its industrialising economy. Britain supplied the most vivid source for ideas about a distinctly modern social question – some elements of which, notably pauperism, were also experienced as problematic elsewhere; France supplied ideas about its possible political effects. In fact, in Britain too industrialisation was concentrated in certain districts – islands, in Pieter's phrase.

Responding to Gábor's introductory remarks, she said that the intention was not to impose retrospective concerns on the Habsburgs. On the contrary, what they were interested in in the project was discourses of the time which linked democracy with post-French-revolutionary 'individualism' – linking the political form with social fragmentation. With the rise of socialism, democracy was sometimes reimagined as a vehicle for socialist ideas: it came to be thought that individualism might need to be defenced against democracy. In fact, there was throughout a liberal/democratic answer to the charge that an emphasis on the equality of citizens threatened to dissolve all social bonds. That was association. Voluntary associations of individuals were identified as new bases for community.

Jonathan Kwan said that he hadn't noticed much anti-semitism in Habsburg lands in the 1830s and 40s. **Gábor** said that he thought it could be found across central Europe. It wasn't confined within state boundaries. **Jonathan** said that his views were no doubt shaped by his reading of mainly liberal newspapers. **Jonathan** said that his views were no doubt shaped by his reading of mainly liberal newspapers.

Aspirations for society

Joanna introduced this session with reference to peasant aspirations. A chapter of the book would look at discourses about democracy in rural society. This would look at the extent to which people talked to peasants about democracy, and they appropriated the concept. Their impression so far was that in Germany the word was not much used to or by peasants – even on the part of those urban people, reaching out to peasant communities, who might have thought of themselves as democrats. This was what Niels Grüne had found in SW Germany – an area in which one might expect to find this happening if anywhere. But something quite different apparently happened in Denmark, where by the early 1840s peasants (meaning fairly substantial farmers) were invoking democracy in their petitions and made common cause with urban democrats, using a language of democracy. After 1848 a peasant-based party came to power in Denmark, continuing to talk about democracy, and held power until the loss of

Schleswig and Holstein precipitated a conservative swing. So there were differences between experience in different places to ponder. But the chapter in the book would also be attempting to set the presence or absence of the word in the context of a more broadly conceived exploration of peasant political cultures and urban-rural political interactions.

It had been intended that Thomas Stockinger would introduce this session, but unfortunately he had Covid. His work on Lower Austrian peasants, involving a comparison between them and French peasants in the great Paris region, operated along rather different lines. (See his *Dörfer und Deputierte : Die Wahlen zu den konstituierenden Parlamenten von 1848 in Niederösterreich und im Pariser Umland (Seine-et-Oise)*. Böhlau, 2012. https://directory.doabooks.org/handle/20.500.12854/36660, and also the summary in 'Le lien parlementaire en 1848. Analyse comparée des candidatures aux élections en Seine-et-Oise et en Basse-Autriche'. *Revue d'histoire du XIXe siècle. Société d'histoire de la révolution de 1848 et des révolutions du XIXe siècle*, no. 43 (13 November 2011): 57–75. https://doi.org/10.4000/rh19.4156. He contrasted the concepts of representation implicit in the actions and words of the two regions. He argued that French peasants were more accepting of the norms of modern democratic representation, and were quite prepared to see a non-peasant sympathetic to them represent them. By contrast, he suggested, Lower Austrian peasants operated with more corporatist notions, thinking that only peasant representatives could channel the peasant voice. This represented a different approach to thinking about democracy, or interest in its own right – though not necessarily correlating with a word-based approach, in that (as it seemed to her) people with what he sees as a corporatist orientation might equally think that they wanted 'democracy', but have particular expectations of that (not totally dissimilar from those of trade unionists who thought that they could only properly be represented by other working men)..

Pieter Judson asked if the project had looked at the Swedish case. **Joanna** said yes, they had talked to some Swedish historians, especially Erik Bengtsson. He argued that Sweden was not a notably proto-democratic country during the nineteenth century. Social differences were stark and the political system tilted towards landowners and industrialists, both under the estates system (until 1866) and after. The very fact that peasants were traditionally represented in one chamber of the estates may have acted to blunt demands for political change. There didn't seem to be the same kind of history of talking about democracy in Sweden as in Denmark. [For 'the first Swedish democrat', see Carl Rudolf Löwstedt: the first Swedish democrat? | Centre for Intellectual History (ox.ac.uk). The Norwegian case was different again. There wasn't a common Scandinavian pattern].

Pieter also urged looking at Galicia. He noted that there were non-trivial numbers of peasant deputies in the Austrian Reichstag – who didn't speak German. One of the first actions of the Reichstag was to abolish the *Robot*. He thought the question of whether peasants understood 'the emancipation of serfs' as emancipation was an interesting question. There was quite a lot of peasant activism including efforts to mobilise Galician peasants.

Konrad Clewing thought that corporatism did play a role. Free peasants in Upper Austria looked to Tyrol as a model. The legacy of serfdom can be seen even today, in that villages in Austria formerly inhabited by enserfed peasants were poorer. He thought Austrian liberals were relatively well disposed to peasants, perhaps contrasting with Italians.

Franz also wanted to mention Tyrol. There were changes in peasant status there linked to reform in the forests of which the state was the main owner. He thought there was a lot of

corporate emancipation. The Tyroleans in the Reichstag provided a model for others. He mentioned a good book about the regulation of peasants.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Pieter Judson had offered to make some concluding remarks (but had expected to have a bit more time to prepare them!)

He thanked the organisers for the invitation. He said he had been impressed by the way that Joanna and Mark had laid out what was important to them. He liked the situational and contextual orientation of the project, which made it possible to attend to very different regions without trying to make them all conform to one model.

He suggested that it might be a useful thought experiment to see if one could develop a narrative about the ideas and practices of democrats in this region without reference to France and Britain. Maybe one could even push Germany to one side. Liberalism and democracy were sometimes imagined as coming from the west. But it was important to look at initiatives that began within the region, and at what might have been distinctive about them.

The Habsburg empire was sometimes seen as peculiar for being multilingual, but actually many if not all states were multilingual at this time: thus at least Italy, Spain and Portugal. If there was something distinctive about the Habsburg lands, it was perhaps rather the institutions and political ideas that developed to manage this diversity. One might ask, how did democracy and democrats relate to those institutions?

The Moravian Compromise was an interesting local initiative, from below, meant to stop democracy from emerging: to prevent the domination of the majority, or the organisation of politics around social divides.

He thought that nationalism had an implicit democratic edge to it – but of course it also excluded some, often and notably Jews.

An idea of national self-determination would emerge. But who does the determining for 'the nation'? In 1918, democracy and nationhood were conflated. That formed an important part of story of how democracy developed.

He thought more should be said about Hungary and its political traditions. Vienna was not paradigmatic. **Franz** added that it would also be good to think more about Italy – about Habsburg Italy and Italians as elements in the mix and parties to interaction.

Pieter thought that 1848 was enormously important for democrats. Why they subsequently became marginal, why that largely ceased to be an important political identity, was an interesting question.

Mark and Joanna thanked Franz for hosting the workshop and for all his organisational afforts, and everyone present for attending and making such interesting contributions.

Biographical details for participants, Vienna September 2024

(Taken from websites, with apologies for any resulting misrepresentation)

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Konrad Clewing

History Department, Leibniz Institute, Regensburg. Studied History and Economics in Munich, Vienna, and Zagreb from 1986 to 1992; completed his PhD thesis in Munich in 1997 on the impact of Habsburg statehood on Dalmatian society and on the nation-building processes triggered by that impact. From 1997-2007, he was managing editor of the Südost-Forschungen at the Südost-Institut (SOI), From 2006 - 2011, he was the vice-director of the SOI and jointly responsible for the scientific focus at the new location in Regensburg. Since 2006, he has been the editor of *Südost-Forschungen and Südosteuropäische Arbeiten* together with the director of the institute, and since 2010 he has also been co-editor of the *Handbuch zur Geschichte Südosteuropas*. At present (since 2018), he is also coordinating the contributions of the IOS to the DigiOst series. Publications include: Clewing, Konrad/Ajeti, Faruk: *Kosovo und die österreichisch-albanischen Beziehungen. Bilder einer Geschichte*. München: Akademischer Verlag München, 2018.

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Publications: *Aufklärung habsburgisch: Staatsbildung, Wissenskultur und Geschichtspolitik in Zentraleuropa, 1750–1850*, 2nd ed. Göttingen: Wallstein 2022; (ed. with J. Feichtinger, J. Surman), *The Worlds of Positivism. A Global Intellectual History, 1770–1930*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2018; and, (ed. with T. Wallnig), *Josephinism zwischen den Regimen: Eduard Winter, Fritz Valjavec und die zentraleuropäischen Historiographien des 20. Jahrhunderts*, Vienna-Cologne-Weimar: Böhlau 2016

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